PETITION TO THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE TO INVESTIGATE AND RECOMMEND A BAN TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE IMPORTS OF OIL, GAS, COAL, PETROLEUM AND HYDROCARBON PRODUCTS FROM THE KINGDOM OF SAUDI ARABIA PURSUANT TO SECTION 232 OF THE U.S. TRADE ACT

I. Executive Summary and Introduction

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia directly threatens the national security of the United States. As one of the world's primary and leading exporters of fossil fuels, Saudi Arabia has actively sought to stifle international measures toward climate change mitigation and perpetuate global reliance upon oil and gas. In doing so, Saudi Arabia continues to gravely threaten American prosperity and well-being by making vulnerable a range of ecosystems, access to resources, public health, and overall national resilience to the mounting climate crisis. Further, Saudi Arabia threatens national security through its ties to terrorist entities that have previously attacked the United States. Saudi Arabia frequently exhibits an open disregard of international norms, resulting in internal and regional oppression, violence, and instability. Saudi Arabia's often- violent suppression of religious freedoms is notable and troubling and raises additional justification to grant this petition under domestic law.[1]

The U.S. Trade Act, as amended, requires the Secretary of Commerce to "initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports" of crude and refined oil and other fossil fuels "upon application of an interested party." 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A). The Trade Act provides the legal authority for the President and Department of Commerce to initiate, and complete, all necessary administrative actions to effectuate meaningful trade restrictions on the import of oil, gas, petroleum, and hydrocarbon products from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

Oil and related fossil fuel exports represent seventy percent of Saudi Arabia's export earnings and fifty percent of the nation's gross domestic product. The United States imports a range of petroleum products from Saudi Arabia; in 2021, imports from Saudi Arabia accounted for 6% of U.S. total petroleum imports and 7% of crude oil imports.[2]

[1] *See* U.S. State Department, Office of International Religious Freedom, *Saudi Arabia (2021)*, June 22, 2022. As the end of the Executive Summary states, "Since 2004, Saudi Arabia has been designated as a "Country of Particular Concern" (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom. On November 15, the Secretary of State redesignated Saudi Arabia as a CPC and announced a waiver of the sanctions that accompany designation as required in the important national interest of the United States pursuant to section 407 of the Act."

[2] In 2022 the United States imported 8,313 thousand barrels per day of petroleum products and 6,278 thousand barrels per day of crude oil, 558 thousand barrels per day and 456 thousand barrels per day of which were from Saudi Arabia respectively. *Oil and petroleum products explained*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, EIA.GOV (last visited Jan. 31, 2023) https://www.eia.gov/energyexplained/oil-and-petroleum-products/imports-and-exports.php; *Petroleum & Other Liquids*, U.S. Energy Information Administration, EIA.GOV (last visited Mar. 3, 2023) https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_impcus_a2_nus_ep00_im0_mbblpd_a.htm.

Fossil fuel imports threaten U.S. national security by exacerbating the climate emergency. The U.S. Department of Defense, and our national security agencies and offices, have repeatedly warned of the national security threat from climate change. Fossil fuel imports directly contribute to this national security threat, which Saudi Arabia furthers due to its abundance of fossil fuels and the government's acute reliance on them for economic prosperity and regime security.

Despite recent claims about green initiatives within the country, Saudi Arabia is committed to perpetuating an oil reliant international system indefinitely. Its purported strategy to achieve neutrality centers around carbon sequestration, a false solution that fails to reduce emissions and perpetuates fossil fuel use.[3] Saudi Arabia has intentionally thwarted international initiatives to limit oil use while expanding Saudi Aramco's production capacity, a mission inherently antithetical toward alleviating the climate crisis.[4]

Further, the proceeds Saudi Arabia receives from United States' purchase of fossil fuels have funded the support of terrorist organizations including Al Qaeda by several of Saudi Arabia's government officials and continue to fund regional violence and unrest through human rights abuses in Yemen.[5] U.S. dependence on fossil fuel has led decades of administrations to overlook the major violations of internationally sanctioned conduct within Saudi Arabia, including unlawful detainment, torture and even killing of critics and oppressed groups within the county. Saudi Arabia has a documented history of pervasive oppression and infringement of the rights of religious minorities.[6]

The most recent Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report on the severity of the climate crisis compels the Biden administration to use all its powers to end fossil fuel trade with nations that cause human rights violations, global warming, and injuries to countless citizens and consumers in the United States and beyond.

Specifically, Petitioners request the following:

- That the Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, immediately initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national

[3] Charles Harvey & Kurt House, *Every Dollar Spent on this Climate Technology is a Waste*, New York Times (Apr. 16, 2022); Lyse Mauvais, *What's in the Pledge? Inside Saudi Arabia's Claims for Climate Championship at COP27*, Earth Journalism Network (Nov. 11, 2022) https://earthjournalism.net/stories/whats-in-the-pledge-inside-saudi-arabias-claims-for-climate-championship-at-cop27.

[4] Ruth Michaelson and Patrick Greenfield, *'False solutions': skepticism over Saudi carbon capture plan*, The Guardian (Nov. 19, 2022) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/19/false-solutions-scepticism-over-saudi-carbon-capture-plan.

[5] *Diplomatic efforts fail to subdue the conflict*, ACLED (last visited Feb. 19, 2023) https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/yemen/#:~:text=ACLED%20now%20estimates%20that%20more,civilians%20killed%20in%20targeted%20attacks; David Ottoway, *The King and US: U.S.- Saudi Relations in the Wake of 9/11*, Foreign Affairs 88(3), 121-131 (May 2009); *See Ashton et al v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, No. 1:17-cv-02003 (S.D.N.Y 2017.); *FBI releases declassified documents about investigating ties between Saudi government and Sept. 11 attacks*, CBS News (Nov. 4, 2021).

[6] *Assessing the Human Rights Situation in Saudi Arabia*, H.R Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 117th Cong. (May 18, 2021).

security of imports of oil, gas, coal, petroleum and hydrocarbon products from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and submit a report to the President to that effect within 270 days after the investigation is started.

- That the Secretary of Commerce find that oil, gas, coal, petroleum and hydrocarbon product imports from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia are threatening the national security of the United States, and strongly recommend a ban on such products to the President.

Petitioner Center for Biological Diversity ("Center"), which has been monitoring and studying Section 232 of the Trade Act for the last decade, files this petition on behalf of its 1.7 million members, activists, and supporters in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. The Center is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization dedicated to protecting native plants and animals and their habitats. The Center works to curb greenhouse gas and other air pollution from fossil fuels and limit the damaging effects of climate change and air pollution on endangered species, their habitats, and human health, for the benefit of all who depend on clean air, a safe climate, and healthy ecosystems. The Center has several programs working at the interface of international trade, environmental protection, biodiversity conservation, greenhouse pollution mitigation, and economic and ecological sustainability.

Petitioner Friends of the Earth ("Friends") is a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C, with an additional office in Berkeley, California. Friends is a membership-based organization with more than 6.8 million activists, including more than 244,000 members, in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. It is also a member of Friends of the Earth International, a network of grassroots groups in 74 countries worldwide. For more than fifty years, Friends has championed the causes of a clean and sustainable environment, protection of the nation's public lands and waterways, and the exposure of political malfeasance and corporate greed. Friends utilizes various means to achieve its mission, including but not limited to, public education, advocacy, legislative processes, and litigation. Friends is concerned about the adverse environmental and socio-economic impacts that climate change and fossil fuel extraction have, including harms to air quality, climate, imperiled species, the health of local communities, and precious groundwater resources. Therefore, on behalf of its members and activists, Friends of the Earth's Climate & Energy Program actively engages in advocacy to curb new oil and gas leases, transition to justly sourced renewable energy, and expose corrupt influence that industry proponents have on U.S. policies and laws governing fossil fuels.

Petitioner WildEarth Guardians ("Guardians") is a nonprofit 501(c)(3) organization headquartered in Santa Fe, New Mexico. Guardians' mission is to protect and restore wildlife, wildlands, wild rivers, and health in the American West. Guardians has over 100,000 members and supporters, and maintains offices in Santa Fe, New Mexico; Denver, Colorado; Missoula, Montana; Boise, Idaho; Tucson, Arizona; Portland, Oregon; and Seattle, Washington. Through crisis, one of the greatest existential threats to wildlife, wild places, wild rivers, and health in the United States. Under its Climate and Energy Program, Guardians works toward significant reductions in greenhouse gases and a just and equitable transition away from fossil fuel production and consumption. Much of this work is focused on ensuring that the production of

coal, oil, and gas from federally managed lands in the U.S. is consistent with the need to reduce greenhouse gases and safeguard the climate, both in the United States and abroad.

II. The U.S. Trade Act, as Amended

Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Act, as amended, states:

> Upon request of the head of any department or agency, upon application of an interested party, or upon his own motion, the Secretary of Commerce (hereafter in this section referred to as the "Secretary") shall immediately initiate an appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports of the article which is the subject of such request, application, or motion.[7]

The Center for Biological Diversity and its members and supporters are interested parties seeking an investigation to determine the effects on national security caused by the import of fossil fuels from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Specifically, petitioners seek recognition of and remedy to the double threat that Saudi Arabian fossil fuel imports into the U.S. represent: Fossil fuel imports and consumption threaten national security by exacerbating global warming, and purchasing Saudi Arabian fossil fuel products directly contributes to the violation of human rights and international legal norms, as well as global violence and terrorist sponsorship.

After initiating an investigation, the Secretary of Commerce must inform the Secretary of Defense of the investigation. The Secretary of Commerce must work with the Secretary of Defense on methodological and policy questions resulting from the investigation, seek information and advice from other agency heads and leaders, and potentially hold public hearings. Within 270 days after initiating the investigation, the Secretary of Commerce must provide a report to the President, with a determination as to whether the subject articles impinge on the national security and any recommendations as to actions necessary to protect the national security.

Congress did not define "national security" in Section 232.[8,9] "National security" includes but is absolutely not limited to national defense.[10] National defense includes both direct defense of the United States, and the United States' ability to project military power globally.[11] By the Department of Defense's own words, global warming and associated climate change are severely

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[7] 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A).

[8] Publication of a Report on the Effect of Imports of Steel on the National Security: An Investigation Conducted Under Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as Amended, 85 Fed. Reg. 40,202, 40,206–07 (July 6, 2020).

[9] According to the Department and its agencies, the two traditional ways of thinking about when imports threaten national security is to determine either (1) whether "the United States is excessively dependent on imports from unreliable or unsafe sources, and thereby is vulnerable to a supply disruption" or (2) whether imports "fundamentally threaten the viability of U.S. industries and resources needed to produce domestically goods and services necessary to ensure U.S. national security." BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF IRON ORE AND SEMI-FINISHED STEEL ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY 1, 13-20 (2001) [hereinafter 2001 Report].

[10] *See* 19 U.S.C. § 1862(d); 85 Fed. Reg. at 40,207.

[11] BUREAU OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 2001 REPORT, AT 5.

impacting the United States military's defensive abilities both within the United States and abroad.[12] In addition, the intelligence community has also written extensively on climate change and global warming as a worldwide threat.[13]

National security is also inextricably tied to economic security, and its many permutations including social displacement, disasters, strains on infrastructure, and rising health care costs. Section 232's implementing regulations recognize this.[14] The import of Saudi Arabia's fossil fuels further threatens national security through their contribution to climate change and funding of violence and oppression within and outside the country's borders as well as energy sector vulnerability.

The power of Saudi Arabia to influence the international price of fossil fuel products through its dominant role in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC+) also impacts U.S. national security by increasing the volatility of oil and gas prices within the United States. In April of 2023, OPEC+ announced its plans to voluntarily reduce output by 1.16 million barrels a day from May until the end of the year, as a "precautionary measure" to stabilize the oil market. Under the reduction plan, Saudi Arabia plans to cut output by 500,000 barrels a day.[15] In response to this announcement, the American and global oil benchmark prices rose by 7%.[16] It is estimated the price cut will raise global prices $10 per barrel.[17]

Saudi Arabia's decision to reduce its output of fossil fuels may initially appear beneficial, as less oil in the market would entail fewer emissions and ultimately minimized climate change related outcomes. However, this action is not based in any desire to reduce international fossil fuel consumption but rather is rooted in the country's own economic self-interest, as 'in recent years, Saudi Arabia, has appeared determined to lift prices to around $90 a barrel."[18] OPEC, and Saudi Arabia in particular have increasingly significant pricing power, "given its elevated market share, inelastic non-OPEC supply, and inelastic demand."[19] Saudi Arabia's continued influence

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[12] *See generally*, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SEC'Y OF DEF. FOR ACQUISITION & SUSTAINMENT, DEP'T OF DEF., REPORT ON EFFECTS OF A CHANGING CLIMATE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (2019).
[13] *See, e.g.*, DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, WORLD-WIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 21–23 (2019).

