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7 SUPERIOR COURT OF WASHINGTON FOR THURSTON COUNTY

8 CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY)
9 and CASCADIA WILDLANDS,)
Petitioners,) No. _____
10 v.) PETITION FOR DECLARATORY AND
11) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FISH)
12 AND WILDLIFE; KELLY SUSEWIND, in his)
official capacity as Director of the Washington)
13 Department of Fish and Wildlife; and LISA)
WOOD, in her official capacity as the SEPA)
14 Coordinator of the Washington Department of)
Fish and Wildlife,)
15 Respondents.)
16 _____)

17
18 The Center for Biological Diversity and Cascadia Wildlands (collectively “Petitioners”)
19 respectfully file this petition challenging as unlawful the actions of Respondents Washington
20 Department of Fish and Wildlife (“WDFW”), WDFW Director Kelly Susewind, and Lisa
21 Wood, WDFW’s coordinator responsible for its adherence to the Washington State
22 Environmental Policy Act (“SEPA”), in improperly authorizing, on August 20, 2018, the lethal
23 removal of members of Washington’s endangered gray wolf population, namely one or more
24 members of the Togo Pack.

25 **NATURE OF THE ACTION**

26 1. This is a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief arising out of and alleging
27 violations of the Washington Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), RCW Ch. 34.05 and

1 SEPA, RCW Ch. 43.21C. This action challenges Respondent Susewind’s order to kill members
2 of the Togo Pack, announced on August 20, 2018 (the “Togo Pack Kill Order”), attached hereto
3 as Exhibit (“Ex.”) A. Petitioners seek a declaration that Respondents’ authorization of the
4 killing of one or more members of the Togo Pack violated Washington law, an injunction
5 preventing WDFW from taking action to execute the Togo Pack Kill Order until its legality can
6 be reviewed by the Court, and an injunction preventing Respondents from authorizing or
7 implementing any future such orders without complying with SEPA and the APA.

8 2. Gray wolves are listed as a federal endangered species in the western two-thirds
9 of Washington, where they are under the management of the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.
10 Gray wolves are listed as a state endangered species throughout Washington. WDFW manages
11 the wolf population in portions of the state where wolves are not a federal endangered species,
12 under the auspices of the 2011 Wolf Conservation and Management Plan (“Plan”). The Plan
13 was a phased non-project review proposal under SEPA, for which WDFW issued a
14 Determination of Significance, acknowledging that it required the development of an
15 Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). The EIS contemplates that because the project was
16 a phased review, “specific actions that may be proposed in the future relating to gray wolf
17 management in Washington would be evaluated under a supplemental environmental impact
18 statement process.”

19 3. The Plan is “the state recovery plan” for gray wolves. Its purpose is to “ensure
20 the reestablishment of a self-sustaining population of gray wolves in Washington and to
21 encourage social tolerance for the species by addressing and reducing conflicts.” The Plan
22 contemplates potential lethal control of wolves when there are conflicts with livestock, which
23 the EIS notes is “unusual” in a recovery plan for an endangered species, but is included as a
24 tool to “build public tolerance for wolves.” Public tolerance is crucial to recovery because
25 “[h]uman-caused mortality is the single most important factor” in wolf recovery, and thus
26 “addressing and reducing conflicts is an important part of conservation.” As a result, the EIS
27 provides: “Lethal control of wolves may be necessary to resolve repeated wolf-livestock

1 conflicts and would be performed to remove problem animals that jeopardize public tolerance
2 for overall wolf recovery.”

3 4. Before lethal control of wolves is used, however, the Plan emphasizes it must be
4 evaluated on a “case specific basis,” with decisions based on a number of factors, including
5 “pack history and size,” “state listed status of wolves,” and “extent of proactive management
6 measures being used on the property.” In addition, the Plan provides that wolves may only be
7 killed if: (1) there are repeated wolf predations of livestock; (2) it is documented that livestock
8 have clearly been killed by wolves; (3) nonlethal methods have been tried but failed to resolve
9 the conflict; (4) predations are likely to continue; and (5) there is no evidence of intentional
10 feeding or unnatural attraction of wolves. The EIS and the Plan specify that “[n]on-lethal
11 management will be emphasized while the species is recovering” and that lethal control will be
12 a “last resort.” In line with this, the EIS and Plan emphasize the use of non-lethal strategies
13 during wolf recovery, including “husbandry methods and non-lethal deterrents,” such as “using
14 range riders to help keep cattle more concentrated on grazing sites,” “delaying turnout of cattle
15 onto grazing sites until calving is finished or young wild ungulates are born,” “allowing calves
16 to reach at least 200 pounds before turning them out to grazing sites,” and “avoiding grazing
17 livestock near the core areas of wolf territories, especially dens and rendezvous sites.”

18 5. For more than six years, WDFW has ignored these and other restrictions that the
19 Plan placed on the potential use of lethal control, most recently with the Togo Pack Kill Order.
20 Instead, WDFW has relied upon criteria for its kill orders that are not contemplated under the
21 Plan or its EIS, but which have been spelled out in a series of informal “protocols” which form
22 the basis for WDFW’s wolf killing program. Specifically, the Togo Pack Kill Order purports to
23 rely upon WDFW’s 2017 Wolf-Livestock Interaction Protocol (“2017 Protocol”). *See* Ex. A at
24 2 (indicating Susewind has initiated the “lethal removal provisions” of the “wolf-livestock
25 interactions protocol”).

26 6. In the five summer grazing seasons after adoption of the Plan, WDFW has killed
27 18 wolves from five packs, resulting in the near or total destruction of three packs. These actions

1 eliminated up to 11% of the wolf population in any given year. WDFW killed 15 of these 18
2 wolves, and targeted three wolf packs for extermination, for the benefit of a single livestock
3 owner.

4 7. WDFW has taken these actions in contradiction to its own conservation goals,
5 abandoning the Plan's justification that killing wolves is necessary to save them. Instead,
6 WDFW has targeted an endangered species at the behest of private commercial interests,
7 willfully ignoring overwhelming scientific evidence demonstrating that killing wolves is both
8 unnecessary and counterproductive—and that it actually results in increased conflicts between
9 wolves and livestock.

10 8. WDFW's actions, including the Togo Pack Kill Order, violate SEPA because
11 WDFW has departed from the limited lethal control contemplated by the Plan, instead
12 undertaking a program to systematically and purposefully kill members of an endangered
13 species—without performing a new or supplemental EIS, or even making a threshold
14 determination as to whether one is required, which determination would be subject to direct
15 challenge and review in the courts.

16 9. The Togo Pack Kill Order, and the 2017 Protocol on which it purportedly relies,
17 is also arbitrary and capricious under the APA, because it is contrary to WDFW's rules and
18 governing statutes, including the management guidelines set by the Plan; is not the product of
19 a reasoned decision-making process; and is based on incomplete or erroneous facts—including
20 a lack of consideration of the available science. In addition, the Togo Pack Kill Order is
21 arbitrary and capricious because it does not follow the requirements of the 2017 Protocol on
22 which it is purportedly based.

23 10. Petitioners thus seek a declaration that the Togo Pack Kill Order violated
24 Washington law.

25 11. Petitioners additionally seek injunctive relief to prevent WDFW from executing
26 the Togo Pack Kill Order, and to preclude it from issuing or acting upon any similar orders that
27 have not met the requirements of SEPA and the APA.

1 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

2 12. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to RCW Chapters 7.24 (declaratory
3 relief) and 7.40 (injunctive relief), RCW 34.05.570 (APA), and RCW 43.21C.075 (SEPA).

4 13. Venue is proper in this Court pursuant to RCW 4.92.010, RCW 35.05.514(1),
5 and RCW 42.56.550.

6 **PARTIES**

7 **Petitioners**

8 14. Petitioner Center for Biological Diversity (“the Center”) is a national, non-profit
9 conservation organization with offices throughout the United States, including Washington, and
10 more than 1.6 million members and supporters, many of whom reside in Washington. The
11 Center is dedicated to the preservation, protection, and restoration of biodiversity, native
12 species, and ecosystems. The Center and its members and supporters have a long-standing
13 interest in the endangered gray wolf (*Canis lupus*), and routinely advocate for gray wolf
14 protection in Washington. For example, the Center participated in developing the state’s Plan,
15 including attending multiple public meetings and submitting comments; regularly attended
16 meetings of Washington’s Wolf Advisory Group (“WAG”); filed multiple petitions asking
17 WDFW to codify critical elements of the Plan into the Washington Administrative Code
18 (“WAC”); and submitted numerous comments to WDFW regarding its lethal removal
19 protocols, kill orders, predation investigations, and other actions related to wolf management.

20 15. Petitioner Cascadia Wildlands is an Oregon non-profit organization with
21 approximately 10,000 members and supporters throughout the United States, including many
22 who reside in Washington. Cascadia Wildlands educates, agitates, and inspires a movement to
23 protect and restore Cascadia’s wild ecosystems. Cascadia Wildlands envisions vast old-growth
24 forests, rivers full of salmon, wolves howling in the backcountry, and vibrant communities
25 sustained by the unique landscapes of the Cascadia Bioregion. Cascadia Wildlands and its
26 members have worked to reform WDFW, and specifically, the agency’s wolf management
27 practices. Cascadia Wildlands and its members have been extensively involved in wolf

1 management and the creation of wolf management policy in Washington. For example,
2 Cascadia Wildlands and its members have routinely submitted comments and attended public
3 meetings on wolf management; met and kept in contact with WDFW staff on the issue; drafted
4 and filed numerous petitions asking that WDFW codify elements of the Plan to create agency
5 accountability through enforceability; attended meetings of the WAG; and repeatedly offered
6 comments on the development of lethal control protocols, kill orders, predation investigations,
7 public disclosures, and other actions related to wolf management.

8 16. Many of Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff live in or near areas
9 occupied by wolves in parts of Washington where the wolf has lost protection under the federal
10 Endangered Species Act, or visit these areas for hiking, camping, photography, birdwatching,
11 observing wildlife, and other recreational and professional pursuits.

12 17. Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff gain aesthetic enjoyment from
13 observing, attempting to observe, hearing, seeing evidence of, and studying wild wolves,
14 including observing signs of the species' presence in these areas, and observing ecosystems
15 enhanced by these animals. The opportunity to possibly view wolves, or signs of wolves, in
16 these areas is of significant interest and value to Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff,
17 and increases their use and enjoyment of public lands. Petitioners' members, supporters, and
18 staff have engaged in these activities in the past, and intend to do so again in the near future.

19 18. Petitioners, as well as their members, supporters, and staff, are dedicated to
20 ensuring the long-term survival and recovery of the gray wolf throughout the contiguous United
21 States, and specifically in the Pacific Northwest, and to ensuring that Respondents comply with
22 all applicable state laws related to the survival and recovery of the gray wolf in Washington. In
23 furtherance of these interests, Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff have worked, and
24 continue to work, to conserve wolves in Washington and throughout the contiguous United
25 States.

26 19. Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff have a procedural interest in
27 ensuring that Respondents' activities comply with all applicable state statutes and regulations.

1 Petitioners and their members, supporters, and staff have an interest in preventing Respondents
2 from killing endangered gray wolves in contravention of applicable state statutes and
3 regulations. The relief requested in this litigation would further that goal.

4 20. The interests of the Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff have been, and
5 will continue to be, injured by Respondents' continued authorization of the lethal removal of
6 wolves in Washington, including through the Togo Pack Kill Order, and any similar orders that
7 may follow or currently be in place for other packs. The interests of Petitioners' members,
8 supporters, and staff have been, and will continue to be, injured by Respondents' killing of
9 wolves in Washington. The interests of Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff have been,
10 and will continue to be, injured by Respondents' failure to comply with SEPA and the APA in
11 authorizing and carrying out the killing of wolves in Washington.

12 21. The relief requested by Petitioners in this petition would redress or lessen the
13 injuries of Petitioners' members, supporters, and staff. The relief requested by Petitioners, if
14 granted, would prevent Respondents from engaging in killing endangered gray wolves until,
15 and unless, they comply with state law. The relief requested by Petitioners, if granted, would
16 reduce the number of endangered gray wolves killed by the state of Washington.

17 22. The mailing address for the Center for Biological Diversity is P.O. Box 469,
18 Victor, ID 83455. The mailing address for Cascadia Wildlands is 1247 Willamette St., Eugene,
19 OR 97401. Petitioners are represented by Claire Loeb Davis of Lane Powell PC, located at
20 1420 Fifth Avenue, Suite 4200, Seattle, WA 98101-2375, whose mailing address is P.O. Box
21 91302, Seattle, WA 98111-9402; by Jonathon Bashford of Bashford Law PLLC, located at
22 1700 Westlake Avenue North, Suite 200, Seattle, WA 98109, whose mailing address is
23 P.O. Box 2285, Seattle, WA 98111-2285; and by Andrea Santarsiere of the Center, at P.O. Box
24 469, Victor, ID 83455.

25 **Respondents**

26 23. Respondent WDFW is an agency of the State of Washington, under the auspices
27 of the Washington Fish and Wildlife Commission ("Commission"). WDFW is located in the

1 Natural Resources Building at 1111 Washington Street S.E., Olympia, WA 98501, and its
2 mailing address is P.O. Box 43200, Olympia, WA 98504-3200. The mission of WDFW is to
3 “preserve, protect, and perpetuate wildlife and ecosystems while providing sustainable fish and
4 wildlife recreational and commercial opportunities.”¹ Its statutory purpose includes a command
5 to “conserve the [state’s] wildlife . . . resources in a manner that does not impair the resource.”
6 RCW 77.04.012. Under RCW 77.12.240, WDFW has the discretion to “authorize the removal
7 or killing of wildlife that is destroying or injuring property,” within the bounds of its other
8 responsibilities under state law.

9 24. The Director of WDFW is required to investigate the distribution of wildlife
10 species across the state. RCW 77.12.020(1). If WDFW determines a species to be “seriously
11 threatened with extinction in the state of Washington,” it may ask the Commission to designate
12 that species as endangered. RCW 77.12.020(6). The Commission has the authority and duty to
13 classify species to determine those requiring protection or management to ensure survival in
14 Washington. RCW 77.12.020(1), (6). Once a species is listed as endangered, WDFW is required
15 to write a species recovery plan that includes target population objectives, an implementation
16 plan to reach those objectives, and criteria for delisting, education, and monitoring. WAC 220-
17 610-110 §11.1. The gray wolf has been listed as endangered by the State of Washington since
18 1980. WAC 220-610-010; *see* former WAC 232-12-014 (1981); Wash. St. Reg. 81-12-029
19 (Jun. 1, 1981). As an endangered species, the gray wolf receives protection under state law from
20 hunting and killing throughout the state, RCW 77.15.120; and its critical habitat is given certain
21 legal protections. *See e.g.*, WAC 222-16-080(1)(a) (limiting forestry practices within one mile
22 of a known den). Because gray wolves have been federally delisted as endangered in the eastern
23 one-third of Washington, WDFW has full management authority over the species in that portion
24 of the state.²

25 _____
26 ¹ Washington Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife, *Mission and Goals*, About WFDW,
http://wdfw.wa.gov/about/mission_goals.html.

27 ² Washington Dep’t of Fish and Wildlife, *Gray Wolf Conservation and Management*,
http://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/gray_wolf/legal_status.html.

1 28. Wolves are highly social animals, and a wolf pack has a well-established social
2 structure. At the top of the social structure are the breeding male and breeding female wolves,
3 but other wolves play key roles in pack survival. When humans remove a wolf from a pack,
4 pack structure and dynamics are disrupted, and the survival of the pack's pups may be
5 endangered. Removal of the breeding male or breeding female from a pack is particularly
6 disruptive and damaging. Larger packs are much more likely to be successful in breeding and
7 raising pups, and when humans kill members of a pack and reduce pack size, it can reduce the
8 reproductive success of the wolf population.


9 29. A pack establishes an annual home territory and defends it from other packs and
10 trespassing wolves. From spring until fall, pack activity is centered around its den and
11 rendezvous sites, as the adults hunt and bring food back to the pups. Rendezvous sites are
12 specific areas that wolf packs use to rest, gather, and play after the pups emerge from the den.

13 30. As apex predators, wolves play a crucial role in the ecosystems where they live,
14 having direct and indirect effects on multiple animal and plant species, and promoting
15 biodiversity and ecosystem balance. The loss of apex predators was a major driver in the
16 destabilization and collapse of certain ecosystems, leading to pandemics, incursions of invasive
17 species, unsustainable increases in prey populations, and lost ecosystem functions. For
18 example, the eradication of wolves likely produced a number of important ecological changes
19 in Washington's Olympic National Park, where resultant over-browsing by elk caused
20 substantial changes in riparian plant communities, including declines in black cottonwood and
21 bigleaf maple, which in turn caused riverbank erosion and channel widening, and likely reduced
22 the rearing habitat for salmon, steelhead, and resident fish.

23 31. Wolves are predominantly predators of medium and large-sized mammals, such
24 as elk and deer, but are also known to hunt or feed on ground squirrels, hares, voles, insects,
25 fish, and plant material. Gray wolves occasionally feed on livestock, but account for a tiny
26 fraction of total livestock losses, even in areas such as Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming where
27 more wolves reside. Statistics cited in the Plan indicate that during 2004 and 2005, wolves in

1 these states were responsible for less than 0.1% of cattle deaths and 0.6% of sheep deaths. The
 2 following chart used in the Plan illustrates the minimal role that wolves play in livestock losses:

3 **Livestock losses from all causes**



14 32. Wolves pose virtually no safety threat to humans. n North America, where there
 15 are about 60,000 wolves, two human deaths have been attributed to wolves in the past 60 years,
 16 in Alaska and Saskatchewan. By comparison, about 18 people in the U.S. are killed by livestock
 17 each year, and 200 by car collisions with deer.

18 **B. Gray Wolves are Exterminated in Washington, then Start a Comeback**

19 33. Humans waged a devastatingly successful campaign to exterminate wolves in
 20 the United States from colonial times well into the twentieth century.

21 34. A robust population of wolves, numbering as many as 5,000, once ranged
 22 throughout nearly all of Washington, but a government-supported policy of eradication led to
 23 the near-extirpation of wolves from the state by the early 1900s. As in other states, Washington
 24 wolf populations were destroyed through trapping, poisoning, hunting, use of bounties, and
 25 government predator-eradication campaigns. Thus, wolves were eliminated from nearly the
 26 entire state by 1900.

1 35. In 1974, the gray wolf was listed under the federal Endangered Species Act. This
2 action started to halt the extinction of the species in the United States.

3 36. In 1980, the gray wolf was added to Washington's list of endangered species.
4 By this time, there had been only occasional sightings of individual wolves, pairs, and tracks,
5 as well as reports of howl vocalizations, generally in the Cascade Mountains and in some
6 northeastern parts of Washington. However, there was no evidence that Washington had a
7 resident breeding population at the time, and these sightings were likely dispersing animals
8 from British Columbia or other states.

9 37. In 1990, the Commission adopted rules requiring WDFW to prepare a recovery
10 and management plan for the gray wolf within 5 years. WAC 220-610-110 § 11.2.1; former
11 WAC 232-12-297 (1990); Wash. St. Reg. 90-11-066 (May 15, 1990). Despite this requirement,
12 WDFW did not begin the recovery and management plan process for the gray wolf until 2007.

13 38. In 1995-1996, wolves were reintroduced to Yellowstone National Park and
14 central Idaho. This northern Rockies wolf population soon began to increase in size and expand
15 in territory. It also became a source population for dispersing wolves, which began heading west
16 into Washington in the early 2000s.

17 39. In 2002, a radio-collared female wolf crossed the border from Idaho into
18 northeastern Washington. She remained there for several weeks before disappearing north into
19 British Columbia. This was the first confirmed instance of any wolves moving westward into
20 Washington from the northern Rockies population. Lone wolf sightings in northeastern
21 Washington were reported in the ensuing years, and breeding pairs and packs gradually formed
22 and established territories.

23 40. While the Plan development process was under way, more wolves dispersed into
24 Washington from Idaho and British Columbia. In 2008, the state's first two wolf packs since
25 the 1930s were confirmed. One pair, named the Diamond Pack, was first documented in 2008
26 in Pend Oreille County and confirmed to have pups in 2009 and 2010. Simultaneously,
27

1 confirmation was made in Okanogan County of the Lookout Pack, which had litters in 2008
2 and 2009 (and probably also in 2007).

3 **C. Washington Develops its Wolf Recovery Plan and EIS**

4 41. In 2007, WDFW finally initiated development of the Plan—twelve years after it
5 was supposed to be completed. WDFW issued a Determination of Significance in 2007, noting
6 that WDFW had decided that the Plan may have a significant impact on the environment, and
7 that an EIS was therefore required under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). A draft EIS was developed
8 and underwent public review in 2009 and 2010.

9 42. The EIS reviewed the Plan as “a phased non-project review proposal.” A
10 “[p]hased review allows agencies and the public to focus on issues that are ready for decision
11 and excludes from consideration issues that . . . are not yet ready.” In its EIS, WDFW identified
12 three “areas of controversy and uncertainty” with regard to the Plan. One of these “areas of
13 controversy and uncertainty” is “wolf-livestock conflict management,” including “lethal
14 management options to address wolf-livestock conflicts.” The EIS states that it considered
15 “current and anticipated factors” that “could result from implementation of proposed
16 management strategies,” but contemplated further environmental review, providing in
17 particular, “*Specific actions that may be proposed in the future relating to gray wolf
18 management in Washington would be evaluated under a supplemental environmental impact
19 statement process.*”

20 43. WDFW convened a stakeholder group, representing diverse interests, to assist
21 in development of the Plan. The 17 members of the stakeholder group met regularly over 15
22 months to identify, discuss, negotiate, and draft components of the Plan. The State held 23
23 public scoping meetings plus official comment periods that generated more than 65,000
24 comments by members of the public. Drafts of the Plan were peer-reviewed by 43 reviewers
25 and 3 blind peer reviewers. In December 2011, the Commission formally adopted the Plan.

26 44. Public opinion polls at the time showed that 75% of Washingtonians supported
27 wolf recovery.

1 45. The Plan “serves as the state recovery plan” for gray wolves, and its goals
2 include (1) “restor[ing] the wolf population in Washington to a self-sustaining size and
3 geographic distribution that will result in wolves having a high probability of persisting in the
4 state through the foreseeable future”; (2) “manag[ing] wolf-livestock conflicts in a way that
5 minimizes livestock losses, while at the same time not negatively impacting the recovery or
6 long-term perpetuation of a sustainable wolf population”; and (3) “develop[ing] public
7 understanding of the conservation and management needs of wolves in Washington, thereby
8 promoting the public’s coexistence with the species.”

9 46. The EIS that accompanied the Plan presented four alternatives for different
10 approaches to wolf recovery. However, with regard to the state’s lethal control of wolves
11 involved in repeated livestock predations, all four alternatives simply provided that it was,
12 “Allowed, consistent with state and federal law.” The EIS noted that it was “unusual to include
13 lethal management strategies in a plan for recovery of a listed species,” but included lethal
14 control as an option that may be necessary to “build public tolerance for wolves.” It left lethal
15 management strategies to be determined at a later date, noting that “[l]ethal control of wolves
16 *may* be necessary to resolve repeated wolf-livestock conflicts” and “[i]mplementation of
17 management options that include lethal control *would be* based on the status of wolves to ensure
18 that conservation/recovery objectives are met.”

19 47. The Plan also leaves the issue of the circumstances under which the state would
20 kill wolves to be determined later, stating that “[l]ethal control of wolves may be necessary to
21 resolve repeated wolf-livestock conflicts and is performed to remove problem animals that
22 jeopardize public tolerance for overall wolf recovery.” The strategy for lethal control in the
23 Plan and EIS is summarized as follows:

24 Lethal removal may be used to stop repeated predation if it is documented that
25 livestock have clearly been killed by wolves, non-lethal methods have been
26 tried but failed to resolve the conflict, predations are likely to continue, and
27 there is no evidence of intentional feeding or unnatural attraction of wolves by
the livestock owner. Situations will have to be evaluated on a case-specific
basis, with management decisions based on pack history and size, pattern of
predations, number of livestock killed, state listed status of wolves, extent of

1 proactive management measures being used on the property, and other
2 considerations.

3 48. The Plan does not define central terms such as “repeated livestock predations,”
4 “clearly been killed by wolves,” or “unnatural attraction,” and fails to describe any criteria for
5 determining that “non-lethal methods have been tried but failed to resolve the conflict,” when
6 “depredations are likely to continue,” or how management is supposed to take into account the
7 listed considerations. The Plan specifically left for the future the “develop[ment] and
8 implementation of a comprehensive program to manage wolf-livestock conflict.”

9 49. The Plan states that “[n]on-lethal management techniques will be emphasized
10 throughout the recovery period and beyond” as a response to wolf-livestock conflicts. It directs
11 that WDFW “should manage conflicts in a way that gives livestock owners experiencing losses
12 the tools to minimize losses, while at the same time not harming the recovery or long-term
13 sustainability of wolf populations.” The Plan provides that “WDFW will work with livestock
14 producers to provide technical assistance on proactive, non-lethal management methods and
15 technologies.” The Plan lists husbandry techniques that are useful in avoiding wolf predation,
16 including the use of range riders and sheepherders, burying of livestock carcasses, moving sick
17 or injured livestock off grazing allotments, delaying the turnout of cattle until calving is finished
18 or wild ungulates are born, allowing calves to reach at least 200 pounds before turning them
19 out, and avoiding grazing livestock near wolf territory core areas, especially dens and
20 rendezvous sites. The Plan also lists a number of non-lethal wolf deterrents, including the use
21 of guard animals, light and noise scare devices, hazing with non-lethal munitions, predator-
22 resistant fencing, and fladry (numerous strips of flagging hung along a fence or rope).

23 50. The Plan provides for generous compensation for livestock killed by wolves.
24 Even if livestock are killed long before achieving marketable weight, livestock owners are paid
25 full market value for each animal confirmed to have been killed by wolves and half the market
26 value of an animal whose death is deemed a probable wolf kill. If the animals were killed on
27 grazing sites of 100 or more acres, livestock owners receive double compensation, *i.e.*, they are

1 paid full market value of two animals for a single confirmed wolf kill, and full market value of
2 one animal for a probable kill.

3 51. The Plan's first listed objective is to develop a program to monitor the
4 population status, trends, and conservation and management needs of wolves in Washington.
5 Its second objective is to "[p]rotect wolves from sources of mortality and disturbance at den
6 sites," with one goal to "minimize mortality from lethal control."

7 52. The Plan notes that "excessive levels of lethal removal can preclude the recovery
8 of wolf populations," and discusses the need for constraints on lethal control to minimize
9 negative impacts, including limiting it to killing solitary individuals or territorial packs
10 whenever possible, and only killing animals in reproductive packs when pups are more than six
11 months old, the packs contain at least six members, there are neighboring packs nearby, and the
12 population is at least 75 wolves. The Plan also suggested managers should consider minimizing
13 lethal control around core recovery areas, especially during the denning and pup-rearing period
14 of April to September. The Plan directs that "managers should assess the potential negative
15 impacts of wolf removal on pack structure and persistence for creating unstable pack dynamics
16 if sink habitats [that is, lower quality habitats where resident packs have difficulty sustaining
17 themselves without immigration from source habitats elsewhere] are created by depredation
18 control, especially in recovering populations." Another strategy mandated by the Plan is to
19 "minimize disturbance at active wolf den sites," including implementing suitable protective
20 measures, and providing information to landowners about the location of den sites and how to
21 avoid disturbing them.

22 53. The Plan's objectives also emphasize the need to "[c]onduct research on wolf
23 biology, conservation and management in Washington," indicating that WDFW will initiate
24 wolf research "if important management questions arise that could be answered through
25 research and monitoring," including "on the levels and effects of depredation on livestock and
26 other domestic animals, and the factors influencing depredation." It also notes the "strong need
27 to conduct research on non-lethal control methods to reduce wolf depredation on livestock,"

1 because such research is “essential” to any “successful wildlife conservation and management
2 plan,” and “[f]uture conservation and management actions involving Washington’s gray wolves
3 will depend on accurate and complete data related to a broad range of biological and social
4 topics, including population status and impacts on affected resources and human activities.”

5 54. The Plan acknowledges that a “well-informed public is essential to gray wolf
6 conservation and some authorities consider outreach efforts to be the highest priority in
7 restoring the species.” It further explains that it is “crucial that wolves and wolf management
8 issues be portrayed in an objective and unbiased manner, and that the public receives accurate
9 information on the species. Conflicts with wolves and the solutions and compromises needed
10 to resolve those conflicts must be discussed fairly.”