[14] *See* 15 C.F.R. § 705.4(a), (b). Among the several factors the agency must consider include the "displacement of any domestic products causing substantial unemployment, decrease in the revenues of government, loss of investment or specialized skills and productive capacity, or other serious effects; and any other relevant factors that are causing or will cause a weakening of our national economy."

[15] *Saudi Arabia will implement a voluntary cut of 500 thousand barrels from May till the end of 2023*, Saudi Arabia Ministry of Energy (Apr. 2, 2023) https://www.moenergy.gov.sa/en/MediaCenter/News/Pages/Saudi-Arabia's-voluntary-cut-of-500-thousand-bpd-May-till-the-end-of-2023.aspx.
[16] Clifford Krauss, *In Surprise, OPEC Plus Announces Cut in Oil Production*, New York Times (Apr. 2, 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/business/opec-plus-oil-production.html.
[17] *Saudi Arabia, other OPEC+ producers announce voluntary oil output cuts*, Arab News (Apr. 2, 2023) https://www.arabnews.com/node/2279976/business-economy.
[18] Clifford Krauss, *In Surprise, OPEC Plus Announces Cut in Oil Production*, New York Times (Apr. 2, 2023) https://www.nytimes.com/2023/04/02/business/opec-plus-oil-production.html.
[19] Hudson Lockett et al., *Crude prices jump after Opec+ announces oil production cut*, Financial Times (Apr. 3, 2023) https://www.ft.com/content/95cfcbb8-526d-409c-930f-4aca616ae2f5.

over global energy prices means it can, "pressure or even threaten energy importers, creating geopolitical tensions in the process." [20]

High oil prices further only encourage Saudi Arabia and other major exporting countries to continue to commit resources toward expanding their fossil fuel industries rather than transitioning to alternative sources of revenue as, "high oil prices prolong the idea…that they can survive the energy transition, rather than work on pivoting away from oil into clean energy."[21] Elevated petroleum prices are also likely to further drive inflation rates of practically all consumer products, threatening the already precarious economic security of countless Americans. [22]

Increasing the supply of available renewable energy can encourage economic resilience to fossil fuel price spikes and supply disruptions.[23] Therefore, limiting fossil fuel importation and investing in domestic renewable energy initiatives could promote U.S. economic and energy security while further reducing the country's vulnerability to the climate crisis.

The fossil fuels within the product scope of this Petition are so damaging to the environment and contribute so greatly to global warming, that they are severely undermining the national security both domestically and abroad.

III. Fossil Fuel Imports from Saudi Arabia Threaten National Security by Fueling the Climate Emergency

Fossil fuels are driving a global climate emergency that presents a "code red for humanity."[24] Thus, not only do Saudi Arabian fossil fuel imports disrupt and make unreliable our domestic energy supplies, but they also fundamentally threaten the U.S. economic system based on the threats of climate change and disappearing coasts. The extraction and burning of fossil fuels are responsible for the vast majority—86 percent—of all human-caused carbon dioxide emissions globally.[25] As UN Secretary-General António Guterres powerfully stated upon the release of the IPCC's 2022 report, "coal and other fossil fuels are choking humanity" and the report is "atlas of human suffering and a damning indictment of failed climate leadership."[26] The extreme heat waves, hurricanes and wildfires wreaking destruction across the United States, the deadly floods in Europe and Asia, record-breaking droughts across Africa and South America, and devastating fires in Australia and the Amazon rainforest over just the past two years provide unequivocal

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[20] Fabio Panetta, *Greener and cheaper: could the transition away from fossil fuels generate a divine coincidence?*, European Central Bank (Nov. 16, 2022) https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2022/html/ecb.sp221116~c1d5160785.en.html.
[21] *Id.*
[22] *Id.*
[23] *Id.*
[24] United Nations Secretary-General, *Secretary-General's statement on the IPCC Working Group 1 Report on the Physical Science Basis of the Sixth Assessment*, Aug. 9, 2021, https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/secretary-generals-statement-the-ipcc-working-group-1-report-the-physical-science-basis-of-the-sixth-assessment.
[25] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. In: Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021) at 5-19, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-i.
[26] United Nations Secretary-General, *António Guterres (UN Secretary-General) to the press conference launch of IPCC report* (February 28, 2022), https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1x/k1xcijxjhp.

proof that time has already run out. The climate emergency is here, and it is killing people, intensifying food insecurity, driving political unrest, causing ecosystem collapse, and creating escalating suffering across the nation and around the world.[27] The climate crisis also furthers glaring injustice, with Black, Latino, Indigenous, Asian American and Pacific Islanders, and other communities of color and low-wealth communities experiencing the gravest impacts.[28] The vast scientific literature documenting these findings has been set forth in a series of authoritative reports from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), U.S. Global Change Research Program, and other institutions, which make clear that fossil-fuel driven climate change is an existential "threat to human well-being and planetary health"[29] and that every increase in fossil fuel pollution pushes us further toward a dangerous and increasingly unlivable planet.[30]

Fossil fuel production, use, import and export must fall to zero as quickly as possible to avoid catastrophic damages from the climate crisis in the U.S. and around the world. An overwhelming scientific consensus makes clear that limiting global temperature rise to the Paris Agreement's 1.5°C climate limit requires governments to immediately halt approval of new fossil fuel production and infrastructure and rapidly phase out existing fossil fuel production and infrastructure in developed fields and mines.[31] The fossil fuels already in development globally contain enough carbon to exceed the 1.5°C limit, meaning that extraction in existing fields and

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[27] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/; NOAA, National Centers for Environmental Information, Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/ (reporting that in 2021 alone in the U.S. , there were 20 weather and climate disaster events with losses exceeding $1 billion each and 688 deaths).

[28] Tim Donaghy & Charlie Jiang for Greenpeace, Gulf Coast Center for Law & Policy, Red, Black & Green Movement, and Movement for Black Lives, Fossil Fuel Racism: How Phasing Out Oil, Gas, and Coal Can Protect Communities (2021), https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Fossil-Fuel-Racism.pdf; U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Climate Change and Social Vulnerability in the United States: A Focus on Six Impacts, EPA 430-R-21-003 (2021), www.epa.gov/cira/social-vulnerability-report.

[29] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (2022) at SPM-35, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/.

[30] U.S. Global Change Research Program, Climate Science Special Report: Fourth National Climate Assessment, Vol. I (2017), https://science2017.globalchange.gov/; U.S. Global Change Research Program, Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States, Fourth National Climate Assessment, Vol. II (2018), https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C, Masson-Delmotte, V. et al. (eds.) (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2021), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/sixth-assessment-report-working-group-i; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2022, Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability (2022), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/.

[31] Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policymakers. In: Global Warming of 1.5°C, Masson-Delmotte, V. et al. (eds.) (2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/sr15/; Kelly Trout, *Drilling Toward Disaster: Why U.S. Oil and Gas Expansion Is Incompatible with Climate Limits*, Oil Change International (2019), http://priceofoil.org/drilling-towards-disaster; Dan Tong et al., Committed emissions from existing energy infrastructure jeopardize 1.5°C climate target, 572 Nature 373 (2019), https://www.nature.com/articles/s41586-019-1364-3; SEI, IISD, ODI, E3G, and UNEP, The Production Gap: The discrepancy between countries' planned fossil fuel production and global production levels consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C (2020), http://productiongap.org/; Sven Teske & Sarah Niklas, Fossil Fuel Exit Strategy: An orderly wind down of coal, oil and gas to meet the Paris Agreement (June 2021), https://fossilfueltreaty.org/exit-strategy; Welsby, Dan et al., Unextractable fossil fuels in a 1.5 °C world, 597 Nature 230 (2021), https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-021-03821-8.

mines must be shut down before their reserves are fully depleted.[32] Yet, as detailed in the landmark United Nations Production Gap Reports, fossil fuel producers are planning to extract more than double the amount of oil, gas and coal by 2030 than is consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C.[33] In order to keep within the 1.5°C limit, the world's fossil fuel production must instead decrease by roughly 6% per year between 2020 and 2030.[34] The United States has a moral responsibility to lead the world in a rapid managed decline of fossil fuel production and use—including an end to fossil fuel imports and exports—based on its role as the historic, dominant driver of the climate crisis, its capacity for a just transition to clean energy, and the President's existing executive authority to accomplish this necessary fossil fuel phase-out.[35]For these reasons, UN Secretary has called for "a quantum leap in climate action," as "a survival guide for humanity," including ceasing all licensing or funding of new oil and gas- consistent with the findings of the International Energy Agency.[36] Restricting the importation of fossil fuels from Saudi Arabia would aid in the goal of stopping any expansion of existing oil and gas reserves and establishing a global phase down of existing oil and gas production compatible with 2050 global net zero target.

The climate emergency poses significant national and global security risks to the country and the planet that have long been documented. In a recent series of reports, the White House, Pentagon, and intelligence agencies have expressed deep concern that the shifts unleashed by

[32] Kelly Trout, *Drilling Toward Disaster: Why U.S. Oil and Gas Expansion Is Incompatible with Climate Limits*, Oil Change International (2019), http://priceofoil.org/drilling-towards-disaster.

[33] SEI, IISD, ODI, E3G, and UNEP, The Production Gap: The discrepancy between countries' planned fossil fuel production and global production levels consistent with limiting warming to 1.5°C or 2°C (2020), http://productiongap.org/; SEI, IISD, ODI, E3G, and UNEP, The Production Gap Report 2021 (2021), http://productiongap.org/2021report.

[34] *Id.*

[35] Center for Biological Diversity et al., Petition for a Moratorium on the Leasing of Federal Fossil Fuels on Public Lands (July 2016), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/keep_it_in_the_ground/pdfs/Petition_for_a_Moratorium_on_the_Leasing_of_Federal_Public_Land_Fossil_Fuels.pdf; Center for Biological Diversity et al., Petition to End Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing of the United States Outer Continental Shelf to Address Climate Change (March 29 2016), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/campaigns/offshore_oil_drilling/pdfs/Petition_to_End_Offshore_Leasing_Center_3-28-16.pdf; Greg Muttitt & Sivan Kartha, Equity, climate justice and fossil fuel extraction: principles for a managed phase out, 20 Climate Policy 1024 (2020), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/14693062.2020.1763900?journalCode=tcpo20; Center for Biological Diversity et al., Petition to Halt the Approval of Fossil Fuel Infrastructure Permits as Contrary to the Public Interest and For Associated Actions and Rulemaking (October 6, 2021), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate_law_institute/energy_and_global_warming/pdfs/Petition-to-Halt-Army-Corps-Re-Fossil-Fuel-Infrastructure-Permits.pdf; Center for Biological Diversity et al., Petition to Reduce the Rate of Oil and Gas Production on Public Lands and Waters to Near Zero by 2035 (January 19, 2022), https://biologicaldiversity.org/programs/public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/pdfs/Petition-to-Phase-Down-Fossil-Fuel-Production-on-Public-Lands-and-Water-19-Jan-2022.pdf; Center for Biological Diversity, The Climate President's Emergency Powers (February 2022), https://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/energy-justice/pdfs/Climate-Emergency-Powers-Report.pdf.

[36] *Synthesis Report (SYR) of the IPCC Sixth Assessment Report (AR6)*, Center for Biological Diversity (last visited Apr. 17, 2023).

climate change can reshape U.S. strategic interests and threaten its geopolitical position.[37] The Department of Defense has concluded that climate change threatens "national security and defense" because it is "reshaping the geostrategic, operational, and tactical environments for the United States and is "exacerbating existing risks and creating new security challenges for U.S. interests.[38] In a 2021 report, the White House acknowledged the intimate relationship among climate change, migration and conflict.[39] Extreme weather events have been leading to climate migration and political unrest in at-risk countries which is expected to increase.[40] The Office of the Director of National Intelligence forecasted that climate change could spawn social upheaval and threaten political stability due to global famine.[41] These reports echo longstanding concerns from the intelligence and defense communities that called for action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and in some cases have adopted renewable energy solutions.[42] The Army notes that climate change poses "an increased risk of armed conflict in places where established social orders and populations are disrupted."[43] The risk will rise even more where climate effects compound social instability, reduce access to basic necessities, undermine fragile governments and economies, damage vital infrastructure, and lower agricultural production."[44]

At the start of his presidency, President Biden issued Executive Order 14008 that stated: "[i]t is the policy of my Administration that climate considerations shall be an essential element of United States foreign policy and national security."[45] Section 103 directs "[a]gencies that engage in extensive international work [to] develop . . . strategies and implementation plans integrating climate considerations into their international work."[46] It also directs DoD, Commerce, CEQ,

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[37] *See*, U.S. Dep't of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary for Policy (Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities), *Department of Defense Climate Risk Analysis, Report Submitted to National Security Council* (2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/21/2002877353/-1/-1/0/DOD-CLIMATE-RISK-ANALYSIS-FINAL.PDF; U.S. Dep't of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, *United States Army Climate Strategy* (2022); White House, *Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration* (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf. *See also* Christopher Flavelle et al., *Climate Change Poses a Widening Threat to National Security*, N.Y. Times, updated Oct. 24, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/climate/climate-change-national-security.html; *See, e.g.*, Mark Jacobson, 100% Clean, Renewable Energy and Storage for Everything https://web.stanford.edu/group/efmh/jacobson/WWSBook/WWSBook.html (last visited March 2, 2022).