11 55. The Plan indicated that wolves would be downlisted from state endangered to
12 threatened status when there had been six successful breeding pairs for three consecutive years,
13 with two successful breeding pairs in each of three separate recovery regions. Wolves would
14 be downgraded from threatened to sensitive when there were 12 successful breeding pairs
15 present for three consecutive years, with four successful breeding pairs in each of the three
16 recovery regions; and would be removed from the list under either of two circumstances, as
17 follows: (1) when there were 15 successful breeding pairs present for three consecutive years,
18 with four successful breeding pairs in each of the three recovery regions and three successful
19 breeding pairs anywhere in the state, or (2) when there were 18 successful breeding pairs, with
20 four successful breeding pairs in each of the three recovery regions and six successful breeding
21 pairs anywhere in the state. The Plan acknowledges that 15 breeding pairs, which represent an
22 estimated 97-361 wolves, would be a “minimal objective to achieve recovery.” In fact, two of
23 the three blind peer reviewers said the recovery objectives in the Plan would be inadequate to
24 achieve recovery. Comments to the EIS said the objectives were not biologically defensible,
25 assumed that connectivity with viable wolf populations elsewhere would be maintained, and
26 lacked a population viability analysis.

1 56. A number of studies published before the Plan pointed to the need to take pack
2 dynamics, social structure, and associated mortality rates into consideration when evaluating
3 the impact of lethal control. See Scott Creel and Jay J. Rotella, *Meta-Analysis of Relationships*
4 *between Human Offtake, Total Mortality and Population Dynamics of Gray Wolves*, 5 PLOS
5 ONE e12918 (2010); Linda Y. Rutledge, et. al., *Protection from Harvesting Restores the*
6 *Natural Social Structure of Eastern Wolf Packs*, 24 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 332 (2009);
7 Arian D. Wallach, et. al., *More than Mere Numbers: The Impact of Lethal Control on the Social*
8 *Stability of a Top-Order Predator* 4 PLOS ONE e6861 (2009); Thomas M. Gehring, et. al.,
9 *Limits to Plasticity in Gray Wolf, Canis lupus, Pack Structure: Conservation Implications for*
10 *Recovering Populations*, 117 CANADIAN FIELD-NATURALIST 419 (2003); John A. Vucetich, et.
11 al., *Effects of Social Structure and Prey Dynamics on Extinction Risk in Gray Wolves*, 11
12 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 957 (1997); Gordon C. Haber, *Biological, Conservation, and Ethical*
13 *Implications of Exploiting and Controlling Wolves*, 10 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1068 (1996).

14 57. One such study, cited in the Plan, emphasizes the need for wildlife managers to
15 carefully evaluate the possible impacts of lethal control on territorial wolves relative to ethical
16 and biological considerations.” Scott M. Brainerd, et. al, *The Effects of Breeder Loss on Wolves*,
17 72 THE JOURNAL OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 89 (2008) (“Brainerd Study”). In particular, the
18 Brainerd Study recommends that managers “prioritize the removal of solitary wolves or
19 territorial packs,” and exercise extreme caution when it is absolutely necessary to kill members
20 of reproductive packs, so as to “minimize pup mortality, social disruption, and breeding
21 interruption.” Specifically, the Brainerd Study recommends (and the Plan acknowledges, in its
22 discussion of strategies for minimizing mortality from lethal control) that managers only
23 remove wolves from reproductive packs when pups are more than six months old and the packs
24 contain six or more members, including three or more adults, and that ideally, such removals
25 would only take place when the pack was close to neighboring packs and the wolf population
26 was more than 75 wolves. From 2012 to the present, WDFW has repeatedly ignored these
27 recommendations. In five of the six kill actions WDFW conducted between 2012-2017 – the

1 Wedge Pack in 2012, the Huckleberry Pack in 2014, the Profanity Peak Pack in 2016, and the
2 Smackout Pack in 2017 – wolves were killed when these packs had pups that were less than 6
3 months old. The kill actions in 2012 and 2014 were undertaken when the wolf population was
4 far less than 75 individuals (annual end of year 2011 report noted 27 wolves, and annual end of
5 year 2013 report noted 52 wolves).

6 58. Other studies published before the Plan had already started to challenge the
7 efficacy of traditional lethal control programs as opposed to non-lethal deterrence measures,
8 laying the foundation for the research that would emerge in the years to follow. *See* Elizabeth
9 K. Harper, et. al., *Effectiveness of Lethal, Directed Wolf-Depredation Control in Minnesota*, 72
10 JOURNAL OF WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT 778 (2008) (“Harper Study”); *see also* Tyler Muhly, et.
11 al, *Livestock Husbandry Practices Reduce Wolf Depredation Risk in Alberta Canada*, in THE
12 WORLD OF WOLVES, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON ECOLOGY, BEHAVIOUR AND MANAGEMENT 263
13 (Marco Musiani, et. al., ed., 2010) (the “Muhly Study”); Marco Musiani, et. al., *Seasonality*
14 *and Reoccurrence of Depredation and Wolf Control in Western North America*, 33 WILDLIFE
15 SOCIETY BULLETIN 876 (2005).

16 **D. Plan Addresses Concerns of Livestock Owners**

17 59. WDFW quickly came under pressure from special interests opposed to wolf
18 recovery, most significantly from certain livestock owners and groups that use public lands to
19 graze their cattle and sheep during the summer. In 2016, beef cattle ranching amounted to one
20 tenth of one percent (0.1%) of Washington’s economy³ and made up even less of the state’s
21 covered employment, providing 697 of the 3.2 million jobs in the state eligible for
22 unemployment insurance.⁴ There are so few sheep ranchers in Washington that neither data on
23 covered employment nor 2016 statistics from the National Agricultural Statistics Service are

25 ³ *Compare* National Agricultural Statistics Service, *Cattle, Incl. Calves - Gross Income, Measured in \$*, Quick
26 Stats, <http://tinyurl.com/yceex5ld>, with Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, *Gross Business Income*, Statistics &
Reports, <http://tinyurl.com/yc7vu7l3>.

27 ⁴ Washington Emp’t Sec. Dep’t, *2016 Annual Averages, Preliminary*, Quarterly Census of Employment and
Wages, <http://tinyurl.com/ycdo8obj>.

1 available.⁵ In 2010, sheep raising amounted to one one-thousandth of one percent (0.001%) of
2 Washington's economy.⁶

3 60. While many Washington livestock producers rely entirely on private land for
4 their annual operations, some livestock owners depend on public land grazing leases, primarily
5 for cattle. These livestock owners typically keep their livestock on private land during the
6 winter, with most calving and lambing occurring in late winter or early spring. In the spring,
7 livestock are released to grazing allotments on state and federal public lands, often in remote
8 locations with rough topography, such as the Colville National Forest. Livestock owners
9 typically provide minimal to no supervision to these herds throughout the summer, and expect
10 to suffer significant losses. In Washington, the Plan estimated that death losses from all causes
11 totaled 44,000 cattle and calves in 2005 and 5,000 sheep and lambs in 2004, or 4.1% of all cattle
12 and calves and 10.9% of all sheep and lambs. Producers lose livestock to a variety of natural
13 and non-natural causes, including injury, illness, disease, weather, birthing problems, and
14 predation. In Washington in 2004 and 2005, the Plan indicated that 94% of cattle losses, valued
15 at \$28.7 million, were non-predator related, and 54% of sheep losses, valued at \$293,000, were
16 non-predator related. Predators, primarily coyotes and cougars, killed an estimated 2,500 cattle
17 and calves worth \$1.53 million and 2,300 sheep and lambs worth \$192,000.

18 61. In the fall, livestock owners gather up the livestock that has survived the
19 summer, shipping most off to feedlots or slaughter, and returning the breeding stock to private
20 land. According to the Plan, Washington public lands have 3.36 million acres set aside in 1,333
21 active grazing leases, with most on national forest lands. Overall, grazing occurs on about one-
22 quarter of state and national lands managed by the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Bureau of Land
23 Management, the Washington Department of Natural Resources, and WDFW; with the highest

24 _____
25 ⁵ See National Agricultural Statistics Service, *Sheep, Incl. Lambs - Gross Income, Measured in \$*, Quick Stats,
26 <http://tinyurl.com/y7ovmx4n>.

27 ⁶ Compare National Agricultural Statistics Service, *Sheep, Incl. Lambs - Gross Income, Measured in \$*, Quick
Stats, <http://tinyurl.com/y7ovmx4n>, with Washington State Dep't of Revenue, *Gross Business Income*, Statistics
& Reports, <http://tinyurl.com/yacpe9ct>.

1 incidence of public land grazing occurring in Colville National Forest, where more than 50%
2 of the land is leased to livestock owners. In 2018, livestock owners pay \$1.41 per month for
3 each cow and calf that they graze on U.S. Forest Service lands.

4 62. Although significant portions of the Plan are devoted to concerns about effects
5 on livestock owners, it correctly anticipated that wolves would be responsible for killing very
6 small numbers of livestock. When the population reached about 100 wolves, WDFW predicted
7 that wolves would kill between 2 and 12 cattle a year, valued at between \$1,338 and \$16,056,
8 and between 14 and 35 sheep a year, valued at \$1,920 to \$4,795. When the population reached
9 300 wolves, the Plan anticipated that wolves would kill between 12 and 67 cattle each year,
10 which would amount to less than 0.15% of total cattle losses, valued at \$8,028 to \$89,646 a
11 year; and between 22 and 92 sheep, which would be less than 1.8% of total losses, valued at
12 \$3,010-\$12,600. The Plan also noted that wolves may benefit some livestock operations by
13 reducing the abundance of coyotes, which are responsible for 40% of confirmed calf death
14 losses and 71% of lamb death losses to predators.

15 63. The Plan's predictions have been roughly accurate. Between 2013 and 2017,
16 when the wolf population had between 51 and 122 wolves, WDFW confirmed that wolves
17 killed a total of 27 cattle, or an average of 5.4 a year, and 28 sheep, or an average of 7 a year.

18 **E. WDFW Immediate Deviates from Plan to Eliminate the Wedge Pack**

19 64. WDFW started killing wolves less than a year after adopting the recovery Plan,
20 targeting the Wedge Pack for elimination in 2012. WDFW killed seven of the eight members
21 of the Wedge Pack, eliminating one of only eight confirmed packs in the state at the time, and
22 killing 14% of the state's endangered wolf population.

23 65. WDFW eliminated the Wedge Pack at the behest of Diamond M Ranch, a
24 livestock producer that has consistently refused to cooperate with WDFW in implementing non-
25 lethal conflict-prevention measures, as required by the Plan, preferring to take losses from its
26 herds and to demand that the state respond by eliminating the pack. In public statements to the
27

1 media, representatives of the Diamond M Ranch have made clear their hatred for wolves, and
2 disdain of government agencies and conservation efforts.

3 66. In July 2012, Diamond M claimed that wolves injured multiple cows and calves,
4 and killed one calf, although WDFW investigators questioned whether wolves were involved
5 in many of these incidents. The investigative reports show that in many cases, investigators
6 were unable to draw a definitive conclusion about these attacks, and at least one attack was
7 confirmed to have been by a cougar. For a calf killed on July 12, 2012, WDFW found
8 “reasonable physical evidence” of wolf involvement, and on July 14, 2012, a WDFW
9 investigator was “reasonably confident” that wolves had injured two additional calves.

10 67. During the third week of July 2012, Diamond M hosted a meeting of senior
11 WDFW staff and elected officials, including Fish & Wildlife Commissioner Gary Douvia;
12 WDFW Director Phil Anderson, Wildlife Program Director Nate Pamplin and Wolf Policy
13 Lead Steve Pozzanghera; Stevens County Commissioner Don Dashiell; state legislators Sen.
14 Bob Morton, Rep. Joel Kretz, and Rep. Shelly Short (from the 7th Legislative District, where
15 Diamond M is located); and President of the Stevens County Cattleman Association Scott
16 Nielson.

17 68. Following this meeting, WDFW made the decision to start killing wolves after
18 Diamond M reported another injured calf on August 2, 2012—even though the responding
19 WDFW investigator reported that he “did not believe it was a wolf encounter,” and after
20 consulting with another biologist, concluded that it “could not be confirmed as a wolf
21 predation.” Nevertheless, on August 7, 2012, WDFW authorized the killing of up to two of the
22 Wedge wolves. Later that day, a WDFW sharpshooter killed one young female member of the
23 Wedge Pack. In the following weeks, WDFW authorized the killing of up to four additional
24 wolves, but its hunters on the ground were unable to locate additional wolves.

25 69. Many objected that these actions failed to adhere to the Plan that had just been
26 adopted. For example, in late August 2012, Sen. Kevin Ranker, the Chair of the Washington
27 State Senate Committee on Energy, Natural Resources and Marine Waters, sent a letter of

1 inquiry to WDFW about its continued efforts to kill the Wedge wolves, emphasizing that
2 “[w]hen it comes to the serious action of lethally removing state-endangered wolves, straying
3 from the Plan’s very specific intent will only heighten controversy and ultimately delay wolf
4 recovery and delisting.”

5 70. But WDFW ignored these pleas to return to the intent of the Plan, as Diamond
6 M reported additional losses from its unattended livestock and pressured WDFW to kill more
7 wolves. On August 21, for example, one of the proprietors of Diamond M called Commissioner
8 Douvia, with whom he had met in July, to demand that WDFW take more action—telling
9 Douvia that he had taken 20% of his cattle out of the Wedge area, but that he did not know the
10 location of the remaining 80% of his herd. By September, WDFW claimed that the Wedge Pack
11 had been responsible for 11 cattle injuries and 4 deaths, although it did not tell the public that
12 it had been unable to confirm that wolves were responsible for many of these predations—or
13 that the majority of these cattle were roaming through vast public lands with no human
14 supervision or attempts at non-lethal deterrent measures.

15 71. On September 21, 2012, WDFW announced that it was targeting the entire
16 Wedge Pack for removal, and called in helicopter sharpshooters to run down members of the
17 pack and shoot them from the air. Over a three-day period, WDFW used the location data from
18 the wolves that it had collared to kill six additional members of the pack, including the breeding
19 pair, the alpha male and female. By the end, the state had killed seven wolves, or 14% of the
20 wolves in the state, and eliminated one of only eight confirmed wolf packs. All that remained
21 of the once thriving Wedge Pack was a single wolf. WDFW spent at least \$77,000 to remove
22 the Wedge Pack at the behest of a single uncooperative livestock owner, insisting that doing so
23 was necessary to “lay a foundation for sustainable, long-term wolf recovery in the region.”

24 72. In a September 28, 2012 letter to WDFW, Sen. Ranker said that the destruction
25 of the entire Wedge Pack represented a “serious failure,” and called on WDFW to take steps to
26 ensure that it was not repeated. Sen. Ranker noted that while he was “gratified that numerous
27 ranchers and other residents of northeast Washington have worked tirelessly with [WDFW] to

1 avoid wildlife conflicts,” he was concerned by the high number of attacks on “certain ranches”
2 that refused to participate in prevention efforts. Wrote Ranker: “I fear that the Department’s
3 actions in the Wedge will be viewed by some who do not support wolf recovery as setting a
4 precedent that localized public pressure can dictate wolf plan implementation, including lethal
5 removal decisions.”