[38] U.S. Dep't of Defense, Office of the Undersecretary for Policy (Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities), *Department of Defense Climate Risk Analysis, Report Submitted to National Security Council* (2021), https://media.defense.gov/2021/Oct/21/2002877353/-1/-1/0/DOD-CLIMATE-RISK-ANALYSIS-FINAL.PDF.

[39] White House, *Report on the Impact of Climate Change on Migration* (2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Report-on-the-Impact-of-Climate-Change-on-Migration.pdf.

[40] *Id.*; Shane Harris & Michael Birnbaum, *White House, Intelligence Agencies, Pentagon Issue Reports Warning Climate Change Threatens Global Security*, Wash. Post, Oct., 21, 2021, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/intelligence-pentagon-climate-change-warnings/2021/10/21/ea3a2c84-31d3-11ec-a1e5-07223c50280a_story.html; Nat'l Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World* (2021), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/GlobalTrends_2040.pdf.

[41] *Id.*

[42] Michael T. Klare, *All Hell Breaking Loose: The Pentagon's Perspective on Climate Change* (2020).

[43] In its first climate strategy report recently released in 2022, the U.S. military set the goals of using 100% pollution-free electricity on Army installations by 2030. U.S. Dep't of the Army, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Installations, Energy and Environment, *United States Army Climate Strategy* (2022).

[44] *Id.* at 4-5.

[45] Exec. Order No. 14,008, 86 Fed. Reg. 7619.

[46] *Id.* at 7621.

EPA, the DNI, NASA, and other government agencies to make a joint risk analysis of climate change to incorporate into the United States' "modeling, simulation, war-gaming, and other analyses."[47]

Fossil fuel extraction is unreliable and unsafe for additional and related reasons. Extraction of fossil fuels, particularly in developing countries, is correlated with authoritarianism, volatile economies, a propensity for violent conflict, and social inequality in what is known as the resource curse.[48] In the private sector, fossil fuel and related companies have violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act more times than any other industry, including weapons traders.[49] According to Transparency International, the fossil fuel industry is the fourth most corrupt industry in the world.[50] Additionally, some of the largest exporters of crude oil products, like Saudi Arabia and Russia, have abysmal human rights records.[51] The effects of coercive economic practices, by these bad actors and others like them, have already been seen in the U.S. as early as the 1970's.[52] These effects are exacerbated by increased U.S. dependence on crude oil, and only further compounded by the rise of ransomware, as shown by the recent Colonial pipeline crisis.[53]

Fossil fuels are also dangerous and unsafe due to the environmental damage from massive catastrophes such as the Deepwater Horizon and Exxon Valdez oil spills, in addition to the countless "smaller" spills that occur almost every day. The Deepwater Horizon oil gusher, for example, highlighted the vast environmental cost of offshore oil drilling, exacerbated by the

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[47] *Id.*
[48] CARL OLSON & FRANK LENZMANN, THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE FOSSIL FUEL SUPPLY CHAIN, 3 MRS ENERGY & SUSTAINABILITY 10 (2016).
[49] *Id.* at 12 (citing Guy Chazan, "The Secret World of Oil," by Ken Silverstein (June 1, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/245fa82c-e0d2-11e3-875f-00144feabdc0).
[50] *Id.*
[51] *See* U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2020 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SAUDI ARABIA (March 30, 2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/saudi-arabia/ (report by the Dept. of State detailing human rights violations by Saudi Arabia in 2020, including arbitrary and politically motivated killings, disappearances, denial of fair trials, and repression of civil liberties); *see also* U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2020 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: RUSSIA (March 30, 2021), https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/russia/.
[52] Reis Thebault, *Long lines, high prices and fisticuffs: The 1970s gas shortages fueled bedlam in America*, WASHINGTON POST (May 13, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/history/2021/05/13/gas-shortages-1970s/ (outlining the 1973 gas shortage as caused by OPEC and other factors of the "resources curse").
[53] Micheal D. Shear, Nicole Perlroth, & Clifford Krauss, *Colonial Pipeline Paid Roughly $5 Million in Ransom to Hackers*, NY TIMES (June 7, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/13/us/politics/biden-colonial-pipeline-ransomware.html (outlining the crisis caused when a hacker collective held an oil pipeline hostage through the installation of ransomware into their automated delivery system, additionally noting the disastrous consequences of future attacks and that many national security experts warn the most dangerous hacker collective are operating out of Russia, one of the largest crude oil importers to the U.S.).

inability of BP to contain the spill until some three months later.[54] As climate change accelerates, effects such as increasingly severe weather events will make these spills more frequent.[55]

IV. Fossil Fuel Imports from Saudi Arabia Threaten National Security because the Proceeds are Funding Continued Use and Reliance on Fossil Fuels

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia possesses approximately 17% of the world's proven petroleum reserves.[56] Without oil revenue, the kingdom of Saudi Arabia could never maintain its status on the world stage, perpetuate its force and influence regionally, or subdue dissidents against the monarchy internally through repression and economic patronage in exchange for limited political agency and liberties.[57]

Saudi Arabia's continued expansion of its oil-reliant economy can be viewed through the actions of the national company Saudi Aramco, which owns the largest onshore field, conventional offshore field, and oil processing facility in the world, producing one of every ten barrels of oil consumed globally.[58] In 2021, the company reported $161 billion in earnings, claiming the award of, "highest-ever recorded annual profit by a publicly listed company."[59] Aramco is the second largest company in the world, currently valued at approximately $1.9 trillion and has been responsible for approximately 4.3% of global emissions since 1965.[60] Saudi Aramco operates over one hundred oil and gas fields globally and owns the second largest onshore and world's largest offshore oil field.[61] Aramco also owns the largest refinery in the U.S. in Port Arthur, Texas.[62] Rather than curb its output, Saudi Aramco aims to continue increasing its production capacity.[63] The company appears to be only looking to expand its fossil fuel extraction projects, planning to spend approximately $55 billion this year alone on capital

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[54] Charles K. Ebinger, *6 Years from the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill: What We've Learned, and What We Shouldn't Misunderstand*, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Apr. 20, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2016/04/20/6-years-from-the-bp-deepwater-horizon-oil-spill-what-weve-learned-and-what-we-shouldnt-misunderstand/

[55] Alexandra Kelley, *Massive Number of Oil Spills Reported in Wake of Hurricane Ida*, THE HILL (Sept. 7, 2021), https://thehill.com/changing-america/sustainability/environment/571058-massive-number-of-oil-spills-reported-in-wake-of.

[56] *Saudi Arabia Facts and Figures*, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC.ORG (last visited Mar. 5, 2023) https://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/169.htm.

[57] *See e.g.* Madawal Al-Rasheed, *Saudi Arabia Post 9/11: History, Religion, and Security*, Middle Eastern Studies 43(1), 153 (Jan. 2007).

[58] Saudi Arabia-Country Commercial Guide: Oil Gas & Petrochemicals, International Trade Administration, TRADE.GOV (Jul. 6, 2022) https://www.trade.gov/country-commercial-guides/saudi-arabia-oil-gas-petrochemicals.

[59] *Oil giant Saudi Aramco record historic $161 bn profit in 2022*, Aljazeera (Mar. 12, 2023) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/12/oil-giant-saudi-aramco-records-historic-161bn-profit-in-2022.

[60] Paul Wallace, *Saudi Aramco posts second-highest profits as a listed company on surging oil prices*, The Financial Post (Nov. 1, 2022) https://financialpost.com/commodities/energy/oil-gas/saudi-aramco-profit-oil; Vivienne Walt and Dhahran And Riyadh, *Inside Saudi Arabia's Plant to Go Green While Remaining the World's No. 1 Oil Exporter*, Time (Sep. 1, 2022) https://time.com/6210210/saudi-arabia-aramco-climate-oil/.

[61] *Greenwashing Files: Aramco*, Client Earth (last visited Apr. 12, 2023).

[62] Matt Egan, *Saudis take 100% control of America's largest oil refinery*, MONEY.CNN.COM (May 1, 2017) https://money.cnn.com/2017/05/01/investing/saudi-arabia-buys-largest-oil-refinery-port-arthur/index.html.

[63] Lylla Younes, *Saudi Arabia has a new green agenda. Cutting oil production isn't part of it*, Grist (Nov. 18, 2022) https://grist.org/article/saudi-arabia-new-green-agenda-cutting-oil-production-not-part-cop27/.

projects.[64] While the company claims it will cut its emissions to net zero by 2050 this agenda ignores Scope 3 emissions resulting from actual consumption of oil and gas, which encompass about 90% of the company's emissions.[65]

In its 2020 Annual Report, the company described in its 7-point business strategy that states that "Aramco intends to maintain its position as the world's largest crude oil company by production volume," and "expand gas activities," demonstrating its continued to commitment to perpetuate its status petroleum producing giant.[66] Its final point in this strategy is to, "operator sustainably by leveraging technology and innovation," however, Aramco does not disclose how much of its $27 billion capital expenditure in 2020 was dedicated to low-carbon technology and innovation.[67]

Saudi Aramco participates in the Oil and Gas Climate Initiative, as one of its claimed attempts to help mitigate the climate crisis, but it has only given $100 million in funding, which has been described as a "token" gesture. [68]

Saudi Aramco's current carbon capture project, the Hawiyah Gas Plant, captures 30 million standard cubic feet of carbon dioxide daily, is used to "enhance oil recovery," essentially to extract more oil, leading to perpetuation of extraction and emissions rather than an overall reduction. Further, this capture only accounts for about 0.03% of the company's estimated 2019 Scope 3 emissions. [69]

Saudi Arabia's government exhibits no intent to cease their production and international distribution of fossil fuels. Despite any claims regarding meeting Paris Agreement standards and reaching net zero emissions by 2060 it still carries a Climate Action Tracker Ranking of "highly insufficient," indicating a lack of effective action toward curbing the mounting climate crisis.[70] In 2021 Saudi Arabia averaged 19 metric tons per capita of carbon emissions compared to the

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[64] *Oil giant Saudi Aramco record historic $161 bn profit in 2022*, Aljazeera (Mar. 12, 2023) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/12/oil-giant-saudi-aramco-records-historic-161bn-profit-in-2022.
[65] *Greenwashing Files: Saudi Aramco*, Client Earth (last visited Mar. 29, 2023) https://www.clientearth.org/projects/the-greenwashing-files/aramco/.
[66] *Resilience and agility: Saudi Aramco Annual Report 2020*, Aramco, 48 (2020) https://www.aramco.com/-/media/publications/corporate-reports/saudi-aramco-ara-2020-english.pdf.
[67] *Id.*; *See Saudi Arabian Oil Company: Consolidated financial statements for the year ended December 31, 2020*, Aramco (2020) https://www.aramco.com/-/media/publications/corporate-reports/saudi-aramco-fy-2020-full-financials-english.pdf.
[68] *Climate Change: Managing our footprint*, Aramco (last visited Apr. 12, 2023) https://www.aramco.com/en/sustainability/climate-change/managing-our-footprint; Kathy Mulvey, *Fossil Fuel Giants Are Pumping Out Greenwashing-Their Tricks Won't Work*, Union of Concerned Scientists (Nov. 13, 2018) https://blog.ucsusa.org/kathy-mulvey/fossil-fuel-giants-are-pumping-out-greenwashing-their-tricks-wont-work/.
[69] *Greenwashing Files: Aramco*, Client Earth (last visited Apr. 12, 2023); David Fickling & Elaine He, *The Biggest Polluters Hiding in Plain Sight*, Bloomberg (Sep. 30, 2020) https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2020-opinion-climate-global-biggest-polluters-scope-3-emissions-disclosures/?sref=tghVnhKl.
[70] *Saudi Arabia*, CLIMATEACTIONTRACKER.ORG (last visited Feb. 19, 2023) https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/saudi-arabia/.

global average of 4.69 metric tons.[71] As of 2021, less than 1% of Saudi electricity is produced renewably. [72]

Even Saudi Arabia's works to reduce oil consumption domestically is motivated by the desire to increase the quantity of fossil fuels available for exportation to other countries. While aiming to produce 9.5 GW on renewable energy for domestic consumption by 2030, the country also expects to double its natural gas production.[73] In September of 2022, Saudi Arabia announced a plan to produce three wind and two solar projects in coming years to reduce its domestic dependency on fossil fuel.[74] The kingdom announced it would spend some $270 billion by 2030 on renewable energy emissions within the country.[75] However rather than reducing net emissions, such practices will only perpetuate international dependence on Saudi oil. Saudi Arabia pumps almost 11 million barrels of oil a day, 7 million of which are exported.[76] By cutting national consumption to 1 million barrels a day, the country could accrue an additional $100 million a day, allowing it to distribute excess oil on the international market.[77] The country plans to increase its production to 13 million barrels a day by 2027, the antithesis of an emissions reducing policy.[78] Energy minister Abdulaziz bin Salman announced in 2021 during the Future Investment Initiative (FII) conference that Saudi Arabia is, "determined to be the leading exporter of hydrogen," along with "green" steel, aluminum, fertilizers, and other products, while further stressing the "ongoing work to significantly increase oil and gas supplies," demonstrating the Saudi energy sector's ambitions to further expand its national distribution of oil and gas. [79]

Exemplary of Saudi Arabia's intentions to reduce internal fossil fuel consumption to increase global dependence on their exports is how the kingdom has taken advantage of the Russian invasion of Ukraine for its own economic interest. In late February of 2022, Saudi Arabia's Holding Co. invested over $600 million in Russia's major oil companies, Gazprom, Resneft, and Lukoil.[80] Additionally, as the United States and European nations have largely restricted their

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[71] *Carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel and industrial purposes in Saudi Arabia from 1970 to 2021*, STATISTA.COM (last visited Feb. 19, 2023) https://www.statista.com/statistics/486065/co2-emissions-saudi-arabia-fossil-fuel-and-industrial-purposes/; *Average per capita carbon dioxide emissions worldwide from 1960 to 2021*, STATISTA.COM (last visited Feb. 19, 2023) https://www.statista.com/statistics/268753/co2-emissions-per-capita-worldwide-since-1990/.