6 **F. WDFW Develops First “Protocol” for Wolf Killing Program**

7 73. Following the elimination of the Wedge Pack, Plaintiffs and six other
8 organizations filed administrative petitions requesting that WDFW go through rulemaking to
9 adopt regulations on when it could kill endangered wolves. WDFW refused. Instead, the
10 Commission granted WDFW’s request to use an informal “protocol” and “flowchart” to guide
11 its considerations for lethal removal, so it could retain “flexibility” in making these decisions.
12 As a proxy for public involvement, the Commission decided WDFW would informally consult
13 the WAG for nonbinding input on its protocols, and hired an independent facilitator to revisit
14 the responsibilities of the WAG and coordinate WAG meetings. After extensive meetings with
15 the facilitator that focused on the importance of process, developing relationships, and
16 consensus, the WAG agreed to a “sufficient consensus” model, whereby each of the members
17 of the WAG would agree to publicly support the group’s decisions, even if they did not agree
18 with them.

19 74. None of WDFW’s “protocols” that WDFW subsequently developed in 2014,
20 2016 and 2016 to guide its wolf killing program were subjected to rulemaking, formal public
21 review and comment, outside scientific assessment, or a SEPA environmental impact
22 determination.

23 75. On January 1, 2014, WDFW released the “Protocol for Lethal Removal of Gray
24 Wolves in Washington During Recovery” (“2014 Protocol”) which it noted was “intended as
25 advisement to WDFW.” The 2014 Protocol largely attempted to parrot the Plan, including its
26 statement that the purpose of lethal removal was to kill “offending wolves.”

1 76. The 2014 Protocol indicated WDFW would consider killing wolves when there
2 had been between two and four livestock predations over a four-month time period, requiring
3 that only one of those predations be a confirmed kill by a wolf, while the others could be
4 suspected wolf attacks and injuries. The 2014 Protocol also provided that WDFW could extend
5 the four-month time period to six months if it determined that predations had been “chronic or
6 excessive.”

7 77. Prior to killing wolves, the 2014 Protocol advised that WDFW should confirm
8 that “essential non-lethal measures consistent with the Livestock-Wolf Mitigation Checklist”
9 and the Plan “have been tried but failed to resolve the conflict, depredations are likely to
10 continue, and there is no other evidence of intentional feeding or unnatural attraction of wolves
11 by the livestock producer.” The WAG did not agree to use of the 2014 Protocol, but rather than
12 continuing discussion, WDFW unexpectedly released it on January 24, 2014.

13 **G. WDFW Targets Wolves in Huckleberry Pack**

14 78. Following the release of the 2014 Protocol, WDFW targeted the Huckleberry
15 Pack for elimination, and succeeded in killing one wolf. WDFW targeted the pack in order to
16 protect sheep belonging to a producer who had refused to cooperate with WDFW, and who left
17 his sheep largely unsupervised to widely disperse in rugged, steep terrain in the middle of the
18 Huckleberry Pack’s territory.

19 79. On August 20, 2014, WDFW issued a permit allowing WDFW employees and
20 the affected livestock producer to kill two wolves on sight. WDFW indicated at that point that
21 it had confirmed that wolves had killed 16 sheep in four separate incidents, and that radio collar
22 data had confirmed that at least one member of the Huckleberry Pack was at the site at the time.

23 80. On August 21, 2014, Petitioners and six other conservation organizations wrote
24 to ask WDFW to rescind the kill order because it was “providing conflicting information about
25 what measures are being taken; offers of feasible nonlethal methods that could be helpful are
26 not being accepted; there have been lapses in sufficient staffing and vigilance; and an order for
27

1 lethal control has been issued even though there hasn't been a wolf seen yet to try some
2 nonlethal, injurious harassment tools already available on-site.”

3 81. Just a day later, however, WDFW declared that the requirements of the 2014
4 Protocol had been met, and authorized lethal removal of up to four members of the Huckleberry
5 Pack. WDFW contracted with a helicopter sharpshooter from U.S. Wildlife Services, providing
6 them with instructions not to shoot the alpha male or female of the pack. On August 23, the
7 sharpshooter shot and killed the pack's alpha female.

8 82. After failing in its efforts to shoot additional wolves, on August 26, 2014,
9 Wildlife Services set leg traps to attempt to capture additional members of the pack. No wolves
10 were captured by the traps, and no more sheep were killed. On August 29, Wildlife Services
11 removed both the helicopter and the leg traps.

12 83. On September 17, 2014, the Stevens County Commissioners (including WAG
13 member Don Dashiell), passed a resolution declaring that WDFW had “failed to honor its
14 obligation,” and informing it that if it did not return to kill the rest of the Huckleberry Pack, the
15 Commissioners would “consider all available options to protect the residents of Stevens
16 County, their families and their property.” WDFW asked the Commissioners to rescind the
17 resolution, but the Commissioners refused.

18 84. The Stevens County Cattlemen's Association estimated damage to the sheep
19 herd would cost about \$5,000, and WDFW paid Dave Dashiell compensation for his losses.
20 Meanwhile, the Huckleberry operation cost the state a total of \$53,000, with nearly \$27,000
21 spent on the expenses to kill one wolf.

22 85. Following the Huckleberry Pack action, WDFW prepared a map in response to
23 requests from a state legislator, which shows the unsupervised sheep had wandered far from the
24 private timber company land where they were supposed to be grazing, and were instead on state
25 Department of Natural Resources land, where the producer had no grazing rights. Indeed, 84%
26 of the sheep that had purportedly been killed by wolves had wandered onto public lands where
27 they were not authorized to be, and for which the livestock producer was paying no fees.

1 **H. U.S. Wildlife Services Enjoined From Participating in WDFW Wolf Kills Due to**
2 **Lack of Appropriate Environmental Review**

3 86. In March 2015, Cascadia Wildlands, along with three other environmental
4 organizations, filed suit against U.S. Wildlife Services, alleging that it failed to do the proper
5 review under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) before contracting with
6 WDFW to kill members of the Huckleberry Pack. The suit challenged Wildlife Services’ final
7 Environmental Assessment for Wolf Damage Management in Washington, in which Wildlife
8 Services made a Finding of No Significant Impact, authorizing Wildlife Services to contract
9 with WDFW to kill wolves in eastern Washington.

10 87. The federal district court in Tacoma granted summary judgment in favor of the
11 plaintiffs in December 2015, finding that Wildlife Services had failed to take the required “hard
12 look” at the likely effects of lethal wolf removal on gray wolf populations and their ecosystems.
13 *Cascadia Wildlands v. Woodruff*, 151 F. Supp. 3d 1153, 1164-67 (W.D. Wa. 2015). The court
14 found that Wildlife Services could not rely on the EIS and Plan to kill wolves at the behest of
15 WDFW. In particular, the court found that the Plan was not specific about when lethal versus
16 non-lethal removal should be used, and did not specify the protocols to be used. It also found
17 that the Plan was nonbinding and subject to changes or additions by WDFW. The court found
18 that Wildlife Services was required by NEPA to conduct an Environmental Impact Statement
19 because its actions killing wolves in Washington on behalf of WDFW were likely to be highly
20 controversial and the effects were highly uncertain, particularly given the dispute within the
21 scientific community regarding whether lethal wolf removal actually reduced livestock
22 predation. The court also found that Wildlife Services had failed to consider the cumulative
23 impact on wolf conservation and population management. It ordered that Wildlife Services stop
24 participating in actions to kill wolves in Washington until and unless it completed the required
25 Environmental Impact Statement.

26 88. During the 2015 grazing season, while the federal lawsuit was pending, WDFW
27 considered further lethal action against the Huckleberry Pack after a dog guarding a sheep flock

1 was injured in an encounter with a wolf. Because of the sheep predations in 2014, WDFW
2 indicated its intent to re-initiate lethal control if there was another predation in 2015. However,
3 non-lethal deterrents were successful in preventing any additional predations related to the
4 Huckleberry Pack in 2015. Similarly, after WDFW reported four wolf-related predations of
5 cattle by the Dirty Shirt Pack in 2015, it worked with the owner to implement non-lethal
6 deterrents that successfully prevented additional predations.

7 **I. Increasing Number of Studies Show Lethal Control is Not Effective**

8 89. At the same time that WDFW was developing a new protocol to kill wolves and
9 making attempts to kill members of the Huckleberry Pack, there was a wave of new scientific
10 research that challenged the efficacy of lethal control policies, and found that non-lethal
11 measures were both cheaper and more cost-effective at stopping predations. WDFW at best
12 ignored, and at worst, actively tried to suppress, this research.

13 90. In 2013, a policy review was published that challenged the last 100 years of
14 government policy of lethal control of wildlife to benefit livestock producers, finding that the
15 policy damaged the ecosystem and was ineffective at reducing predation in the long term, and
16 recommending that government agencies cease all lethal control in federal wilderness areas,
17 and instead train livestock producers in non-lethal control methods. Bradley J. Bergstrom, et.
18 al., *License to Kill: Reforming Federal Wildlife Control to Restore Biodiversity and Ecosystem*
19 *Function*, 7 CONSERVATION LETTERS 131, 142 (2014).

20 91. On May 1, 2014, a study was published comparing the costs of lethal and non-
21 lethal predator management, and finding that non-lethal mitigation can reduce predation and
22 can be economically advantageous compared to lethal methods of predator control. J.S.
23 McManus, et. al., *Dead or Alive? Comparing Costs and Benefits of Lethal and Non-Lethal*
24 *Human-Wildlife Conflict Mitigation on Livestock Farms*, FAUNA & FLORA INTERNATIONAL 1
25 (2014) (the “McManus Study”).

26 92. On May 2, 2014, a study was published questioning the assumption that
27 intolerance for predators, including wolves, was tied to perceived threats to livelihoods, such

1 as from livestock owners. The study suggested illegal poaching of predators was more
2 influenced by social factors, and that negative attitudes that led to poaching may be reinforced,
3 rather than decreased, by government-sanctioned predator killing. Adrian Treves and Jeremy
4 Bruskotter, *Tolerance for Predatory Wildlife*, 344 *Science* 476, 476-77 (2014).

5 93. In 2014, under contract with WDFW, Western Wildlife Outreach prepared an
6 annotated scientific literature review that annotated over 50 peer-reviewed papers related to the
7 topic of reducing and avoiding conflicts livestock and wolves. The report includes extensive
8 recommendations as to measures that it determined would be most effective in Washington,
9 and is available on WDFW's website.⁷ The consensus of these studies was that nonlethal
10 methods, when used appropriately, provide the best method for reducing and avoiding wolf-
11 livestock conflict. The research found that livestock were a secondary prey source for wolves,
12 and were killed opportunistically when they were encountered. Specifically, it observed that
13 researchers had demonstrated that livestock proximity to den location correlated with higher
14 wolf predations, and recommended management strategies to move livestock away from wolf
15 core areas, especially denning and rendezvous areas. The primary finding of the Western
16 Wildlife Outreach literature review was that site and operational factors needed to be considered
17 for each individual livestock operation in order for non-lethal deterrents to be effectively
18 deployed.

19 94. On October 29, 2014, the University of Washington co-hosted a discussion panel
20 with the Pacific Wolf Coalition, which brought together scientists from around the country.⁸
21 Several members of the Commission, WDFW employees, and elected officials attended the
22 October 2014 symposium, and WDFW Wolf Policy Lead Donny Martorello spoke at the
23 opening of the panel, describing the status of wolves in Washington. Dr. Robert Wielgus,
24

25 ⁷ L. Smith and J. Hutchinson, *Living with Livestock & Wolves, Wolf-Livestock nonlethal Conflict Avoidance: A*
26 *review of the Literature*, available at
27 https://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/gray_wolf/livestock/wolf_livestock_conflict_avoidance_literature_review_11_2014_final_submitted_version.pdf.

⁸ A video of the panel is available at <http://www.pacificwolves.org/videos/>.

1 director of WSU’s Large Carnivore Conservation Lab, discussed his recent study, which found
2 that there was a 5% increase in predation for both cattle and sheep for every wolf that was
3 killed. Dr. Douglas Smith, from Yellowstone National Park, concluded that killing wolves
4 reduces social cohesion in packs and causes wolves to disperse, and that dispersing wolves and
5 smaller packs are more likely to hunt livestock. Dr. Adrian Treves, from the University of
6 Wisconsin-Madison, discussed his studies that found that lethal removal actions in Michigan
7 actually shortened the period between subsequent predations.

8 95. Based on the panel discussion, a subsequent white paper concluded that the
9 WAG would benefit from regular consultation with outside scientists, and might consider
10 expanding its membership to include at least one wolf researcher. The white paper further
11 suggested that Washington should rethink how lethal control was implemented, including
12 focusing on time and location recommendations for decreasing the impact of lethal removal,
13 and making it mandatory for livestock owners to implement site-specific conflict prevention
14 plans before lethal control is undertaken.

15 96. On December 3, 2014, Wielgus published “Effects of Wolf Mortality on
16 Livestock Depredations” (“Wielgus Study”), following review by WDFW, which had funded
17 the research. The Wielgus Study assessed the effects of wolf mortality on reducing livestock
18 predations in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming from 1987 to 2012, and found that, contrary to
19 expectations, increased wolf mortality was positively associated with an increase in predations
20 the following year. The trend continued with a 5 to 6% increase in cattle predations for every
21 wolf killed, until wolf mortality exceeded the wolf population growth rate of 25%—a level that
22 was unsustainable for continued wolf populations. Wielgus indicated that one reason for the
23 link between wolf killing and livestock predation might be that killing wolves caused pack
24 instability, which caused the dispersal of wolves and allowed for an increase in the number of
25 breeding pairs.

26 97. The Wielgus Study was heralded nationwide as a significant advance in the
27 understanding of the effects of lethal control. For example, *National Geographic* reported that

1 the Wielgus Study “flies in the face of the common idea that the swiftest and surest way to deal
2 with wolves threatening livestock is by shooting the predators,” and “adds to a growing
3 understanding of how humans influence the complex dynamics driving these pack animals,
4 sometimes with unexpected consequences.”⁹

5 98. Wielgus’s 2014 paper also provoked furious backlash from those who wanted
6 to see WDFW continue killing wolves. In a December 3, 2014 *New York Times* article, a
7 spokesperson for the Stevens County Cattlemen’s Association said the study was “shameful”
8 and “not clean science,” and accused it of having a predetermined pro-wolf conclusion because
9 it was funded by WDFW.¹⁰ As a result of pressure from Rep. Joel Kretz over the study, WSU
10 stopped publicizing Wielgus’s work, and ultimately agreed with Kretz and WDFW to take
11 Wielgus’s name off of WSU’s continuing grants for wolf research in exchange for continued
12 funding. Following a demand by Kretz that Wielgus be investigated for scientific misconduct,
13 however, WSU ultimately refused. After an independent review of Wielgus’s research by the
14 director of the Center for Interdisciplinary Statistical Education and Research, the university
15 concluded there was “no evidence of research misconduct.”