[72] *Saudi Arabia*, Climate Transparency (2021) https://www.climate-transparency.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/CT2021SaudiArabia.pdf.

[73] Ruth Michaelson and Patrick Greenfield, *'False solutions': skepticism over Saudi carbon capture plan*, The Guardian (Nov. 19, 2022) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/19/false-solutions-scepticism-over-saudi-carbon-capture-plan.

[74] *Id.*

[75] Irana Slav, *Saudi Arabia to Invest $270 billion in clean energy*, OILPRICE.COM (Jan. 31, 2023) https://oilprice.com/Latest-Energy-News/World-News/Saudi-Arabia-To-Invest-270-Billion-In-Clean-Energy.html.

[76] Vivienne Walt and Dhahran And Riyadh, *Inside Saudi Arabia's Plant to Go Green While Remaining the World's No. 1 Oil Exporter*, Time (Sep. 1, 2022) https://time.com/6210210/saudi-arabia-aramco-climate-oil/.

[77] *Id.*

[78] *Oil giant Saudi Aramco record historic $161 bn profit in 2022*, Aljazeera (Mar. 12, 2023) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/3/12/oil-giant-saudi-aramco-records-historic-161bn-profit-in-2022.

[79] *Saudi Arabia will invest $266 bln in clean energy: Minister*, Alarabiya News (Jan. 30, 2021) https://english.alarabiya.net/News/saudi-arabia/2023/01/30/Saudi-Arabia-will-invest-266-bln-in-clean-energy-Minister.

[80] Giorgio Cafiero, *Analysis: The Russia-Ukraine war and the view from Saudi Arabia*, Alhazeera, (Oct. 24, 2022) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/24/analysis-russia-ukraine-war-view-from-saudi-arabia.

importation of Russian oil in response to the conflict in Ukraine, Saudi Arabia has opted to purchase cheaper fossil fuels from Moscow for its powerplants to make more of its own available for international exportation at a higher value.[81] As a result of the sanctions directed at Russian fossil fuel, Saudi Arabia has additionally been able to increase its output by 20%, leading to the fastest economic growth in the country in over a decade.[82]

Further, the state's blueprint for achieving its climate goals is a sham designated to perpetuate fossil fuels. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud's Vision 2030 agenda for the nation advocates for carbon capture, utilization, and storage; "green" hydrogen production; and the planting of ten billion trees (a feat seemingly impossible in an incredibly water-scarce region) rather than reducing emissions.[83] In fact, Saudi Arabia's purported climate plan admittedly requires more fossil fuels in the near term to fund projects to sequester carbon, a technique which is ineffective, uneconomical, and difficult to scale.[84] Such a solution is no solution at all, but rather "a dangerous and delusional" plan to prolong use and dependence on fossil fuels while failing to produce material outcomes in combating the climate crisis.[85]

Beyond its own borders, Saudi Arabia's actions internationally indicate an agenda of perpetuating fossil fuel consumption. Saudi Arabia has utilized its vast financial resources domestically and abroad toward research, lobbying, and development to avoid confronting the necessity of conversion to renewable energy sources.[86] They have invested in research to keep gasoline cars competitive against electric alternatives, including mobile "carbon capture" devices. The Saudi government also provided $2.5 billion in funding to U.S. universities and spent approximately $140 million during 2016 on American lobbyists.[87] Such practices are indicative of a drive not only to influence the conversation in the United States regarding fossil fuel consumption but to shape the global academic and political narratives surrounding emissions reductions. The funds reaped by Saudi's oil driven economy thus are funneled to beget future fossil-fuel derived funds.

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[81] Clifford Krauss, *Ostracized by the West, Russia Finds a Partner in Saudi Arabia*, NY Times (Sep. 14, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/14/business/energy-environment/russia-saudi-oil-putin-mbs.html.
[82] *Saudi economy sees fasted growth in decade on higher oil output*, Aljazeera (Jun. 7, 2022) https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/6/7/saudi-economy-sees-fastest-growth-in-decade-on-higher-oil-output.
[83] Vivienne Walt and Dhahran And Riyadh, *Inside Saudi Arabia's Plant to Go Green While Remaining the World's No. 1 Oil Exporter*, Time (Sep. 1, 2022) https://time.com/6210210/saudi-arabia-aramco-climate-oil/ ; Lyse Mauvais, *What's in the Pledge? Inside Saudi Arabia's Claims for Climate Championship at COP27*, Earth Journalism Network (Nov. 11, 2022) https://earthjournalism.net/stories/whats-in-the-pledge-inside-saudi-arabias-claims-for-climate-championship-at-cop27.; *Managing our footprint: Carbon capture, utilization & storace*; Aramco (last visited Apr. 12, 2023) https://www.aramco.com/en/sustainability/climate-change/managing-our-footprint/carbon-capture-utilization-and-storage.
[84] *Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage*, Aramco (last visited Mar. 29, 2023) https://www.aramco.com/en/sustainability/climate-change/managing-our-footprint/carbon-capture-utilization-and-storage; Stanford *study casts doubt on carbon capture*, Stanford News (Oct. 25, 2019) https://news.stanford.edu/2019/10/25/study-casts-doubt-carbon-capture/; Charles Harvey & Kurt House, *Every Dollar Spent on this Climate Technology is a Waste*, New York Times (Apr. 16, 2022).
[85] Robert Kennedy, *Dangerous and delusional': Critics denounce Saudi climate plan*, Aljazeera (Oct. 2021) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/10/26/green-or-greenwashing-saudi-arabias-climate-change-pledges.
[86] Hiroko Tabuchi, *Inside the Saudi Strategy to Keep the World Hooked on Oil*, New York Times (Nov. 21, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/21/climate/saudi-arabia-aramco-oil-solar-climate.html.
[87] *Id.*

In the international arena, Saudi Arabia has for decades successfully opposed all efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption, stagnating discussions about global mitigation and encouraging discussions of carbon sequestration alternatives which lack scientific backing regarding their effectivity. During the 2022 United Nations Climate Conference (COP27), Saudi Arabia actively sought to minimize productive dialogue toward climate change mitigation; their negotiators placed extensive effort and energy into blocking dialogue surrounding the 1.5C warming limit.[88] They also sought to stifle language about phasing out, or even merely limiting, the use of fossil fuels, a behavior the nation's representatives have consistently illustrated in past international conversations about climate change. [89] According to German foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, more robust action to combat fossil fuel attributed emissions, "was stonewalled by a number of large emitters and oil producers," including Saudi representatives.[90]

While doubling down on fossil fuel expansion, Saudi Arabia and Saudi Aramco are investing heavily in greenwashing. For example, during COP27, while blocking necessary action, Saudi Arabia simultaneously held a separate meeting for the Middle East and North Africa to encourage regional ambitions toward fighting desertification, increasing renewable solar and wind energy, and promoting carbon capture and storage technology, where, predictably, discussion of necessary oil production cuts was barred.[91]

Even if unable to keep the rest of the world dependent upon oil and gas for energy, Saudi Arabia intends to perpetuate the use of fossil fuels for other purposes such as chemicals and plastics. In June 2021, Abdulaziz bin Salman reportedly stated, "we are still going to be the last man standing, and every molecule of hydrocarbon will come out."[92] The chemical and petrochemicals industries remain the Gulf's second largest manufacturing sector, producing up to $108 billion worth of products annually.[93] Saudi Arabia's chemicals maker SABIC reported its highest quarterly net income in almost a decade in August 2022, reinforcing the nation's case for converting oil to plastics and other products.[94] Currently four million barrels a day from the country are turned into plastics and fertilizer, but Saudi Arabia plans to convert over a third of its current oil output to chemical production by 2030.[95] The environmental toll of plastics

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[88] Ruth Michaelson and Patrick Greenfield, *'False solutions': skepticism over Saudi carbon capture plan*, The Guardian (Nov. 19, 2022) https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/nov/19/false-solutions-scepticism-over-saudi-carbon-capture-plan.
[89] *Id.*
[90] Ivana Kottasová, et al., "COP27 summit agrees to help climate victims. But it does nothing to stop fossil fuels, CNN (Nov. 21, 2022) https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/19/world/cop27-egypt-agreement-climate-intl/index.html.
[91] Lylla Younes, *Saudi Arabia has a new green agenda. Cutting oil production isn't part of it*, Grist (Nov. 18, 2022) https://grist.org/article/saudi-arabia-new-green-agenda-cutting-oil-production-not-part-cop27/.
[92] Javier Blas, *The Saudi Prince of Oil Prices Vows to Drill 'Every Last Molecule'*, BLOOMBERG.COM (Jun. 22, 2021) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-07-22/saudi-prince-abdulaziz-bin-salman-seeks-to-tame-oil-prices-opec-russia#xj4y7vzkg.
[93] *The voice of the chemical industry in the Arabian Gulf*, GPCA.ORG.AE (last visited Feb. 13, 2023) https://www.gpca.org.ae.
[94] Anthony Di Paola and Matthew Martin, *Aramco's Giant Chemicals Show Signs of Paying Off* BLOOMBERG.COM (Aug. 9, 2021) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-08-09/aramco-s-giant-chemicals-deal-starts-to-show-signs-of-paying-off#xj4y7vzkg.
[95] Anthony Di Paola and Verity Ratcliffe, *Saudi Arabia Sharpens Petrochemicals Focus in Energy Transition*, BLOOMBER.COM (Dec. 6, 2022) https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/saudi-arabia-sharpens-petrochemicals-focus-in-energy-transition-1.1855461.

production is devastating, and by 2030 GHG emissions alone from plastics production reach 1.34 gigatons per year.[96]

The climate crisis is the most serious threat facing the nation and the globe, and Saudi Arabia's fossil fuel economy leaves the United States vulnerable on multiple fronts. Saudi officials annually funnel billions of dollars received from fossil fuel exportation toward organizations and individuals affiliated with terrorism. Over two decades since the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States is still healing from the physical and psychological wounds of terrorism within the country and its repercussions abroad in the form of overseas wars. Survivors and families of those lost continue to pursue justice through legal action to hold Saudi leaders accountable for their direct involvement in the attacks through the channeling of funds and aid to Al Qaeda and its operatives, failing to provide critical information to the U.S. government regarding the terrorist organization and the hijackers, and pointing blame and intentionally misleading U.S. intelligence officials regarding the origin of the attacks and their involvement.[97]

Beyond feeding violent extremism through the funding of terrorist organizations, Saudi Arabia continues to bring suffering and instability to millions within the region, with global repercussions, through its extravagant purchases of military weapons and violence actions in Yemen. It is estimated that over 150,000 people have died as a direct result of the conflict, with more than 14,500 civilians killed in targeted attacks.[98] The thousands of lives lost and countless more permanently uprooted from their homes from this tragedy, would not be possible were Saudi Arabia not equipped with its vast wealth and resources. Saudi Arabia would not be equipped with its vast wealth and resources were it not for the continued purchasing of its fossil fuel products by the U.S., which is also Saudi Arabia's biggest distributor of military weapons.[99] Further, many of the Saudi-led killings of civilians through air strikes were carried out by jets developed, maintained, and sold by U.S. companies and by pilots trained by the U.S. military.[100] The exchange of weapons for oil is a toxic transaction spurring violence against innocents, furthering U.S. dependence of foreign oil, and ensuring certainty of climatic destruction on a global scale.

Saudi Arabia's government actions further exhibit a threat to international norms and human rights. Saudi Arabia is notorious for its historically repressive laws, infringement on human rights, and imprisonment, suppression, and even assassination of outspoken critics. The most

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[96] *Plastic & Climate: The Hidden Costs of a Plastic Planet*, CIEL.ORG (last visited Feb. 13, 2023) https://www.ciel.org/project-update/plastic-climate-the-hidden-costs-of-a-plastic-planet/.
[97] *See Ashton et al v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, No. 1:17-cv-02003 (S.D.N.Y 2017.); *FBI releases declassified documents about investigating ties between Saudi government and Sept. 11 attacks*, CBS News (Nov. 4, 2021).
[98] *Diplomatic efforts fail to subdue the conflict*, ACLED (last visited Feb. 19, 2023) https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/yemen/#:~:text=ACLED%20now%20estimates%20that%20more,civilians%20killed%20in%20targeted%20attacks.
[99] Bruce Riedel, *It's time to stop US arms sales to Saudi Arabia*, Brookings (Feb. 4, 2021) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2021/02/04/its-time-to-stop-us-arms-sales-to-saudi-arabia/.
[100] Edward Wong, *U.S. Fails to Assess Civilian Deaths in Yemen War, Internal Report Says*, NY Times (Jun. 15, 2022) https://www.nytimes.com/2022/06/07/us/politics/saudi-yemen-war-us-weapons.html.

recent, and horrific of these government sanctioned violations of international norms and basic humanity was the assassination of Jamal Khashoggi in Turkey, which was concluded by the UN Human Rights Council to have been coordinated by Saudi government officials and the Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salam [101]

The many human rights abuses of the Saudi government also include the displacement and murder of individuals belonging the Bedouin Huwaitat tribe. To gain the land for Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's NEOM project, the military cleared two towns and forcibly removed approximately 20,000 inhabitants without compensation. Three protesting members of the community were sentenced to death for refusing to leave their homes while others were sentenced to 50 years in prison.[102]

Despite small steps toward international norms, such as the 2017 decision to permit women in the country to drive, there continues to be in Saudi Arabia, "routine suppression of basic rights and free expression [that] has gone unaddressed. From lack of religious freedom and minority rights to the act of suppression of public debate, free speech, and a criminalization of dissent."[103] The continued discrimination against women and religious minorities illustrates the incongruities between the claims of the Crown Prince and the reality of the kingdom. The country's Shia minority population for instance, continues to face repression. An example of this can be seen in the 2017 violence within the town of Awamiya, a Shia-majority city in the kingdom's Eastern Province where residents experienced government-lead violence while resisting the demolition of their historic and culturally significant 400-year-old neighborhood.[104] The Shia population of the country's Eastern Province has long experienced oppression and violent suppression following their complaints against marginalization. Vocal supporters of protests against the regime on behalf of this repressed group, such as Sheirk Nimr Baqir al-Nimr, have been executed for their criticisms of the government.[105] Human rights watch notes that Shia Muslims in Saudi Arabia continue to face social, legal, economic, and political discrimination, and state clerics and institutions continue to incite, "hatred and discrimination against religious minorities."[106]

The United States government statutorily recognizes the threat violations of human rights anywhere place on the nation's security. The International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998 recognizes the right to religious freedom imbedded in international law and requires the

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[101] *Khashoggi killing: UN human rights expert says Saudi Arabia is responsible for "premediated execution"*, United Nation of Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner (Jun. 19, 2019) https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2019/06/khashoggi-killing-un-human-rights-expert-says-saudi-arabia-responsible.

[102] Mohammed Rasool, *Saudi Arabia Sentences 3 Men to Death for Refusing to Vacate NEOM Development*, Vice World News (Oct. 11, 2022) https://www.vice.com/en/article/5d3kkd/neom-saudi-arabia-howeitat-tribe.

[103] *Assessing the Human Rights Situation in Saudi Arabia*, H.R Subcommittee on Middle East, North Africa, and Global Counterterrorism of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives, 117th Cong. (May 18, 2021).

[104] Husain Abdulla, *Western complicity in Saudi Arabia's destruction of Awamiya*, Middle East Eye (Aug. 14, 2017) https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/western-complicity-saudi-arabias-destruction-awamiya.

[105] *Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr: Saudi Arabia executes top Shia cleric*, BBC (Jan. 2, 2016) https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35213244.

[106] *2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Saudi Arabia*, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (2021).

alignment of the country's foreign policy approach with this universal value.[107] Under IFRA, the President is required annually to review the status of religious freedom in every country, and designate countries where the government has engaged in or tolerated "particularly severe violations of religious freedom" as Countries of Particular Concern (CPC).[108] The IRFA mandates that the President take targeted responses to violations of religious freedom, such as imposing sanctions. [109] Saudi Arabia has been designated as a CPC since 2004, and in 2022 USCIRF's recommended Saudi Arabia continue to remain on the State Department's CPC list because the government engages in or tolerates, "systematic, ongoing, and egregious violations," of religious freedom.[110]

Criticism of the Saudi government continues to be suppressed through violence and intimidation. The country's Specialized Criminal Court (SCC) regularly sentences individuals to lengthy prison terms for their human rights work and "expression of dissenting views," and enforces heavy restrictions on those who are released such as travel bans or orders to close social media accounts. As of February 2023, 67 cases of people being prosecuted for exercising their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly," had been recorded by Amnesty International.[111] Beyond suppression, imprisonment, and execution, the Saudi government has also promoted or failed to protect it people from disappearances. The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances wrote that, "the unchecked and increased concentration of power with the royal authority, which has undermined judicial independence has contributed to a culture of impunity, and investigative rules and practices have fostered the occurrence of enforced disappearances."[112] While many were optimistic that the introduction of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as the new head of the kingdom would result in a more progressive regime, such depictions have largely masked the reality of continued if not exacerbated degree of repression in the country. Since Mohammed Bin Salman's rise to power, the use of the death penalty has almost doubled, with over 1,000 executions have occurred, an average of 129.5 annually, since 2015.[113]

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[107] Kristen Lavery & Elizabeth Cassidy, *International Religious Freedom Act (IFRA)*, United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (Mar. 2021) https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2021-03/2021%20Legislation%20Factsheet%20-%20IRFA.pdf.

[108] *Frank R. Wolf International Religious Freedom*, USCIRF.GOV (Dec. 16, 2016) https://www.uscirf.gov/about-uscirf/frank-r-wolf-international-religious-freedom.

[109] *Id.*, at 4.

[110] *2021 Report on International Religious Freedom: Saudi Arabia*, STATE.GOV (Jun. 2, 2022) https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-report-on-international-religious-freedom/saudi-arabia/.

[111] *Saudi Arabia: Alarming crackdown on online expression*, Amnesty International (Feb. 14, 2023) https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2023/02/saudi-arabia-alarming-crackdown-on-online-expression/.

[112] *General allegation*, The United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 121st session (May 15, 2020) https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Disappearances/Allegations/121-SaudiArabia.pdf.

[113] Martin Chulov, *Rate of executions in Saudi Arabia almost doubles under Mohammed bin Salaman*, The Guardian (Feb. 1, 2023) https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/01/executions-in-saudi-arabia-almost-double-under-mohammed-bin-salman.

V. The United States Must Ban Saudi Arabian Fossil Fuel Imports to Promote National Security in Conjunction with U.S. Climate Action

To decarbonize the U.S. economy and address the climate emergency, U.S. production, consumption, export, and import of fossil fuels must all fall to zero. Fossil fuel trade exacerbates the climate crisis further by contributing significantly to transportation-based emissions; approximately 40% of all global shipping emissions come from the interborder movement of petroleum products.[114] If fossil fuel imports are left out of the policy equation, the threat they pose to national security will grow.[115] Imports of fossil fuels must all fall to zero as soon as possible.

Table 1 shows the overall oil consumption, production, imports, exports, and net imports by year, stated in millions of barrels per day. For the first time ever, the U.S. is now an overall oil exporting country according to recent statistics from the U.S. Energy Information Agency – the country exports more oil than it imports. In addition, U.S. oil production is at all-time high levels. Because the trade in oil itself drives global warming, and because the United States must rapidly phase out its oil consumption and production, national security dictates that the U.S. drastically curtail both its imports and exports of this dangerous good under both its HTS numbers (2709 and 2710).

Table 1: Oil Flow in the United States in Millions of Barrels per Day[116]

Year	Consumption	Production	Imports	Exports	Net Imports
2016	19.687	14.625	10.055	5.261	4.795
2017	19.958	15.443	10.144	6.376	3.768
2018	20.504	17.732	9.943	7.601	2.341
2019	20.543	19.266	9.141	8.471	0.67
2020	18.12	18.4	7.857	8.508	-0.65
2021	19.78	16.65	8.47	8.63	-9.16
2022	20.28	17.45	8.42	9.33	-0.91

[114] Nishan Degnarian, *Calls for Global Shipping to Ditch Fossil Fuels and Meet Climate Goals*, Forbes (Sep. 25, 2020) https://www.forbes.com/sites/nishandegnarain/2020/09/25/loud-calls-for-global-shipping-to-ditch-fossil-fuels-and-meet-climate-goals/?sh=366595af2aaf.

[115] *See* Samantha Gross, *The United States Can Take Climate Change Seriously While Leading the World in Oil and Gas Production*, BROOKINGS (Jan. 27, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/bigideas/the-united-states-can-take-climate-change-seriously-while-leading-the-world-in-oil-and-gas-production/.

[116] *Overview of U.S. Petroleum Production, Imports, Exports, and Consumption*, Bureau of Transportation Statistics (last visited Mar. 9, 2023) https://www.bts.gov/content/overview-us-petroleum-production-imports-exports-and-consumption-million-barrels-day.

VI. Product Scope of this Petition

Petitioners herein identify all imports of oil, gas, coal, petroleum, and hydrocarbon products from Saudi Arabia as impinging upon the national security of the United States. These articles and their subparts have an immense impact on GHG emissions both directly and indirectly. We request that the Department of Commerce investigate each of the requested articles and find that presidential action is necessary.

Please see the Attachment A for Crude and Refined Oil Imports, Gas, Coal, Petroleum and Hydrocarbon Products from Saudi Arabia. This data is taken from existing U.S. federal government data compiled by the U.S. International Trade Commission (https://dataweb.usitc.gov/) and divided into tables for specific products described below.

A. HTS 2709 (crude oil products)

Petitioners identify all articles under HTS subchapter 2709.00 as within the scope of this petition. HTS subchapter 2709.00 categorizes crude oil products by density, under four subheadings: 2709.00.20; 2709.00.10.00; 2709.00.20.10; 2709.00.20.90. However, Crude oils is generally differentiated and compared by sulfur content and density. With respect to sulfur content, crude oil is either sweet, having a sulfur content of less than one percent, or sour, having a sulfur content of greater than one percent. With respect to density, crude oil can be light, medium, or heavy. Density is measured by A.P.I. gravity, the density of crude oil compared to the density of water. The greater the API gravity, the lighter the oil, and conversely, the lower the API gravity the heavier the oil. Lighter crude oils are typically more valuable. Oils with an API gravity of 22.3 to 31.1 degrees are considered medium crude oils. Oils with an API gravity of more than 31.1 degrees are considered light crude oils.

HTS 2709.00.20 applies to crude oil with an API gravity of 25 degrees or greater. This includes both light and medium crude oils.

HTS 2709.00.10.00 applies to crude oil with an API gravity under 25 degrees. This includes both medium and heavy crude oil. Heavy crude oils have a more severe environmental impact than lighter crude oils. According to the American Geoscientists Institute the lifecycle emissions of heavy crude oils range from 600 kg CO2 to nearly 750 kg CO2. Light crude oil is not far behind with lifecycle emissions of 480 kg CO2 for typical West Texas oil.[117] Additionally, heavy crude oils are more energy and water intensive to extract, and contain contaminants that must either be disposed of or removed before they are commercially usable.

HTS 2709.00.20.10 applies to condensate wholly derived from gas. Gas condensate has a variety of uses in the oil production lifecycle. It is used as a feedstock in refining, heating, and

[117] West Texas Oil is a benchmark oil produced in the United States. It is a lighter crude oil with an API gravity of 39.6 degrees, and a "sweet" oil, or an oil with low sulfur content.

plastics production, as well as a diluent to improve the flow of heavy oils which cannot flow well through pipelines due to the heavy oils' viscosity.