16 99. Although Wielgus had regularly appeared before the WAG, WDFW and the
17 legislature to discuss the ongoing research that WDFW was funding on interactions between
18 wolves and livestock, after the Wielgus Study was published, he was not invited back.

19 100. Instead of asking Wielgus to discuss the research that WDFW had funded, on
20 September 25, 2014, WDFW invited Elizabeth Bradley from Montana Fish, Wildlife and Parks
21 to speak to the WAG. Bradley described the results of a forthcoming study, which she said
22 found that removal of entire packs would decrease predations for a while, but that partial pack
23 removal was not effective. On July 6, 2015, Bradley published the article that she had previewed

25 ⁹ Warren Cornwall, *Why Killing Wolves Might Not Save Livestock*, National Geographic, Dec. 3, 2014,
26 <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2014/12/141203-wolves-hunting-livestock-ranchers-endangered-species-environment/>

27 ¹⁰ Kirk Johnson, *Study Faults Efforts at Wolf Management*, New York Times, Dec. 3, 2014,
<https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/us/washington-state-study-faults-efforts-at-wolf-management.html>.

1 for the WAG (“Bradley Study”). It looked at statistics from Montana, Idaho, and Wyoming
2 from 1989 to 2009, to study the effects on predation of no action, partial pack removal, and full
3 pack removal. Bradley found that killing entire packs significantly reduced predations in a
4 localized area. She found that partial pack removal was somewhat more effective than no action
5 if performed within the first seven days of a predation, but after that time, there was only a
6 marginal difference, with no difference at all if it was conducted after 14 days following a
7 predation. Her study did not examine whether any difference that she detected was due to the
8 increased human presence that came with partial pack removal, or whether there would have
9 been the same, or a more significant, decrease in predations if non-lethal deterrents were used.
10 In an interview on January 25, 2016, Bradley emphasized her opinion that removing “one [wolf]
11 here and one there” was ineffective, and that it was better to immediately kill entire packs in
12 response to predations.¹¹

13 101. On January 1, 2016, researchers in Italy published a study that examined why
14 wolves preyed on livestock, and found that the rate of predation was decreased by the presence
15 of stable packs, instead of dispersing wolves; the adoption of non-lethal preventative measures
16 by livestock owners; and the availability of other prey. The research suggested that wolf
17 management focus on increasing prey abundance and non-lethal deterrents in lieu of using
18 lethal controls. Camille Imbert, et. al., *Why Do Wolves Eat Livestock? Factors Influencing Wolf*
19 *Diet in Northern Italy*, 195 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 156, 156-68 (2016).

20 102. On May 11, 2016, Adrian Treves and Guillaume Chapron published a study
21 examining the hypothesis used by many wolf management programs that state-sponsored wolf
22 culls were necessary to control poaching and improve public acceptance of wolf populations.
23 Looking at wolf populations and policy in Wisconsin and Michigan, they found state lethal
24 control actually increased poaching and decreased social acceptance of wolves. The authors
25 wrote: “When the government kills a protected species, the perceived value of each individual
26

27 ¹¹ Andy Walgamott, *Another ‘Counterintuitive’ Study on Wolf Depredations*, Northwest Sportsman Magazine,
Jan. 25, 2016, <http://nwsportsmanmag.com/wolf-news/another-counterintuitive-study-wolf-depredations/>.

1 of that species may decline. Liberalized wolf culling may have sent a negative message about
2 the value of wolves or that poaching prohibitions would not be enforced.” Adrian Treves &
3 Guillaume Chapron, *Blood Does Not Buy Goodwill: Allowing Culling Increases Poaching of a*
4 *Large Carnivore*, 283 PROC. R. SOC. B 1, 5 (2016) (“Chapron/Treves Study”).

5 103. Treves co-authored another study published on September 1, 2016, which
6 surveyed the scientific literature to date, and found there was little evidence that killing
7 predators accomplishes the goal of protecting livestock. Treves found that the studies of non-
8 lethal methods of control applied higher standards of evidence than the tests of lethal predator
9 control, and that “non-lethal methods were more effective than lethal methods in preventing
10 carnivore predation on livestock generally” and were not shown to have any negative effects,
11 while studies showed that both government culling and public hunting “were followed by
12 increases in predation on livestock.” Adrian Treves, et al., *Predator Control Should Not Be a*
13 *Shot in the Dark*, 14 FRONTIERS IN ECOLOGY & ENV’T 380, 380 (2016) (“Treves Study”). The
14 Treves Study recommended suspending lethal predator control methods until tests were
15 completed that showed that they had effectiveness in preventing livestock loss.

16 104. Once again, this study was recognized as bringing an important shift to wolf
17 management programs. *National Geographic* proclaimed that “The Case for Mass Slaughter of
18 Predators Just Got Weaker,” specifically mentioning that the Treves Study challenged
19 WDFW’s rationale for authorizing the removal of the Profanity Peak Pack in order to decrease
20 wolf predation.¹² The article quoted Doug Smith, a senior wildlife biologist with Yellowstone
21 National Park, who said the Treves Study filled a gap in the understanding of lethal control
22 methods and it was “about time that lethal and nonlethal control had a critical evaluation.”
23 Smith also pointed out that it would be difficult to persuade livestock owners to shift away from
24 lethal control because it was a quick and easy fix with short-term results.

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26
27 ¹² Jani Actman, *The Case for Mass Slaughter of Predators Just Got Weaker*, National Geographic, September 1,
2016, <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/09/wildlife-lethal-nonlethal-predator-control-hunting-evidence/>.

1 105. In February 2017, the *Journal of Mammalogy* published a special feature
2 presenting data showing that “nonlethal methods of preventing depredation of livestock by large
3 carnivores may be more effective, more defensible on ecological, legal, and wildlife-policy
4 grounds, and more tolerated by society than lethal methods.” Bradley J. Bergstrom, *Carnivore*
5 *Conservation: Shifting the Paradigm From Control to Coexistence*, 98 JOURNAL OF
6 MAMMALOGY 1, 1 (2017). The special feature included a study based on seven years of research
7 on non-lethal deterrence measures to protect sheep herds in Idaho, which found that sheep
8 losses were 3.5 times higher in areas that did not use the deterrence measures, and that when
9 deterrence measures were used without killing wolves, sheep predation losses decreased to just
10 0.02% of the total sheep present, the lowest loss rate statewide. Suzanne Stone, et al., *Adaptive*
11 *Use of Nonlethal Strategies for Minimizing Wolf-Sheep Conflict in Idaho*, 98 JOURNAL OF
12 MAMMALOGY 33, 33 (2017). The special issue also included a study of predator control in
13 Australia, which found that “ending lethal control may in itself reduce livestock losses by
14 enabling the predator’s social structure to stabilize,” and a study related to the hunting of wolves
15 in Michigan, which found that hunting did not reduce threats to livestock or human safety, or
16 meet any standards for wildlife management. Arian D. Wallach, et al., *Cattle Mortality on a*
17 *Predator Friendly Station in Central Australia*, 98 JOURNAL OF MAMMALOGY 45, 45 (2017);
18 John A. Vucetich, et al., *Evaluating the Principles of Wildlife Conservation: a Case Study of*
19 *Wolf (Canis Lupus) Hunting in Michigan, United States*, 98 JOURNAL OF MAMMALOGY 53, 53
20 (2017).

21 106. WDFW willfully ignored the mounting research demonstrating that killing
22 wolves would not help it to either achieve conservation goals or limit livestock losses. Although
23 it had funded the Wielgus Study, and reviewed it before publication, after it saw the backlash
24 from livestock producers, it pretended the study did not exist. Under increasing pressure to take
25 the developing science into account, the Commission eventually directed WDFW to prepare a
26 “science panel” at a Commission hearing to discuss wolf management. However, WDFW
27 refused requests to ask an independent third party to empanel experts for the presentation, to

1 produce a white paper that would be subject to peer review, or to allow public and expert
2 comment on WDFW's conclusions.

3 107. Instead, WDFW staff, led by Martorello, gave a science presentation on
4 February 10, 2017 that included no input from third-party experts ("February 2017 Panel").
5 Although the posted minutes from this Commission meeting indicate that WDFW staff briefed
6 the Commission on "the body of wolf science," in fact the February 2017 Panel only reported
7 on six studies. Dozens of relevant studies, including many mentioned above, were missing from
8 the discussion. Most notably, the February 2017 Panel ignored substantial research that WDFW
9 had funded, and which was contemplated by the Plan as essential: there was no mention of any
10 of the intensive work WDFW had funded through the WSU Large Carnivore Lab, including the
11 Wielgus Study, or of the comprehensive literature review and recommendations on wolf-
12 livestock conflict avoidance that Western Wildlife Outreach had performed under contract with
13 WDFW.

14 108. Nevertheless, the February 2017 Panel did consider some studies that caused
15 WDFW to acknowledge the need to reevaluate its program. During the panel, Martorello gave
16 a presentation on the Chapron/Treves Study, which upended the old conventional (but
17 unsupported) wisdom that state-sponsored lethal control was necessary to maintain social
18 tolerance of wolves. Martorello said the study compelled WDFW to question the goal of lethal
19 removal: "Is it tolerance? Is it to minimize reoccurring depredations? What is it? Where do we
20 have the science to back up what that goal is?" Martorello also discussed the Treves Study,
21 which found the research supporting the effectiveness of lethal control was so substandard it
22 did not support current policies. Based on this study, he similarly concluded that WDFW needed
23 to "really hone in" on its objective for lethal removal.

24 **J. WDFW Issues 2016 Kill Protocol**

25 109. Unfortunately, WDFW has refused to this day to conduct the reevaluation of its
26 policies that Martorello conceded was necessary during the February 2017 Panel. Instead,
27 WDFW has continued its wolf killing program under the guise of new protocols, which shift

1 the justification for killing wolves farther and farther away from the purposes contemplated by
2 the Plan.

3 110. On May 31, 2016, WDFW issued a new “Protocol for consideration and
4 implementation of lethal removal of gray wolves during recovery to stop wolf depredation on
5 livestock” (“2016 Protocol”). WDFW ignored objections from some members of the WAG in
6 releasing the 2016 Protocol, falsely proclaiming that the WAG had unanimously agreed to
7 support the protocol, and that it thus “represents input and considerations from numerous
8 individuals representing Department staff, livestock, producer, environmental, and hunter
9 interests.” The 2016 Protocol provided that WDFW may kill wolves to stop predations on
10 livestock if it had documented:

- 11 1) four or more confirmed wolf predation events within a calendar year, or six
12 or more within two consecutive years;
- 13 2) at least one confirmed predation resulted in the death of livestock;
- 14 3) the producer had used proper sanitation procedures to remove carcasses that
15 would attract wolves, as well as one proactive non-lethal deterrent measure that
16 had been in place a sufficient amount of time prior to a confirmed predation;
- 17 4) WDFW expects predations to continue; and
- 18 5) WDFW has notified the public of the chronology of events leading to the kill
19 order, including all confirmed wolf predations and the non-lethal deterrence
20 measures that had been used.

21 111. The 2016 Protocol shifted away from the purposes of lethal control in the Plan
22 and EIS. Instead of targeting “problem wolves” to secure “social tolerance,” the 2016 Protocol
23 indicated that it aimed to “stop depredations from continuing in the near future.” The 2016
24 Protocol stated that the objective of killing wolves was to “stop livestock depredations by
25 removing as few wolves as possible,” and that ideally WDFW would start out with killing just
26 one or two wolves, then progress to partial pack removal, before making a decision to kill the
27 entire pack. However, it noted that WDFW “has full discretion on how many wolves to
remove.”

1 112. The 2016 Protocol did not undergo any outside scientific assessment, and
2 WDFW did not conduct any analysis of whether lethal control would be effective at reducing
3 livestock predations. Nor did it weigh the effectiveness of lethal versus non-lethal control after
4 predations occurred; look at the effects of lethal control on wolf ecology, reproduction and pack
5 dynamics; examine whether killing wolves decreased social tolerance for them; analyze the
6 importance of keeping livestock away from core wolf areas such as den or rendezvous sites; or
7 consider whether there should be different thresholds for killings wolves on public versus
8 private lands.

9 **K. WDFW Targets Profanity Peak Pack for Destruction**

10 113. In August 2016, WDFW once again targeted an entire wolf pack for
11 extermination at the behest of the Diamond M Ranch, against the recommendations of WSU
12 wildlife biologists who were working with wolves and livestock in that area. WDFW all but
13 destroyed the Profanity Peak Pack by killing seven of its 11 wolves, or about 10% of the state's
14 confirmed wolf population at the time. Once again, Diamond M had refused to use effective
15 deterrent measures and declined the state's offer to compensate it for its losses. But this time,
16 the evidence also shows that Diamond M had knowingly provided an "unnatural attraction" to
17 the wolves, by placing salt blocks for its livestock within 200 yards of the wolf den, and leaving
18 them there for several weeks after it knew the salt blocks were causing its cattle to swarm around
19 the den location. Records produced in response to public disclosure requests indicate the salt
20 blocks were only moved because WDFW had placed traps near the den to kill wolves, and was
21 afraid the cattle milling around the den would get caught by them.

22 114. In 2014, the Profanity Peak Pack was first documented in the area of a 30,000-
23 acre tract of remote and rugged land in the Colville National Forest where Diamond M grazes
24 its cattle. In the spring of 2016, the pack was estimated to consist of six adult wolves, including
25 a successful breeding pair, and five new pups. Earlier that year, the female wolf in the Profanity
26 Peak Pack that WDFW had outfitted with a radio collar had left the pack and paired with a male
27 to form the new Sherman Pack. This temporarily left WDFW without a collared wolf in the

1 Profanity Peak Pack, but on June 9 and 12, WDFW captured and collared an adult male and an
2 adult female belonging to the pack.

3 115. Diamond M turned its cattle out onto its grazing allotment between June 8 and
4 10, 2016, at which time the current den site of the Profanity Peak Pack was unknown. By the
5 end of June, however, WDFW had confirmed the pack's den site. WDFW was aided in this
6 determination by a team of WSU researchers, who were in the area researching cattle-wolf
7 interactions, and monitoring both collared wolves and collared cattle from cooperating ranches.
8 According to the *Seattle Times*, WDFW informed Diamond M of the den site almost
9 immediately, while Diamond M independently found the den site at almost the same time.¹³

10 116. Through the WSU research team, WDFW also knew by the end of June that the
11 Profanity Peak den was within 200 yards of where Diamond M had placed salt blocks for its
12 cattle, causing cattle to congregate in the immediate vicinity of the den and a nearby rendezvous
13 site. WSU cameras filmed the wolves and their pups frolicking in the area next to the den within
14 days, hours, and sometimes even minutes of cattle traversing the same path in search of the
15 salt.¹⁴ A WGU graduate student wrote in his thesis that “everywhere [the Profanity Peak]
16 wolves went there were cattle,” and noted that the pack started to kill cattle only after the cattle
17 had been overwhelming its den and rendezvous site for days.

18 117. Despite their knowledge of this proximity, however, neither WDFW nor
19 Diamond M took any steps to move the salt blocks, to move the cattle, or to deploy more people
20 to watch the cattle. At the time, Diamond M staff only checked on the cattle a couple of times
21 a week.

22 118. On July 8, 2016, a WDFW staff member found a dead calf belonging to
23 Diamond M, and WDFW confirmed that the calf had been killed by wolves. Following the first
24 predation, Wielgus, who was leading the WSU team, called Martorello multiple times to urge

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26 ¹³ Lynda V. Mapes, *A War Over Wolves: Outspoken Researcher Says His University and Lawmakers Silenced and Punished Him*, *Seattle Times*, http://projects.seattletimes.com/2017/ws-u-wolf-researcher-wielgus/?utm_source=email_share&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=projects.

27 ¹⁴ See <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9umv3j1yBP4>.

1 him to take action to have the salt blocks removed before they created further conflict. Yet the
2 salt blocks stayed in place.

3 119. In its final report on the Profanity Peak operation, released on January 12, 2017,
4 WDFW said that following the first predation, it reviewed Diamond M's procedures and found
5 that they met the expectations for "proactive deterrence measures" under the 2016 Protocol.
6 This finding did not mention the fact that Diamond M had turned its cattle out onto a vast and
7 rugged landscape with virtually no supervision, had kept salt blocks in the immediate area of
8 the wolf den, and had taken no action to herd its cattle away from the den.

9 120. Instead, WDFW maintained that it had determined that Diamond M had met the
10 criteria for proactive deterrence measures because it had waited to turn out its calves until they
11 were over 200 pounds and less vulnerable. But WDFW knew this was not true. In an internal
12 email written on July 15, 2016, Martorello indicated that Diamond M's calves were "early born,
13 so calf weights at turnout were generally at or above 200 lbs.," but admitted that "some calves
14 were below this weight." The reports from WDFW's predation investigations show that many
15 of the Diamond M calves killed by wolves throughout July were just around, or even below,
16 200 pounds, even after they had been grazing for four to six weeks.

17 121. In the chronology of events maintained on its website, WDFW also maintained
18 that Diamond M had satisfied the 2016 Protocol's "sanitation requirement" by *allowing WDFW*
19 *to remove the calf carcass it had found on July 8, 2017.* But, as Martorello acknowledged in a
20 phone conversation, removing carcasses *after* a predation is not the proactive sanitation the
21 protocol envisioned, which requires livestock owners to remove carcasses of livestock that have
22 died from any cause in order to not attract wolves in the first place. WDFW was vague when
23 asked whether carcasses of other cows and calves were regularly removed from the allotment,
24 which it described as "dense and rugged," with only one road access point.

25 122. WDFW also reported that the ranch had staff on the allotment about twice a
26 week, and that Diamond M was arranging for some additional hands to help monitor its herds.
27 In the chronology of events, WDFW reported that Diamond M had hired two additional people

1 to patrol the range by “horseback and/or foot.” However, it told the WAG on September 2,
2 2016, that these people were just attempting to navigate the 30,000-acre parcel on foot. WDFW
3 did not make clear how often these people were present, or whether they were there to deter
4 wolves, or just to move cattle around the allotment.

5 123. Finally, WDFW reported in its chronology that a single range rider was deployed
6 onto the 30,000-acre allotment on July 12, 2016. But there was also no indication that a single
7 range rider was able to create any significant human presence in the vast territory. To the
8 contrary, it appears the range rider was not monitoring the herd very closely, because the vast
9 majority of dead cattle were found by WDFW staff, not by the range rider or ranch staff. Indeed,
10 WDFW records indicate WDFW staff were directed to monitor GPS data point clusters from
11 the collared wolves to attempt to discover more dead cattle, rather than using the collar
12 information to try to prevent conflicts.

13 124. Between July 12 and July 23, there were one additional confirmed and three
14 additional probable wolf predations of Diamond M cattle, and one confirmed predation of
15 another livestock owner’s cattle on a nearby grazing allotment. On August 3, WDFW reported
16 the fourth and fifth confirmed cattle deaths, both Diamond M calves. WDFW responded by
17 directing a “partial pack removal,” authorizing up to two adults and three pups of the Profanity
18 Peak Pack to be killed. On August 5, a helicopter sharpshooter shot and killed two adult female
19 wolves, including the pack’s breeding female.

20 125. Diamond M’s range rider finally moved the salt blocks away from the wolf den
21 on August 8, 2016—more than five weeks after the location of the wolf den was known, a
22 month after the first calf was found dead, and three days after WDFW started killing Profanity
23 Peak wolves. Indeed, WDFW only asked Diamond M to move the salt block after it started
24 trapping wolves—in part because WDFW was worried that the traps would catch cattle instead.
25 However, WSU researchers observed that even after the salt blocks were removed, the cattle
26 continued to return to the area to search for them and to lick salt on the ground, and Diamond
27 M took no action to move them away from the den to another pasture within the allotment.

1 126. Meanwhile, WDFW conducted additional trapping and hunting operations
2 through August 18, but was unable to kill more wolves due to difficulties with the rugged terrain
3 and heavy timber. After 16 days passed without another cattle predation, WDFW suspended
4 the kill order on August 18.

5 127. On August 19, WDFW documented two confirmed and two probable wolf
6 predations, all of Diamond M calves. In response, WDFW issued an order to kill all the
7 remaining nine wolves in the Profanity Peak Pack. Over the next two days, helicopter gunners
8 killed two adult males and a female pup, and mortally wounded an adult female. WDFW
9 reported in an email advisory that a wolf had been shot but her body could not be found, yet
10 assured the public that she had been humanely killed. However, the mortally wounded female
11 wolf was found three days later dragging her legs, and was only then put out of her misery.

12 128. WDFW confirmed additional predations on August 31, September 27, and
13 October 3, bringing the total to ten confirmed and five probable predations. WDFW killed an
14 adult male wolf on September 28, bringing the total number of dead wolves to seven. WDFW
15 continued unsuccessfully to try to kill the remaining four members of the pack through October
16 19, using helicopter and ground operations and hiring a local trapper. It suspended the killing
17 operation on October 19, because most of the cattle had been moved off the national forest
18 lands. One adult female and three pups escaped WDFW's sharpshooters, although biologists
19 speculated that with the pack decimated, the three pups might have died of starvation. By 2017,
20 WDFW indicated that the Profanity Peak Pack had disappeared. WDFW spent at least \$134,999
21 in its efforts to exterminate the Profanity Peak Pack.

22 **L. WDFW Hides the Facts of its Profanity Peak Operation**

23 129. While feigning openness, WDFW worked hard to obscure the facts throughout
24 the Profanity Peak kill operation, avoiding direct answers, telling a series of half-truths, and
25 facilitating attacks on a scientist who revealed the facts it was trying to hide. As described
26 above, WDFW had issued a number of false and misleading statements about Diamond M's
27 supposed "deterrence measures." In addition, WDFW went to great lengths to hide information

1 about the salt blocks, their proximity to the wolf den, and what it had known about this issue at
2 the time of the predations.

3 130. At various times, WDFW claimed it did not know the location of the pack's den
4 until the end of summer. However, in a September 2, 2016, email update on the Profanity Peak
5 operation, Martorello informed the WAG that WDFW knew by the end of June that the
6 Profanity Peak den was four to five miles from the cattle turnout area, and that "as cattle
7 continued to disperse through the allotment they inevitably crossed paths with the den site and
8 later with rendezvous sites." Martorello further advised that: "In one situation, the wolf
9 rendezvous site overlapped with part of the normal grazing path, where livestock were
10 concentrated with the use of salt blocks. Once that overlap was detected, the Department
11 contacted the producer, who removed the salt blocks from the area." WDFW did not disclose,
12 to either the public or the WAG, that (1) the salt block was actually *within 200 meters of the*
13 *den*; (2) it knew of this proximity by the end of June; (3) wolves only started killing cattle after
14 the salt caused cattle to congregate at the den; and (4) neither WDFW nor the producer took
15 any action to move the salt or the cattle until the kill order was already being implemented.

16 131. The location of the salt blocks only became public knowledge because it was
17 exposed by WGU Professor Rob Wielgus. In an interview with the *Seattle Times* on August 25,
18 2016, about the Profanity Peak situation, Wielgus said, "This livestock operator elected to put
19 his livestock directly on top of their den site; we have pictures of cows swamping it, I just want
20 people to know."¹⁵ Wielgus said that it was both "predictable and avoidable" that the Profanity
21 Peak Pack would start killing cattle after the cattle were left to mill around its den site.

22 132. The comment provoked another intense backlash. Rep. Kretz told the *Seattle*
23 *Times* that Wielgus "ought to be drawn and quartered and a chunk of him left everywhere in
24 the district."¹⁶ Martorello contacted WSU and dictated text for a press release issued on

25 _____
26 ¹⁵ Lynda V. Mapes, *Profanity Peak Wolf Pack in State's Gun Sights After Rancher Turns out Cattle on Den*, *Seattle Times*, Aug. 25, 2016, <http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/environment/profanity-peak-wolf-pack-in-states-gun-sights-after-rancher-turns-out-cattle-on-den/>.

27 ¹⁶ *Id.*

1 August 31, 2016. The press release “disavowed” Wielgus’s statements to the *Seattle Times*,
2 called them “inaccurate and inappropriate,” and falsely claimed that Wielgus had “subsequently
3 acknowledged” that the statements “had no basis in fact.”¹⁷ Although he helped write the
4 statement, Martorello refused WSU’s request for WDFW to release it jointly.

5 133. Nevertheless, Martorello referenced and linked to WSU’s statement in an email
6 to WAG members that he sent out two days later, in order to “make sure” the WAG members
7 were aware of the development. Meanwhile, Wielgus made no further comments because he
8 had been forbidden by WSU from having any further contact with the media.

9 134. Following this incident, WDFW funding for large carnivore studies was diverted
10 from WSU to the University of Washington, including the removal of funding for research that
11 was already under way.

12 135. Despite the fact that members of the WAG specifically asked WDFW at a
13 September 15, 2016, meeting to address the salt blocks in its final agency report on Profanity
14 Peak released in January 2017, the report makes no mention of the issue. All the report said
15 about the overlap between cattle and wolves was that a WDFW biologist had collared wolves
16 “about two miles” from cattle, and by the end of June, WDFW had confirmed that the pack’s
17 new den was four to five miles from where Diamond M turned out its cattle. Thus completely
18 ignoring the salt block issue, the report concluded Diamond M had “met the expectations for
19 non-lethal deterrence” outlined in the Plan and the 2016 Protocol. The report did not mention
20 that the kill operation violated the Plan’s *second* primary objective, to protect wolves from
21 “mortality and disturbance at den sites,” as well as a Plan provision directing lethal control to
22 be minimized near dens, and its recommendation that livestock owners avoid “grazing livestock
23 near wolf territory core areas, especially dens and rendezvous sites.”

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27 ¹⁷ *WSU Issues Statement Clarifying Comments on Wolf Pack*, August 31, 2016,
<https://news.wsu.edu/2016/08/31/wsui-issues-statement-clarifying-comments-profanity-peak-wolf-pack/>.

1 **M. WDFW Implements 2017 Protocol Designed to Kill Wolves Faster**

2 136. In a February 2017 meeting, WAG members declared that the 2016 Protocol
3 was “terrible,” and had resulted in “disaster.” These perceived failures led to discussion of
4 creating a new protocol based on lessons learned from Profanity Peak. However, instead of
5 focusing on how to avoid the proximity of the cattle to the wolf den—the factor that created the
6 Profanity Peak problem—the WAG focused on an option WDFW put forward, to start killing
7 wolves earlier.

8 137. The WAG was not given a chance to learn the real lessons of Profanity Peak,
9 because WDFW has failed to ever come clean about the events that transpired—or to
10 acknowledge to the WAG that it made a grievous error by failing to demand that the salt block
11 and cattle be moved as soon as the proximity was discovered. There is also no sign that the
12 WAG saw two studies completed by WSU and WDFW in 2016 and 2017, which pointed to the
13 conclusion that Profanity Peak was an anomaly that could have been prevented. In the 2016
14 study, WGU student Jeffrey Brown collared 588 calves in 10 herds to track mortalities over
15 two grazing seasons in wolf-occupied territory. Brown detected no wolf-caused mortalities in
16 any of the collared animals, and found that losses due to wolves were *at most* 0.81%. Brown
17 concluded that “The low mortality estimates suggest that wolves have little widespread impact
18 on livestock mortality in Washington and that livestock producers in this system are effectively
19 managing for all causes of livestock loss.”

20 138. Neither does the record reflect that the WAG ever learned the results of the 2017
21 study by WGU student Gabriel Spence, which had been under way during the Profanity Peak
22 incident. Spence used GPS to monitor 10 different wolf packs over three grazing seasons. He
23 found that most wolf packs killed no livestock, such that 94% of wolf prey in Washington
24 consists of wild ungulates. On average, wolves killed only 3 of 1,000 cattle in wolf pack
25 territory. While *all* of the packs that killed cattle had a den in an active grazing allotment,
26 Profanity Peak in 2016 was the only pack that had cattle “at the den site while it was being used
27 for wolves,” and the pack only started killing cattle after the cattle arrived at the den. Notably,

1 Spence also found the predation rate on cattle belonging to Producer X was 3 wolf-killed cows
2 per 100 cows on the range, *roughly 14 times higher* than the average for other Washington
3 livestock owners in wolf territory.

4 139. On March 14 2017, WDFW sent the WAG its “Draft Concepts and Framework”
5 for a new Protocol (“2017 Framework”). The 2017 Framework signaled a significant shift in
6 the goals of WDFW’s lethal control protocols, with the purpose of lethal control now becoming
7 to “influence pack behavior to reduce the potential for recurrent depredations while continuing
8 to promote wolf recovery.” In making this change, WDFW explicitly broke from the Plan’s
9 “social tolerance” goals of lethal removal, citing to the Chapron/Treves Study in noting that the
10 “reason for using lethal removal as a tool is *not* to increase social tolerance, as the use of lethal
11 removal may or may not have ancillary desired outcomes to social tolerance.” The 2017
12 Framework thus no longer attempted to draw any purported connection between state-
13 sponsored killing of endangered wolves and wolf recovery. Rather, it proclaimed that instead
14 of focusing on wolf recovery, it is now using a “livestock producer-centered and community
15 driven model,” through which one of WDFW’s roles is to “[r]ecognize and support livestock
16 producers’ culture of independence.” The 2017 Framework also reiterated language from the
17 2016 Protocol disclaiming the Plan’s focus on “problem wolves,” indicating that it is difficult
18 to identify the “offending pack members,” and “given this complexity,” WDFW gave itself
19 complete discretion on how many wolves to kill.