HTS 2709.00.20.90 is the other category for crude oils testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or more. Typically, these are synthetic crude oils. For example, two blends of synthetic crude oil, Zuata and Hamaca, originating from Venezuela were classified under HTS 2709.00.20.90 by U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Office of Trade Relations. The oil from these wells were fractioned with some of the resulting oils being used as refinery feedstock. Refinery feedstock is oils that are reused in the refining process to create higher value oils.

B. HTS 2710 (refined oil products)

The Center identifies the following articles as within the scope of this petition: all articles under 2710.12.15; 2710.19.06; 2710.19.11; 2710.19.16.00; all articles under 2710.20 except 2710.20.25.00; 2710.99.05.00; and 2710.99.10.00. These articles are various refined oils that are primarily used as fuels.

C. PETROLEUM GAS AND HYDROCARBON PRODUCTS UNDER HTS 2711, AND PETCOKE[118] UNDER HTS 2713

See the Attachment A for more information on U.S. imports of coal, gas, petroleum, and hydrocarbon products from Saudi Arabia.

VII. Relief Requested

President Biden and his Commerce Department possess the authority to stop the import of dangerous and deadly petroleum products under Section 232 of the U.S. Trade Act. Now is the time to use and implement this authority to protect the national security of the country and advance the President's climate goals. As it specifically relates to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, this petition asks for an agency recommendation of a complete ban of imports of all Saudi Arabian oil, gas, coal, petroleum and hydrocarbon products into the United States under HTS Numbers 2709, 2710, 2711, and 2713. See Attachment B to this Petition for a description of the relevant subheadings under these HTS Numbers.

Section 232 allows the President "to adjust the imports of the article and its derivatives," if Commerce decides that presidential action is required.[119] The previous President exercised his authority under Section 232 by imposing tariffs.[120] However, tariffs are only one type of action that a President might take. For national security reasons, an import ban by the U.S. is necessary and justified regarding the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's export of fossil fuels to the United States.

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[118] *Petroleum & Other Liquids*, U.S. Energy Information Administration (last visited Mar. 9, 2023). https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/PET_MOVE_IMPCUS_A1_NRS_EPPCM_IM0_MBBL_M.htm

[119] 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(a)(ii).

[120] *See* Adjusting Imports of Aluminum into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 20677 (May 7, 2018) (imposing tariffs on aluminum imports into the United States); Adjusting Imports of Steel into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 45025 (Sept. 4, 2018) (imposing tariffs on steel imports into the United States).

Doing so would also signal to the rest of the world the commitments of the United States to combatting terror, civilian killings in war, oppression and violence toward women and minority groups, suppression of the press, and fossil fuel dependence.

Petitioners note that the President also possesses powers under the National Emergencies Act[121] and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act[122] to effectuate a ban on Saudi Arabian oil and fossil fuel products, though these powers are different and not a substitute for compliance with Section 232.

VIII. Conclusion

For all the reasons so stated, we hereby petition the U.S. Department of Commerce to initiate an investigation on the impact of fossil fuel imports from the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia upon U.S. national security. Within 270 days after initiating this investigation, the Secretary of Commerce must provide a report to the President, with a determination as to whether the subject articles impinge on the national security and any recommendations as to actions necessary to protect U.S. national security. Fossil fuels from Saudi Arabia are significantly contributing to the calamity of climate change, and severely threatening the national security of the United States. Time of is of the essence and we urge you to act promptly.

Respectfully submitted,

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Dated: June 14, 2023

[121] 50 U.S.C. Section 1621.
[122] 50 U.S.C. Sections 1701 *et seq.*

ATTACHMENT A: United States Imports of Saudi Arabian Fossil Fuels, organized by year and harmonized tariff schedule number.

All data from https://dataweb.usitc.gov/

HTS 2709.00.10 Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I.

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2709.00.10 (Barrels)	
1989	100,848,461
1990	60,157,575
1991	27,341,506
1992	19,927,041
1993	8,972,356
1994	0
1995	50,448,953
1996	35,129,012
1997	100,776,798
1998	25,030,378
1999	7,942,178
2000	0
2001	91,667
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	94,181,185

2009	98,473,886
2010	86,029,005
2011	127,846,142
2012	73,659,426
2013	165,355,967
2014	235,704,105
2015	24,712,326
2016	25,270,081
2017	6,590,894
2018	31,717,207
2019	59,689,535
2020	2,955,058
2021	25,069,742
2022	438,625,020
Total	1,958,267,476

HTS 2709.00.20 Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or more

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2709.00.20 (Barrels)	
1989	6,291,445,752
1990	8,856,008,264
1991	10,129,222,714
1992	9,396,202,471
1993	6,949,817,073
1994	6,932,115,418
1995	6,892,475,934
1996	6,455,570,805
1997	4,704,255,082

1998	3,155,074,365
1999	3,548,763,877
2000	6,370,070,029
2001	4,804,646,260
2002	4,741,805,336
2003	7,377,819,698
2004	9,152,758,637
2005	11,611,716,566
2006	13,795,679,929
2007	15,153,244,917
2008	25,342,340,151
2009	9,131,424,550
2010	10,854,214,144
2011	13,962,682,338
2012	21,526,186,683
2013	16,256,632,146
2014	15,868,659,020
2015	7,714,738,006
2016	4,921,515,792
2017	7,001,812,850
2018	10,176,575,459
2019	7,496,395,937
2020	4,360,393,798
2021	7,269,527,005
2022	13,026,841,253
Total	321,228,632,259

HTS- 2710.00.05 Distillate and residual fuel oils (including blends) derived from bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I.

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.05 (Barrels)	
1989	194,251,337
1990	421,888,577
1991	333,403,131
1992	413,678,633
1993	358,832,306
1994	233,793,915
1995	243,012,776
1996	854,358,721
1997	808,987,979
1998	586,271,367
1999	566,936,303
2000	1,292,754,095
2001	1,316,766,655
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0

2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	7,624,935,795

HTS 2710.00.10 Distillate and residual fuel oils (including blends) derived from bituminous minerals, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or more

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.10 (Barrels)	
1989	49,128,175
1990	31,545,795
1991	2,283,022
1992	0
1993	29,123
1994	866,969
1995	17,975,308
1996	102,673,020
1997	303,341,346
1998	502,723,207
1999	679,259,351
2000	1,103,162,107
2001	1,063,562,848
2002	0

2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	3,856,550,271

HTS 2710.00.15 Motor fuel, from petro oils and bitumin. minrls, o/than crude, or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petro. oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.15 (Barrels)	
1989	276,880,304
1990	427,008,765
1991	314,748,287

1992	250,379,274
1993	123,798,103
1994	70,203,192
1995	72,658,746
1996	171,695,860
1997	224,421,734
1998	83,337,134
1999	139,438,701
2000	139,492,913
2001	72,289,877
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0

2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	2,366,352,890

HTS 2710.00.18 Motor fuel blending stock, from petro oils and bitumin. minrls, o/than crude, or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petro. Oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.18 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	5,247,972
1992	0
1993	0
1994	11,606,112
1995	177,486
1996	0
1997	5,932,467
1998	0
1999	2,613,597
2000	1,196,976
2001	56,427,535
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0

2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	83,202,145

HTS 2710.00.20 Kerosene (ex. motor fuel or mtr fuel blend. stock), fr. petro oils and bitumin. minrls, o/than crude, or preps. 70%+ by wt. fr. petro. Oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.20 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	7,130,060
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	34,701,808
1995	1,737,006
1996	940,470
1997	2,416,436

1998	1,245,878
1999	15,181,038
2000	21,013,988
2001	57,945,855
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	142,312,539

HTS 2710.00.25 Naphthas (ex. motor fuel or mtr fuel blend. stock), fr. petro oils and bitumin. minrls, o/than crude, or preps. 70%+ by wt. fr. petro. oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.25 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	5,662,012
1991	0
1992	0
1993	10,777,306
1994	33,045,030
1995	18,259,365
1996	37,065,828
1997	0
1998	43,408,863
1999	484,020
2000	22,032,146
2001	16,161,770
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0

2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	186,896,340

HTS 2710.00.30 Lubricating oils, w/or w/o additives, fr. petro oils and bitumin. minrls, o/than crude, or preps. 70%+ by wt. fr. petro. oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.30 (Barrels)	
1989	1,300
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	18,065
1995	0
1996	0
1997	25,490
1998	4,974
1999	29,808
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0

2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	79,637

HTS 2710.00.40 Lubricating greases, 70% or more by wt. fr. petro. oils and o/10% by wt. of salts of fatty acids of animal or vegetable origin

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.40 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0

1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	3,712
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0

2022	0
Total	3,712

HTS 2710.00.45 Mixt.of hydrocarbons(fr.petro oils & bitum. min., o/than crude, or preps.70%+ by wt. fr. petro. oils), nesoi, n/o 50% single hydrocarbon

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.00.45 (Barrels)	
1989	5,189,545
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	10,520,504
1995	224,638
1996	20,649,462
1997	67,392
1998	0
1999	878,195
2000	1,130,907
2001	19,814,027
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0

2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	58,474,670

HTS 2710.11.15 Light oil motor fuel from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.11.15 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0

2001	0
2002	104,851,555
2003	202,000,884
2004	167,516,758
2005	266,972,502
2006	95,942,527
2007	364,075,329
2008	432,334,771
2009	164,118,111
2010	128,898,181
2011	62,527,109
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	1,989,237,727

HTS 2710.11.18 Light oil motor fuel blending stock from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals (o/than crude) or prep 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.11.18 (Barrels)	
1989	0

1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	22,237,421
2004	26,250,614
2005	94,816,560
2006	66,144,887
2007	64,271,033
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0

2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	273,720,515

HTS 2710.11.25 Naphthas (exc. motor fuel/mtr fuel blend. stock) fr petroleum oils & bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps 70%+ by wt. fr petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.11.25 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	5,819,461
2003	11,556,693
2004	60,511,369
2005	151,281,997
2006	52,735,377
2007	52,201,002

2008	71,064,356
2009	14,683,856
2010	56,442,352
2011	166,299,660
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	642,596,123

HTS 2710.11.45 Light oil mixt. of hydrocarbons fr petro oils & bitum min(o/than crude) or prep 70%+ wt. fr petro oils, nesoi,n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.11.45 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0

1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	1,145,040
2003	13,304,087
2004	527,383
2005	1,434,588
2006	11,454,359
2007	41,798,454
2008	90,790,687
2009	22,370,583
2010	22,256,901
2011	50,188,608
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	255,270,690

HTS 2710.11.90 Light oils and preparations from petroleum oils & oils from bituminous min. or preps 70%+ by wt. from petro. oils or bitum. min., nesoi

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.11.90 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	195,880
2003	0
2004	220,126
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	403,289
2009	152,664
2010	729,324
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0

2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	1,701,283

HTS 2710.12.15 Light oil motor fuel from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.12.15 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0

2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	6,900,642
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	238,727,541
2019	111,512,615
2020	129,633,862
2021	712,671,269
2022	1,005,829,186
Total	2,205,275,115

HTS 2710.12.18 Light oil motor fuel blending stock from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals (o/than crude) or prep 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.12.18 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0

1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	6,871,870

2020	0
2021	29,869,605
2022	130,979,127
Total	167,720,602

HTS 2710.12.25 Naphthas (exc. motor fuel/mtr fuel blend. stock) fr petroleum oils & bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps 70%+ by wt. fr petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.12.25 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0

2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	84,479,102
2013	5,803,433
2014	1,092,878
2015	10,811,833
2016	6,502,504
2017	485,666
2018	4,101,076
2019	11,639,030
2020	657,060
2021	0
2022	26,330,623
Total	151,903,205

HTS 2710.12.45 Light oil mixt. of hydrocarbons fr petro oils & bitum min(o/than crude) or prep 70%+ wt. fr petro oils, nesoi,n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.12.45 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0

1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	17,077,133
2014	12,356,812
2015	2,834,535
2016	2,251,771
2017	18,197,366
2018	26,473,624
2019	55,099,144
2020	237,596
2021	5,548
2022	227,587,357
Total	362,120,886

HTS 2710.19.05 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I.

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.05	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	1,159,463,241
2003	1,238,650,662
2004	1,579,956,744
2005	2,567,205,061
2006	3,260,195,180
2007	3,392,212,017
2008	4,446,596,733
2009	2,010,824,660
2010	2,896,452,428
2011	5,802,724,427
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0

2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	28,354,281,153

HTS 2710.19.06 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from bituminous minerals, testing < 25 degrees A.P.I.