20 140. Finally, the 2017 Framework indicated in a “Note for WAG” that identifying a
21 specific number of predations as a threshold for when WDFW will consider lethal removal
22 “may be an over simplification given the complexities in real world situations, has some inherit
23 [sic] challenges, and is not generated by science.” However, WDFW acknowledged that
24 “stakeholders” want “certainty and a means to hold government accountable,” and offered to
25 accept “a number” for that reason. But WDFW punted to the WAG the decision of whether to
26 use “a number” and what that “number” would be: “Therefore, WDFW prefers to leave the
27

1 number discussion – whether or not to have a number and what number to use if so—to
2 WAG/WDFW process.”

3 141. In its March 23, 2017, comments to this document, Plaintiff Cascadia Wildlands
4 observed that WDFW was using a “quasi-scientific, experimental approach to lethal control”
5 as means of avoiding livestock conflict. Cascadia Wildlands urged WDFW to provide specific
6 guidance on “meaningful, long and short term monitoring efforts” to determine whether the
7 approach was effective, and to test the “equally viable approach” of “not killing wolves in a
8 depredation situation and measuring response.”

9 142. In separate comments dated March 28, 2017, Petitioners and five other
10 conservation organizations told WDFW that “existing science does not support moving quickly
11 to kill wolves in response to depredations as suggested by the draft protocol.” The comments
12 challenged WDFW’s apparent reliance on the Bradley Study to support this concept, pointing
13 out that the study found that partial pack removal “was only slightly more effective in reducing
14 depredation recurrence than no removal,” and that recurrence rates between partial removal and
15 no removal were virtually the same after seven days.

16 143. Wielgus asked to speak to the WAG during its next meeting on March 29-30, at
17 which it was scheduled to discuss the new protocol. Wielgus was hoping to discuss the results
18 of the research that Spence, his student, had completed for WDFW the previous summer.
19 Wielgus also sought to explain to the WAG that the Profanity Peak conflict could have been
20 avoided if the salt blocks had been moved in June after its proximity to the den was discovered,
21 and if people had been deployed at that time to keep cattle away from the den site and to move
22 them to another pasture.

23 144. Martorello told Wielgus that he could have only five minutes to address the
24 WAG during the public comment period. WAG member Tom Davis, of the Washington Farm
25 Bureau, said he would not attend the meeting if Wielgus was allowed to speak. Instead, Wielgus
26 sent written comments, conveying the results of the completed WSU field study and his
27 thoughts on Profanity Peak. Wielgus also urged the WDFW to add a requirement to the new

1 protocol, specifying that it would only kill wolves on public lands on behalf of livestock owners
2 who had signed and agreed to abide by WDFW's Cooperative Agreement, which sets forth
3 requirements for the use of deterrence measures.

4 145. None of the considerations raised by Petitioners or Wielgus were discussed
5 during the March 29-30 WAG meeting to finalize the new protocol. Rather, much of the
6 discussion centered on WDFW's unsupported hypothesis that if it killed wolves more quickly,
7 it might result in fewer predations and necessitate the killing of fewer wolves. Records do not
8 indicate that WDFW and the WAG discussed any of the science demonstrating that lethal
9 control is at best ineffective at stopping livestock predations, or the science indicating that when
10 the state kills wolves, it causes the rest of society to value them less as a species.

11 146. After more than a day of scattered discussions with no general agreement,
12 someone proposed before lunch on March 30 that WDFW "look at all the options" that had
13 been thrown out and "put together a draft statement over lunch." Following lunch, WDFW
14 proposed new "numbers," which would allow lethal removal after either 3 predations within a
15 30-day rolling window or 4 predations in a 10-month rolling window, if livestock producers
16 "meet[] expectations" for two appropriate deterrence measures and responsive deterrent
17 measures. After more discussion, the WAG's third-party mediator "gauge[d] the temperature"
18 of the group, concluding that there was a "general positive vibe." Following public comment,
19 there was more discussion, during which one WAG member said he was not "feeling great
20 about this" and had not "given approval to anything." In response, a WDFW representative
21 sympathized that "we are all in a really hard spot," but pushed for a decision on whether or not
22 the WAG can "support the policy stuff." Time was up, so soon afterward, the third-party neutral
23 declared a "sufficient consensus." Although nothing was in written form, the WAG had thus
24 decided upon the new thresholds for lethal removal.

25 147. These new thresholds were the centerpiece of the protocol WDFW issued on
26 June 1, 2017 ("2017 Protocol"). The 2017 Protocol includes WDFW's new goal, that it "may
27 consider lethal removal of wolves to attempt to change pack behavior to reduce the potential

1 for recurrent depredations while continuing to promote wolf recovery.” Although many of the
2 overt references about being “livestock-producer centered” were removed from the final 2017
3 Protocol, it espouses two new values, “supporting rural ways of life, and maintaining livestock
4 production as part of the state’s cultural and economic heritage.” The 2017 Protocol obediently
5 follows the “decision” made by the WAG and charts a quicker path to kill wolves. In contrast
6 to the 2016 Protocol, which required four *confirmed* predations in a *calendar year*, the 2017
7 Protocol allows WDFW to kill wolves if there are (1) four predations within a 10-month *rolling*
8 *window*, or (2) three predations within a 30-day rolling window. In both cases, one predation
9 may be a “probable” rather than a “confirmed” wolf predation.

10 148. The 2017 Protocol describes a “variety of proactive measures livestock
11 producers can take to reduce the probability of wolf-livestock conflicts.” These example
12 deterrence measures include “human presence” around livestock, monitoring livestock,
13 protecting calving/lambing areas, avoiding den and rendezvous sites, using scare devices, using
14 guardian or herding dogs, strategic carcass sanitation, using permanent and portable fencing,
15 delaying turnout of calves under 200 pounds, and coordination between the livestock producer
16 and the landowners. None of these proactive measures is required, but the 2017 Protocol
17 provides that WDFW may consider lethal removal only if at least two proactive or responsive
18 deterrence measures had been implemented, and had failed to meet the goal of changing pack
19 behavior. In addition, the 2017 Protocol provides that if proactive deterrence measures were
20 not in place “a sufficient amount of time prior to the wolf depredations,” WDFW would
21 consider lethal removal only at a higher number of predation events and after such measures
22 had been tried and failed to resolve the conflict.

23 149. Before killing wolves, 2017 Protocol also requires WDFW to conclude that it
24 expects predations to continue and that killing wolves is not expected to harm wolf recovery.
25 However, the 2017 Protocol provides no criteria for WDFW to use to determine whether it
26 “expects depredations to continue,” deterrence measures were “appropriate,” or killing wolves
27 will harm wolf recovery. The 2017 Protocol provides that WDFW will use an “incremental

1 removal approach,” during which it will have periods of active attempts to kill wolves, followed
2 by periods of evaluation, to see if the predations continue and to give the wolves a chance to
3 regroup so that they can be killed more easily. The 2017 Protocol also provides that WDFW
4 will no longer inform the public when it is going to remove an entire pack of wolves, although
5 “the removal of the entire pack may occur as a result of repeated incremental removals.”

6 150. WDFW did not perform any analysis of the 2017 Protocol’s likely effects versus
7 the likely effects of a different approach, such as insisting that livestock owners use more
8 effective non-lethal deterrents before lethal control is considered (including requiring livestock
9 owners to sign WDFW’s Cooperative Agreement); requiring that cattle be moved away from
10 known den or rendezvous sites on public lands; or utilizing only non-lethal methods to prevent
11 wolf predations on public lands. Despite WDFW’s earlier promises to “incorporate science into
12 the protocol,” the 2017 Protocol did not undergo any outside scientific review, and there is no
13 evidence that WDFW conducted any assessment of whether or not lethal control would be
14 effective at reducing livestock predations; weighed the effectiveness of lethal versus non-lethal
15 control after predations occurred; looked at the effects of lethal control on wolf ecology,
16 reproduction and pack dynamics; examined whether killing wolves decreased social tolerance
17 for them; analyzed the importance of keeping livestock away from core wolf areas such as den
18 or rendezvous sites; or considered whether there should be different thresholds for killings
19 wolves on public versus private lands.

20 151. To the contrary, the 2017 Protocol provides no support at all for its
21 “experimental quasi-scientific” theory that using an “incremental removal approach” and
22 killing wolves after fewer predations would be effective in stopping predations and preventing
23 more wolves from being killed, especially in light of the fact that the weight of the science
24 indicates the opposite is true. Nor does WDFW provide any rationale for using a 10-month
25 rolling window to measure predations, despite the fact that conditions for both the pack and the
26 herd can change drastically during that time. Indeed, WDFW has since admitted that there is
27 no scientific basis for the 10-month rolling predation window.

1 152. Unlike previous protocols, the 2017 Protocol includes a bibliography, which
2 cites to a couple of social science studies about human motivations, the population model used
3 to support the plan (developed jointly by Wielgus and WDFW), the materials developed by
4 Western Wildlife Outreach in 2014 on non-lethal deterrence measures, and the Harper Study,
5 which noted that the act of attempting to kill wolves may change behavior of the pack even if
6 unsuccessful. Notably, the 2017 Protocol did not cite to any scientific support for its hypothesis
7 that using incremental measures to kill wolves faster would decrease either livestock predations
8 or wolf deaths. Nor did it show any consideration of the mounting science showing that lethal
9 control is, at best, ineffective.

10 **N. WDFW Issues Order to Kill Members of the Smackout Pack**

11 153. The Smackout wolf pack was confirmed as a pack in 2011, in a forested,
12 mountainous range in Stevens County and Pend Oreille County, including a portion of the
13 Colville National Forest. Following the death of the pack's breeding adult male, other wolves
14 dispersed from the pack and formed the Dirty Shirt, Carpenter Ridge, and Ruby Creek packs.
15 According to the WDFW survey conducted at the end of 2015, the pack had a minimum of
16 eight wolves, including a successful breeding pair.

17 154. If the 2017 Protocol had been in place, it is likely that the Smackout Pack would
18 not have survived the 2016 grazing season. WDFW reported a confirmed wolf predation
19 resulting in a dead calf on national forest land on September 21, 2016, a probable wolf predation
20 resulting in a dead cow on national forest land on September 28, 2016, and a confirmed wolf
21 predation resulting in an injured calf on private property on September 29, 2016. No further
22 predations were reported in 2016, so the requirements to kill wolves under the 2016 Protocol
23 were not met.

24 155. There were also no predations reported in spring 2017. However, WDFW
25 reported that wolves started harassing cattle in late June, and on June 30, a ranch employee
26 killed one wolf that the employee said was in the act of attacking livestock.

1 156. On July 20, 2017, WDFW reported that there had been an additional confirmed
2 predation attributed to the Smackout Pack on July 18, 2017, resulting in an injured calf. It was
3 only the first confirmed predation of the 2017 grazing season, but under the 2017 Protocol, it
4 counted as the pack's last strike. By a margin of just a few days, the predations from the
5 previous year counted within the 2017 Protocol's rolling 10-month window, bringing the total
6 confirmed and probable predations attributed to the pack to four.

7 157. On July 20, 2017, WDFW announced that it had authorized the killing of wolves
8 from the Smackout Pack. WDFW later reported that it killed a female pup on July 21, 2017,
9 and a female adult on July 30, 2017. WDFW also reported one additional predation on July 22,
10 2017, of a calf that was believed to have been killed before July 20, 2017. On July 31, 2017,
11 WDFW reported that was entering an "evaluation period" to determine if it would kill additional
12 wolves.

13 158. In its July 20, 2017, announcement that it had begun operations to kill members
14 of the Smackout Pack, WDFW noted that over the previous two months, radio signals from
15 GPS collars attached to two of the pack's members indicated that those wolves were frequently
16 within a mile of livestock. This prolonged and frequent proximity, at this time of year, suggests
17 the livestock may have been pastured very close to the pack's den or rendezvous site, or both.
18 However, to date, WDFW has not released information on either the location of all the
19 predations¹⁸ or the locations of the pack's known den or rendezvous sites.

20 159. On September 21, 2017, WDFW issued a report on the Smackout Pack
21 operation, which claims that the "approach highlighted in the protocol of both proactive and
22 responsive nonlethal deterrents, and the incremental removal, appeared to have the intended
23 effect of changing the Smackout pack behavior." WDFW claimed that the three livestock
24 owners involved in the Smackout Pack conflict had implemented a number of non-lethal

25 _____
26 ¹⁸ In its final report on the Smackout Pack action, issued on September 21, 2017, WDFW provided a map that
27 shows the location of 3 of the 5 Smackout Pack predations, but did not provide the location of the remaining two
because they took place on private land.

1 deterrents during the conflict, including using range riders under contract with WDFW,
2 maintaining sanitation by removing sick or injured cattle, and using “fox lights.” By WDFW’s
3 own account of the facts, there is no way to determine whether these deterrents were responsible
4 for stopping predations this year, leaving WDFW’s decision to kill two Smackout Pack wolves
5 after only one predation this grazing season both premature and unnecessary.

6 160. As of September 25, 2017, WDFW had attributed two predations to the
7 Smackout Pack this year. In return, WDFW had killed two wolves, including a pup.

8 **O. WDFW Issues Order to Eliminate Sherman Pack**

9 161. The Sherman wolves split from the Profanity Peak Pack in early 2016. The
10 Sherman Pack included about five wolves at the start of 2017, with a range in the forested,
11 rugged terrain of the Colville National Forest.

12 162. On August 25, 2017, WDFW issued an order to kill members of the Sherman
13 Pack, because there had been four predations in a ten-month period of cattle from the Diamond
14 M Ranch. WDFW reported that the livestock owner had satisfied the 2017 Protocol by using
15 range riders and calving outside the grazing area, and summarily reported that it expected
16 predations to continue and that the lethal removal was not expected to harm the wolf
17 population’s ability to reach recovery objectives. WDFW stated it was authorizing “incremental
18 removal,” and that the “last estimate of pack size from the 2016 survey was 5 wolves.”
19 However, at the time, WDFW knew that only two wolves remained of the Sherman Pack, and
20 that “incremental removal” would result in the destruction of the pack.