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0

2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	4,949,115,720
2013	4,863,556,397
2014	4,151,189,266
2015	1,803,211,694
2016	1,696,905,613
2017	1,891,509,269
2018	1,613,564,012
2019	1,349,807,244
2020	427,614,954
2021	1,338,514,874
2022	3,123,171,926
Total	27,208,160,969

HTS 2710.19.10 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum oils or oil of bituminous minerals, testing 25 degree A.P.I. or >

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.10 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0

1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	1,024,875,070
2003	987,493,567
2004	1,143,978,310
2005	1,242,664,109
2006	1,055,425,606
2007	1,639,502,075
2008	2,640,242,597
2009	1,053,084,424
2010	2,397,240,497
2011	4,320,681,066
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0

2021	0
2022	0
Total	17,505,187,321

HTS 2710.19.11 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum oils or oil of bituminous minerals, testing 25 degree A.P.I. or >

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.11 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0

2010	0
2011	0
2012	2,823,382,381
2013	1,935,689,051
2014	2,164,734,101
2015	1,417,001,425
2016	1,348,435,577
2017	1,383,199,639
2018	2,235,488,378
2019	469,411,015
2020	228,609,467
2021	732,313,572
2022	799,047,392
Total	15,537,311,998

HTS 2710.19.15 Kerosene-type jet fuel from petroleum oils and oils of bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.15 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0

1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	1,166,807
2003	15,631,600
2004	14,693,616
2005	101,536,426
2006	37,859,348
2007	59,994,361
2008	61,800,051
2009	23,500,108
2010	30,867,921
2011	54,123,306
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	401,173,544

HTS 2710.19.16 Kerosene-type jet fuel from petroleum oils and oils of bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.16 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	44,036,270
2013	22,696,125
2014	388,704,794
2015	50,990,860
2016	28,368,288

2017	37,663,044
2018	108,385,037
2019	153,417,267
2020	118,461,392
2021	294,503,118
2022	144,472,536
Total	1,391,698,731

HTS 2710.19.23 Kerosene (ex. motor fuel/mtr fuel blend stock/jet), fr petro oils and bitumin. minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. fr petro oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	4,871,125
2003	11,608,157
2004	6,550,425
2005	123,026

2006	1,577,604
2007	2,416,566
2008	4,606,609
2009	5,450,431
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	37,203,943

HTS 2710.19.30 Lubricating oils, w/or w/o additives, fr. petro oils and bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. fr. petro oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.30 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0

1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	9,189
2008	16,985
2009	26,078
2010	34,112
2011	34,670
2012	56,573
2013	11,585
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	2,901,364
2018	61,890
2019	52,033
2020	2,130,150
2021	44,044,922
2022	48,180,939

Total	97,560,490

HTS 2710.19.40 Lubricating greases from petro oil/bitum min/70%+ by wt. fr. petro. oils > 10% by wt. of fatty acid salts animal/vegetable origin

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.40 (kg)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0

2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	6,663
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	6,663

HTS 2710.19.45 Mixture of hydrocarbons from petro oils & bitum. min. or preps.70%+ by wt. fr. petro. oils, nesoi, n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.45 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0

2001	0
2002	5,891
2003	5,151,141
2004	1,170,636
2005	1,913,120
2006	0
2007	0
2008	819,689
2009	281,905
2010	674,012
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	6,559,543
2016	10,853,480
2017	3,272,867
2018	567,324
2019	3,660,981
2020	0
2021	5,604,140
2022	7,940,049
Total	48,474,778

HTS 2710.19.90 Petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals or preps nesoi 70%+ by wt. from petroleum oils or bitum. min., not waste, nesoi

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.19.90 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	2,484,232
2009	4,768,803
2010	26,155,660
2011	27,939,219
2012	15,454,819
2013	15,500
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0

2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	2,450,120
2022	35,725,292
Total	114,993,645

HTS 2710.99.10 Wastes of distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum oil/bituminous minerals, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or >

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.99.10 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	3,925
2004	19,110
2005	0

2006	0
2007	99,096
2008	93,400
2009	0
2010	74,060
2011	3,564
2012	0
2013	15,000
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	308,155

2710.99.16 Waste motor fuel or motor fuel blending stock from petro oils and bitumin. minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petro oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.99.16 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0

1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	46,272
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	46,272

HTS 2710.99.21 Waste kerosene or naphthas from petro oils and bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. From petro oils/bitumin minerals

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.99.21 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0

2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	22,868
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	3,151
Total	26,019

HTS 2710.99.31 Waste lubricating oils, w/or w/o additives, from petro oils and bitumin minerals (o/than crude) or preps. 70%+ by wt. from petro oils

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.99.31 (Barrels)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0

2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	0
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	0
2009	0
2010	0
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	2,200
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	2,205
2022	0
Total	4,405

HTS 2710.99.45 Waste mixtures of hydrocarbons from petro oils & bitum. min. or preps.70%+ by wt. fr. petro oils, nesoi, n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2710.99.45 (Barrels)	
1989	0

1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	0
2004	24,428
2005	0
2006	0
2007	0
2008	774,704
2009	0
2010	0
2011	4,915
2012	2,520
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	4,581

2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	6,300
Total	817,448

HTS 2711.11.00 Natural gas, liquefied

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2711.11.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	4,135,496
2003	0
2004	1,225,469
2005	0
2006	8,918,909
2007	11,645,895

2008	1,277,329
2009	28,276,209
2010	77,559,525
2011	0
2012	0
2013	0
2014	0
2015	0
2016	0
2017	0
2018	0
2019	0
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	133,038,832

HTS 2711.12.00 Propane, liquefied

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 27111.12.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	716,908
1990	10,809,019
1991	19,090,092
1992	40,577,630
1993	91,852,543
1994	60,235,499
1995	50,287,616
1996	179,069,135

1997	179,290,959
1998	147,870,693
1999	148,566,346
2000	306,517,628
2001	359,725,229
2002	389,909,487
2003	506,331,036
2004	750,879,767
2005	674,001,598
2006	984,199,076
2007	1,026,704,588
2008	1,187,981,014
2009	533,043,255
2010	749,285,732
2011	1,211,734,451
2012	1,196,374,749
2013	1,317,413,776
2014	1,177,960,900
2015	563,968,707
2016	381,434,558
2017	357,438,032
2018	277,183,419
2019	208,015,875
2020	217,757,568
2021	25,343,683
2022	101,871,470
Total	15,433,442,038

HTS 2711.13.00- Butanes, liquefied

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2711.13.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	5,331,318
1990	9,539,201
1991	12,107,531
1992	9,448,164
1993	30,167,257
1994	12,586,632
1995	7,458,036
1996	65,962,703
1997	90,511,262
1998	72,835,179
1999	67,212,801
2000	145,553,231
2001	166,442,411
2002	112,411,977
2003	215,978,079
2004	160,194,314
2005	298,818,167
2006	382,725,421
2007	338,820,912
2008	521,127,722
2009	223,690,496
2010	280,978,824
2011	316,732,241
2012	156,997,350
2013	285,183,459

2014	425,228,317
2015	185,590,520
2016	97,205,929
2017	191,861,879
2018	217,855,563
2019	133,800,326
2020	35,022,321
2021	34,382,549
2022	115,875,504
Total	5,425,637,596

HTS 2711.14.00- Ethylene, propylene, butylene, and butadiene, liquified

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2711.14.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	5,161,682
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	837,869
1994	15,050,743
1995	71,722,449
1996	250,196,986
1997	333,146,888
1998	229,650,183
1999	193,415,528
2000	314,969,850
2001	331,376,263
2002	424,285,556

2003	556,719,777
2004	641,046,143
2005	640,982,390
2006	815,863,782
2007	1,098,836,287
2008	1,448,190,225
2009	579,453,405
2010	1,096,332,432
2011	1,435,518,649
2012	1,495,322,577
2013	1,440,309,486
2014	1,262,980,686
2015	565,190,439
2016	438,508,554
2017	335,086,068
2018	525,414,902
2019	111,073,678
2020	46,692,589
2021	746,641
2022	45,626,314
Total	16,749,709,021

HTS 2711.19.00- Liquefied petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons, nesoi

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2711.19.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0

1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	2,208,664
1997	10,474,746
1998	8,390,652
1999	30,362,216
2000	74,037,556
2001	47,312,513
2002	18,389,558
2003	71,602,967
2004	49,644,468
2005	64,743,799
2006	151,345,359
2007	88,563,246
2008	95,030,546
2009	39,877,265
2010	23,625,638
2011	53,533,748
2012	33,937,383
2013	51,598,249
2014	50,240,265
2015	10,962,957
2016	19,222,190
2017	20,302,321
2018	40,650,587
2019	7,438,901

2020	2,991,152
2021	0
2022	0
Total	1,066,486,946

HTS 2711.21.00- Natural gas, in gaseous state

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2711.21.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	4,332,843
2003	34,758,540
2004	38,641,519
2005	29,299,147
2006	6,996,599
2007	0
2008	0

2009	0
2010	25,632,737
2011	94,101,712
2012	62,597,431
2013	0
2014	1,129,783
2015	36,914,092
2016	70,609,469
2017	28,914,227
2018	5,674,171
2019	1,214,041
2020	7,232
2021	0
2022	5,859,645
Total	446,683,188

HTS 2711.29.00- Petroleum gases and other hydrocarbons, except natural gas

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2711.29.00 (Cubic Meters)	
1989	0
1990	2,298,467
1991	0
1992	0
1993	1,197,990
1994	3,787,758
1995	77,509,033
1996	369,317,568
1997	405,286,773

1998	335,740,901
1999	388,726,530
2000	911,848,779
2001	852,670,860
2002	882,958,616
2003	1,122,856,378
2004	1,369,838,188
2005	1,834,474,758
2006	2,132,246,481
2007	2,417,006,346
2008	3,612,761,812
2009	1,550,017,815
2010	2,290,345,563
2011	3,256,795,713
2012	3,760,888,624
2013	3,701,425,121
2014	3,242,037,405
2015	1,789,586,847
2016	1,288,201,807
2017	1,173,846,309
2018	1,545,552,633
2019	670,680,107
2020	364,145,115
2021	181,308,147
2022	309,621,980
Total	41,844,980,424

HTS 2713.11.00-Coke petroleum, not calcined

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2713.11.00 (Metric Tons)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	58,514,099
1996	343,753,492
1997	572,828,984
1998	428,389,081
1999	508,069,037
2000	1,114,158,162
2001	1,082,768,836
2002	1,089,372,394
2003	1,560,175,791
2004	1,820,555,626
2005	2,300,722,104
2006	3,110,251,515
2007	3,632,727,145
2008	5,728,965,461
2009	2,241,739,310
2010	3,580,209,639
2011	6,218,218,226
2012	7,228,141,172
2013	7,614,621,528

2014	6,332,008,312
2015	3,552,433,128
2016	2,930,536,238
2017	2,793,719,597
2018	3,105,908,960
2019	974,519,983
2020	501,508,135
2021	216,019,951
2022	406,796,831
Total	71,047,632,737

HTS 2713.12.00- Coke, petroleum coke, calcined

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2713.12.00 (Metric Tons)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	0
1997	0
1998	0
1999	0
2000	0
2001	0
2002	0
2003	96,617,905

2004	83,842,528
2005	51,821,517
2006	135,566,936
2007	190,837,706
2008	231,080,131
2009	91,393,408
2010	112,288,137
2011	17,601,359
2012	4,047,419
2013	18,319,688
2014	273,176,382
2015	55,085,085
2016	0
2017	36,674,852
2018	0
2019	12,338,839
2020	0
2021	0
2022	0
Total	1,410,691,892

HTS 2713.20.00- Petroleum bitumen

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2713.20.00 (Metric Tons)	
1989	0
1990	0
1991	0
1992	0
1993	0

1994	0
1995	3,029,177
1996	142,929,674
1997	169,834,252
1998	148,726,095
1999	196,874,919
2000	614,317,281
2001	442,511,490
2002	417,880,782
2003	506,862,479
2004	739,237,577
2005	1,176,354,016
2006	1,673,748,991
2007	1,671,923,503
2008	2,386,121,501
2009	1,034,815,221
2010	1,611,791,708
2011	1,505,357,507
2012	1,567,827,758
2013	1,618,477,455
2014	1,301,514,203
2015	684,764,411
2016	519,427,528
2017	563,274,216
2018	468,620,071
2019	364,609,984
2020	195,012,104
2021	83,910,370

2022	254,997,310
Total	22,064,751,583

HTS 2713.90.00-Residues (except petroleum coke or petroleum bitumen) of petroleum oils or of oils obtained from bituminous materials

Imports for Consumption | Annual Data | HTS 2713.90.00 (Metric Tons)	
1989	0
1990	5,690
1991	0
1992	1,244,044
1993	0
1994	0
1995	0
1996	18,048,563
1997	20,083,527
1998	18,528,871
1999	9,626,355
2000	13,742,103
2001	17,798,300
2002	20,035,081
2003	59,745,250
2004	93,820,797
2005	115,940,763
2006	231,762,659
2007	309,919,614
2008	410,274,296
2009	152,540,625

2010	255,763,317
2011	323,964,698
2012	425,536,443
2013	308,372,738
2014	265,418,983
2015	156,738,317
2016	93,727,866
2017	60,484,677
2018	109,317,137
2019	84,017,594
2020	35,769,230
2021	27,739,348
2022	50,866,427
Total	3,690,833,313

ATTACHMENT B – Description of HTS Codes

- 2709
    - .10 Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I
        - Lower API means more dense, heavier oil
            - Typically less valuable
        - Petroleum oils used to create plastics, make machinery work, make cosmetics
        - Oils from bituminous materials used in making paint, making building materials
        - Crude used for making gasoline, fuel, making plastics…etc.
        - No imports 1994, 2000, 2002-2007 but regular importation all other years of between about 2 million and 165 million barrels
        - 2021: 25,069,742 barrels
        - Total 1,519,642,456 barrels
    - .20 Petroleum oils and oils from bituminous minerals, crude, testing 25 degrees API or more
        - Higher API, lighter, typically more valuable
        - Similar uses
        - Consistently imported 1989-2021 ranting from 4 million to 21 million barrels annually
        - 2021: 7,269,527,005
        - Total: 308,201,791,006

- 2710
    - Reference to petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous materials
        - Bituminous materials are thermoplastic mixture of hydrocarbons including tar, coal, pitch
        - Waste oils0 waste containing petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous materials that are no longer fit as primary products like used libruciating oils, sludge oil from storage tanks of petrolume, oils in the form of emulsions in wate
    - Waste oils
        - Can still be refine into lubricants, processed into fuel oils, and used as raw materials for refining and petrochemical industries
    - .00.05 Distillate and residual fuel oils (including blends) derived from bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I
        - Distillate oil: Oil that has been further refined from heavier oils
            - Includes diesel
            - No 1, 2, 4 diesel fuel used in on-highway engines like trucks and automobiles and off-highway such as trains and agricultural machinery
            - No 1, 2, 4 fuels (different) are used primarily for space heating and power generation
        - Residual oil: oil residue that remains after distilling out the lighter grade components
            - More viscous and must be heated to allow it to flow and be burned
            - No 5 and 6 fuel oils

        - Used in steam-powered vessels and inshore powerplants
        - No 6 fuel oil used for electric power, space heating, vessel bunkering and various industrial purposes
    - Imported 1989-2001 then stopped
    - Total: 7,624,935,795
- 00.10 Distillate and residual fuel oils (including blends) derived from bituminous minerals, testing 25 degrees A.P.I or more
    - Imported 1989-1991, not 1992
    - Imported 1993-2001 the stopped
    - Total: 3,856,550,271
- .00.15 Motor fuel, from petro oils and bitumen minerals other than crude, or preps 70%+ by weight from pertroluem oils
    - Imported 1989-2001 then stopped
    - Total: 2,366,352,890
- .00.18 Motor fuel blending stock, from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps. 70%+ from petroleum oils
    - Used for direct blending in the manufacture of moto oil
    - Imported in 1991, 1994-1995, 1997, 199-2001
    - Total: 83,202,145
- .00.20 Kerosene (ex. Motor fuel or motor fuel blend stock) for petro oils and bituminous minerals other than crude 70% by weight from petroleum oils
    - Used to light lamps, as a cleaning agent, to power gen engines, and cooking fuel
    - Imported 1990, 1994-2001 then stopped
    - Total: 142,312,539
- .00.24 Napthas (ex. Motor fuel or motor fuel blend stock) from petroleum oils and bituminous materials other than crude or preps. 70% by weight from petroleum oils
    - Used as a solvent for paints, dry-cleaning solvent, solvent for cutback asphalts, solvent for rubber industry and for industrial extraction process
    - Imported in 1991, 1993-1996, 1997-2001
- .00.30 Lubricating oils with or without additives from peroluem oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps. 70%+ from petroleum oils
    - Used to reduce friction, heat, and wear between mechanical components usually in motorized vehicles (motor oil and transmission fluid)
    - Imported in 1989, 1994, 1997-1999
    - Total: 79,637
- .00.40 Lubricating greases, 70% or more by weight from petroleum oils and or 10% weight of salts of fatty acids of animal or vegetable origin
    - Used to protect against water ingress and provide rust protection as well as reducing friction experienced by machine
    - Imported in 2001
    - Total: 3,712
- .00.45 Mix of hyrdrocarbons from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
    - Imported 1989, 1994-1997, 199-2001
    - Total: 58,474,670
- .11.15 Light motor fuel from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
    - Lubricant for motor vehicles

        - Imported from 2002-2011
        - Total: 1,989,237,727
    - .11.18 light oil motor fuel blending stock from petroleum oils & bituminous miners other than crude or prep 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
        - Imported from 2003-2007 (potentially replaced 11.15?)
        - Total: 273,720,515
    - .11.25 Naphthas (exc. Motor fuel motor fuel blend stock) from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals other than crude or preps 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
        - Imported from 2002-2011 (replace .00.24?)
        - Total: 642,596,123
    - .11.45 Light oil mixture of hydrocarbons from petroleum oils and bituminous mineral other than crude or prep 70%+ weight from petroleum oils, nesoi n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon
        - Imported from 2002-2011 (replace .00.45?)
        - Total 255,270,690
    - .11.90 Light oils and preparations from petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals or preps 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils or bituminous mineral, nesoi
        - Used for petroleum gas, creat soild fuel and rocket fuel
        - Imported 2002, 2004, 2008-2010
        - Total: 1,701,283
    - .12.15 Light oil motor fuel from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps. 70% weight from petroleum oils
        - Motor fuel is any product derived primarily from petroleum, shale, natural gas used primarily as a fuel in internal combustion or other engines
        - Imported in 2012, 2018-2021 (replace .11.15)
        - 2021: 712,671,269
        - Total: 1,199,445,929
    - .12.18 Light oil motor fuel blending stock from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (other than crude) or prep 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
        - Motor fuel blending stock used for directing blending in manufacture or motor fuel
        - Imported 2019 and 2021
        - 2021: 29,869,605
        - Total: 36,741,475
    - .12.25 Napthas (exc. Motor fuel motor fuel blend stock) from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
        - Imported 2012-2020 (replace 11.25?)
        - Total 125,572,582
    - .12.45 Light oil mixture of hydrocarbons from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or prep 70% weight from petroleum oils, nesoi, n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon
        - Imported 2013-2021 (replace 11.45?)
        - 2021) 5,548
        - Total: 134,533,529
    - .19.05 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from bituminous minerals, testing under 25 degrees A.P.I
        - Imported 2002-2011 (replace 00.05?)
        - Total: 28,354,281,153

- .19.06 Distillate ad residual fuel (including blends) derived from petroleum or oils from bituminous minerals, testing <25 degrees A.P.I
  - Imported 2012-2021 (replaced .19.05?)
  - 2021: 1,338,514,874
  - Total: 24,084,989,043
- .19.10 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum oils or bituminous minerals, testing 25 degrees A.P.I or >
  - 2002-2011 (replace 00.10?)
  - Total: 17,505,187,321
- .19.11 Distillate and residual fuel oil (including blends) deireved from petroleum oils or bituminous minerals, testing 25 degrees A.P.I or >
  - 2012-2021 (replace .19.11?)
  - 2021: 732,313,572
  - Total: 14,738,264,606
- .19.15 Kerosene-type jet fuel from petroleum oils of bituminous minerals (other than crude) or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
  - Kerosene-based product used in commercial and military turbojet and turboprop aircraft
  - 2002-2011
  - Total: 401,173,544
- .19.16 Kerosene-type jet fuel from petroleum oils and oils of bituminous minerals (other than crude) or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum
  - 2012-2021 (replace .19.16?)
  - Total: 1,247,226,195
- .19.23 Kerosene (ex. Motor fuel/motor fuel blend stock/jet) from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (other than crude) or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
  - Imported 2002-2009 (replace 00.20?)
  - Total: 37,203,943
- .19.30 Lubricating oils with or without additives, from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals other than crude or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
  - Imported 2007-2013, 2017-2021 (replace 00.30?)
  - 2021: 44,044,922
  - Total: 49,379,551
- .19.40 Lubricating greases from petroleum oil/ bituminous minerals/ 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils > 10% by weight of fatty acids animal/vegetable origin
  - Imported in 2017
  - Total: 6,663
- .19.45 Mixture of hydrocarbons from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils, nesoi no/o 50% any single hydrocarbon
  - 2002-2005, 2008-2010, 2015-2019, 2021 (replace .00.45?)
  - 2021: 5,604,140
  - Total: 40,534,739
- .19.90 Petroleum oils & oils from bituminous minerals or preps nesoi 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils or bituminous minerals, not waste, nesoi
  - Imported 2008-2013, 2021
  - 2021: 2,450,120
  - Total: 79,268,353

- .99.10 Wastes of distillates and residual fuel oil (including blends) derived from petroleum oil/bituminous minerals, testing 25 degrees A.P.I. or>
  - Imported 2003-2004, 2007-2008,2010-2011,2013 (replace .99.10?)
  - Total: 308,155
- .99.16 Waste motor fuel or motor fuel blending stock from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (other than crude) or prep.s 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
  - Imported 2004
  - Total: 46,272
- .99.21 Waste kerosene or napthas from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (other than crude) or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils/bituminous minerals
  - Imported 2018
  - Total: 22,868
- .99.31 Waste lubricating oils with or without additives from petroleum oils and bituminous minerals (other than crude) or preps 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils
  - 2016 and 2021
  - 2021: 2,205
  - Total: 4,405
- .99.45 Waste mixtures of hydrocarbons from petroleum oils & bituminous minerals or preps. 70%+ by weight from petroleum oils, nesoi n/o 50% any single hydrocarbon
  - Imported 2004, 2007, 2011-2012, 2018
  - Total: 811,148

- 2711 Petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons
  - .12.00 Propane, liquified
    - Used in home and water heating, cooking and refrigerating food, clothes drying, powering farm and industrial equipment
    - Saudi to US
      - 1989-2021
      - 2021: 25,343,683
      - Total 15,331,570,568
  - .13.00 Butanes, liquified
    - Used for cigarette lighters, portable stoves, propellant in aerosols, a heating fuel, refrigerant, and manufacture wide range of products
    - Saudi to US
      - 1989-2021
      - 2021: 34,382,549
      - Total 5,309,762,092
  - .14.00 Ethylene, propylene, butylene, and butadiene
    - Ethylene: Used for fabricated plastics, antifreeze, making fibers, manufacture ethylene oxide, polyethylene for plastics, alcohol, mustard gas, other organics
    - Propylene: used widely as fuel gas for high-velocity oxygen fuel processes
    - Saudi to US
    - Butylene used in cosmetics
    - Butadiene: used to make synthetic rubbers for tires, grommets, elastic bands
      - 1989, 1932-2021
      - Total: 746,641
      - Total 16,704,082,707
  - .19.00 Liquefied petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons, nesoi

        - Used for farming equipment fuel and in agricultural processes, an aerosol propellant, refrigerant, fuel gas in heating appliances, cooking equipment, vehicles
        - Imported 1996-2020
        - Total: 1,066,486,946
    - .21.00 Natural gas, in gaseous state
        - methane
        - Used in cooking, heating, electricity production, producing a range of materials such as glass and clothing
        - Imported 2002-2006, 2010-2012, 2014-2020
        - Total: 440,823,543
    - 29.00 Petroleum gases and other hydrocarbons, except natural gas
        - Propane or butane
        - Used in heating appliances, cooking machines, automobiles, aerosol propellants, refrigerants, automotive fuel
        - Imported 1990, 1993-2021
        - 2021: 181,308,147
        - Total: 41,535,358,444
- 2713 Petroleum Coke, Petroleum Bitumen, and Residues of Petroleum Oils or of Oils Obtained from Bituminous Minerals
    - .11.00 Coke, petroleum, not calcined
        - Byproduct or tar processing
        - Used as an energy source, in steel making for high heat absorbing properties, fuel-grade coke in furnaces
        - Imported 1995-2021
        - 2021: 216,019,951
        - Total: 70,640,835,906
    - .12.00 Coke, petroleum coke, calcined
        - Calcine- thermal treatment of solid chemical compound
        - Used to make anodes for aluminum, steel, and titanium smelting
        - Imported 2003-2015, 2017, 2019
        - Total: 1,410,691,892
    - .20.00 Petroleum bitumen
        - Used for paving, roofing, binder in asphalt for roads and parking lots
        - Imported 1995-2021
        - Total: 21,809,754,273
    - .90 Residues (except petroleum coke or petroleum bitumen) or petroleum oils or of oils obtained from bituminous materials
        - Used for road construction, roofing, and waterproofing
        - Imported 1990,1992, 1996-2021
        - Total: 3,639,966,886