21 163. In issuing the order to destroy the Sherman Pack, WDFW did little more than
22 check the boxes on the 2017 Protocol, ignoring its knowledge that some of those boxes were
23 meaningless. WDFW found that Diamond M had adopted two proactive deterrence measures,
24 as required by the 2017 Protocol, but this finding was based on Diamond M’s self-reporting,
25 with no attempt by WDFW to verify the accuracy of the information. As one deterrence
26 measure, WDFW claimed that Diamond M’s calves were born “outside of occupied wolf
27 range.” But WDFW failed to verify that all of Diamond M’s calves were actually born outside

1 the wolf range, instead basing this finding on “the producer’s business model,” which entails
2 its calves generally being born early in another location before trucking them in to the grazing
3 allotments.

4 164. WDFW also credited Diamond M with a non-lethal deterrent for the five range
5 riders paid by WDFW to rotate through its grazing allotments, even though it knew this “human
6 presence” was not meaningful. The contract range rider hired by WDFW indicated in June 2017
7 that he and the four range riders he supervised were watching cattle for seven producers over
8 four counties. In their July 2017 report, this range rider group indicates it had covered the
9 territories of the Profanity, Sherman, Wedge, Smackout, and Dirty Shirt packs, which cover
10 roughly 1.2 million acres. Diamond M’s grazing allotments alone are 30,000 to 40,000 acres of
11 extremely rough terrain, which is inaccessible, even by horseback, and upon which even
12 Diamond M is unable to find its cattle. Indeed, the logs of the range riders hired by Diamond
13 M indicated on some days that they “saw no cattle,” while on others they noted only “cattle
14 seen,” with no indication of how many.

15 165. On September 1, 2017, WDFW reported it had killed one member of the
16 Sherman Pack. Although the pack had thus been destroyed, WDFW nevertheless reported that
17 it had begun an “evaluation period” to determine if its action “changed the pack’s behavior.” It
18 did not acknowledge in any of its weekly reports that the pack had been destroyed. Instead, on
19 October 20, 2017, WDFW announced that the “Sherman pack’s behavior had responded to the
20 approach highlighted in the protocol of using non-lethal deterrents, and, if necessary,
21 incremental removal.”

22 **P. WDFW Issues the Togo Pack Kill Order**

23 166. On October 27, 2017, a livestock producer shot and killed an adult female wolf
24 that he claimed was chasing his livestock in Northern Ferry County. WDFW found that the
25 action was a valid “caught-in-the-act” shooting, which is allowed under WAC 220-440-080.
26 WDFW reported that the “incident occurred outside any known pack territories.”
27

1 167. On or about November 2, 2017, WDFW was contacted by a different livestock
2 producer about an injured calf discovered about three miles from where the wolf had been
3 killed. In a November 9, 2017 update on its website, WDFW reported its conclusion that the
4 calf had been injured by a wolf, and indicated that “[i]nformation on the use of deterrence
5 measures will be provided in our next monthly wolf report.”

6 168. In its next monthly wolf report, issued on or about November 14, 2017, WDFW
7 reported that the producer involved in the November 2, 2017 incident “checks on the cattle
8 multiple times every day during feedings,” that he has “used range riders periodically this year
9 and last year,” that he “removes sick or injured cattle from the area,” and that he receives
10 information from WDFW on the location of nearby collared wolves. The report provided no
11 specifics about any proactive wolf deterrence measures that were in place at the time of the
12 predation, or in the location where the predation took place.


13 169. In the November 2017 monthly report, WDFW also indicated that the same
14 producer had contacted the agency on November 8 after discovery a calf that had been killed.
15 WDFW reported that it had confirmed that this was a wolf predation, which again had occurred
16 less than three miles from the October 27, 2017 wolf shooting. It did not provide any further
17 details about any proactive deterrence measures used by this producer.

18 170. WDFW reports that it suspected pack activity in this area, which is now
19 considered the Togo Pack territory, back in 2016. However, it could not verify the presence of
20 wolves during the summer or autumn of 2016. WDFW focused on the area when performing
21 its wolf pack count during the winter of 2016-2017, but did not detect any pack activity. During
22 the 2017 grazing season, a WDFW contract range rider worked with a producer in the area to
23 investigate reports of wolves, but was again unable to document any verifiable pack activity.

24 171. WDFW wolf biologists spent additional time during the winter of 2017-2018
25 trying to confirm the presence a wolf pack in the area. In February 2018, WDFW was able to
26 confirm through tracks and scat that at least two wolves were traveling together in the area. As
27

1 a result, it first recognized the Togo Pack in the 2017 Annual Report, released on March 30,
2 2018, and listed it as having two members.

3 172. Although WDFW has not posted specifics about the Togo Pack's range on its
4 website, the map in the 2017 Annual Report indicates that the pack is in North Ferry County,
5 near the Canadian border and next to the territory of the Wedge Pack, and in an area
6 encompassing the rugged terrain of the Colville National Forest. WDFW reports that the Togo
7 Pack spans a wide area stretching across the Kettle Range Mountains.



22
23 173. At the time that it identified the Togo Pack, WDFW did not indicate that the
24 pack had been responsible for any cattle predations. WDFW has never raised the issue of
25 retroactively attributing predations from a general geographic area to a newly formed pack with
26 the WAG, and the possibility that WDFW might do this was not addressed in the Plan, the EIS,
27 or the protocols released in 2014, 2016, or 2017. To the contrary, WDFW has expressed in prior

1 court proceedings that when it does not have a collar on a member of a pack, it is unable to
2 track that pack for the purposes of attributing predations or executing on kill orders.

3 174. However, in a May 24, 2018 update to its website, WDFW reported that the
4 Togo Pack was responsible for a dead calf that was discovered on May 20 in a federal grazing
5 allotment in northern Ferry County. At the same time, WDFW declared that this was the “third
6 confirmed depredation involving the Togo pack in the past seven months,” announcing for the
7 first time that it was counting the November 2 and 8 predations against the Togo Pack. WDFW
8 did not provide any details about how it knew that the November predations were attributable
9 to the Togo wolves.

10 175. According to a May 23, 2018 article in the Capital Press, the calf killed on May
11 20 was just one and half weeks old, and was found on a federal grazing allotment within the
12 Colville National Forest. In its May 24, 2018 update, WDFW reported that the producer was
13 not employing any proactive deterrence measures, other than “checking on his cattle daily.”
14 WDFW reported that it had recommended to the producer that range riders would be the most
15 effective deterrent, given that the operation is in unfenced rugged terrain, and that the producer
16 thereafter made plans to rotate range riders through his grazing allotment.

17 176. In an article on May 24, 2018, the Capital Press reported that because the
18 producer had not met the requirement of deploying at least two deterrence measures before the
19 May 20, 2018 predation, WDFW would not count the predation toward the minimum threshold
20 needed before it will kill wolves. The article said that Martorello had indicated that WDFW
21 would review the November predations to see if they met the criteria to count toward the lethal
22 removal threshold.

23 177. In a telephone discussion with a representative from the Center on May 25, 2018,
24 Martorello confirmed that the May 20 predation would not count against the Togo Pack. He
25 indicated that he did not know what specific nonlethal deterrent measures were in place at the
26 time of the November 2017 predations, but said that one of WDFW’s conflict specialists might
27 know, and promised to get back to the Center with that information. After a follow-up email on

1 May 25, 2017, Martorello indicated that WDFW was working on getting a written response to
2 the Center, and that he anticipated replying by the following week. However, on June 7,
3 Martorello responded that the Center would need to submit its requests for information through
4 the public disclosure process. The Center submitted a public disclosure request for this
5 information on June 25, 2018.

6 178. In the same telephone conversation, Martorello indicated that WDFW decided
7 to attribute the November predations to the Togo Pack as a result of proximity and reported
8 sightings of wolves in the area by locals. But he did not disagree that WDFW had failed to
9 collect any scat from the area in 2017 which could have matched the predations to the Togo
10 Pack, or deny that the predations could have been by lone wolves coming over from nearby
11 wilderness areas in British Columbia.

12 179. In its July 2018 monthly wolf report, released on or about August 2, 2018,
13 WDFW reported that one of its wolf biologists was able to locate a significant amount of wolf
14 signs from the area in between the locations of the May 20 predation and the November 2017
15 predation—which it said was normally associated with wolf denning activity. On June 2, 2018,
16 WDFW caught and collared a black adult male wolf in the area of the May 20 predation—
17 marking the first time that it has had a tracking collar on one of the Togo Pack wolves.

18 180. In an August 11, 2018 website update, WDFW reported that the local sheriff's
19 office had reported a dead cow on a federal grazing allotment in the Togo Pack territory on
20 August 8, 2018. WDFW reported that it had confirmed that the death was a result of wolf
21 predation, and that the producer had left the cow on the allotment, “[d]ue to the remote location
22 and rugged terrain.” WDFW reported that the producer had delayed turnout until June, used
23 Fox lights on his private pasture, removed sick or injured cattle from his allotment, and used
24 one or more range riders each day. However, WDFW did not explain how the use of Fox lights
25 in a private pasture were relevant to the August 8 predation, which occurred on federal grazing
26 lands. Nor did WDFW explain how many range riders were being used, over what territory,
27 and whether they were able to monitor all of the cattle each day—or, how the producer could

1 claim to be removing “sick or injured cattle” from his allotment at the same time that it reported
2 that the dead cow had been left out in the allotment because the territory was too remote and
3 rugged.

4 181. In the same update, WDFW also reported that it had received notification August
5 9 from the same producer about another calf that was injured on the federal grazing allotment,
6 and that it had confirmed that these injuries were also the result of wolf predation.

7 182. WDFW’s update reported that the pack consisted of at least two adult wolves,
8 and possibly a third, and that it had produced an unknown number of pups this spring. Although
9 WDFW claimed that the Togo Pack had thus been responsible for five predations in less than
10 10 months, it did not indicate that it was issuing a kill order, but that Director Susewind had
11 directed the staff to confirm the number of adults in the pack and learn more about its activities
12 before considering further action.

13 183. On August 13, 2018, WDFW issued another website update, indicating that it
14 was continuing to gather information on the Togo Pack before making a decision on further
15 action. In particular, WDFW indicated that it had deployed remote cameras to try to determine
16 the number of wolves in the pack, and set traps to try to radio collar additional wolves. WDFW
17 reiterated that the Togo Pack consisted of at least two adult wolves, who had produced an
18 unknown number of pups, and that it had received unconfirmed reports of a potential third wolf.

19 184. On August 20, 2018, WDFW issued the Togo Pack Kill Order. The Togo Pack
20 Kill Order authorized incremental removal of the wolves from the Togo Pack. It provides that
21 the last estimate of pack size was two adult wolves and an unknown number of pups.

22 185. In the Togo Pack Kill Order, WDFW reported that there had been another
23 predation reported on August 18, 2018, and that WDFW had confirmed a wolf depredation to
24 a calf belonging to the same livestock producer involved in the August 8 and August 9
25 predations. Based on this predation, WDFW alleges that the Togo Pack had been responsible
26 for three predations within 30 days, and six predations within the past 10 months. WDFW
27 indicated that the livestock producer had used Fox lights on his private pasture to deter wolves,

1 although once again, the predation had occurred off private pasture lands on a federal grazing
2 allotment. WDFW also indicated the producer had removed sick or injured cattle from the
3 allotment, deployed one or more range riders to help check the cattle, and moved the cattle out
4 of areas with higher wolf activity.

5
6 **FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

7 ***Against All Respondents***

8 **SEPA Violation: Failure to Perform a Threshold Determination**

9 186. Petitioners incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

10 187. Under SEPA, a threshold environmental determination is required before any
11 action is taken by a state agency. WAC 197-11-310; *see* WAC 197-11-704 (definition of
12 “action” includes, *inter alia*, agency decisions on management activities that directly modify
13 the environment and agency adoption of any plan or policy governing the development of a
14 series of actions).

15 188. A threshold environmental determination requires an agency to determine
16 whether a proposed action is likely to have a probable significant adverse environmental impact
17 and to consider mitigation measures. The threshold determination is “critical for full
18 implementation of SEPA’s mandate.” *Lassila v. Wenatchee*, 89 Wn.2d 804, 813, 576 P.2d 54
19 (1978). The SEPA responsible official is required to determine whether all or part of the action,
20 as well as alternatives or impacts, have been analyzed in a previously prepared environmental
21 assessment document. The responsible official is also required to take into account the absolute
22 quantitative effects of a proposal, whether several marginal impacts when considered together
23 may result in a significant adverse impact, whether the proposal affects an endangered species,
24 and whether the proposal establishes a precedent for future actions with significant effects. An
25 SEIS is required if the lead agency reasonably believes that a proposal may have a significant
26 adverse impact. WAC 197-11-330.

1 189. Despite a request from Petitioners in March 2017, Respondents refused to
2 initiate SEPA review on the 2017 Protocol. Respondents have refused to conduct a threshold
3 determination before issuing the Togo Pack Kill Order, or the 2017 Protocol on which it relies
4 for guidance. Respondents thus failed to determine whether the Togo Pack Kill Order, and other
5 orders based on the 2017 Protocol, would have a significant environmental impact or to
6 consider alternatives such as an exclusive focus on non-lethal control. As the SEPA responsible
7 official, Wood failed to take into account relevant factors, including the absolute quantitative
8 effects of the Togo Pack Kill Order, the quantitative effects of the 2017 Protocol on which it
9 relied for guidance, and whether the Togo Pack Kill Order and the 2017 Protocol establish a
10 precedent for future actions with regard to an endangered species.

11 190. Respondents' failure to conduct a threshold environmental determination is a
12 violation of SEPA.

13 191. WDFW should be enjoined from enforcing the Togo Pack Kill Order, or issuing
14 any further kill orders, until it has conducted the required threshold determination for a protocol
15 to guide any such future orders.

16 192. Petitioners are entitled to an award of costs, attorneys' fees, and other expenses
17 associated with this litigation pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, RCW 4.84.350.

18 **SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF**

19 *Against All Respondents*

20 **SEPA Violation: Failure to Produce a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement**

21 193. Petitioners incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

22 194. The purpose of SEPA is to provide decision makers and the public information
23 about potential adverse impacts of a proposed action, and ensure decisions are made after
24 thorough scientific analysis, consideration of expert comments, and public scrutiny.

25 195. Under SEPA, an agency must consider environmental information—impacts,
26 alternatives, and mitigation—before committing to a particular course of action. WAC 197-11-
27 055(2)(c). SEPA requires an agency to consider total environmental and ecological factors to

1 the fullest extent when taking major actions significantly affecting the environment. The
2 procedural requirements of SEPA are designed to provide full environmental information and
3 are to be invoked whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a
4 reasonable probability. *Moss v. City of Bellingham*, 109 Wn. App. 6, 19, 31 P.3d 703 (2001).
5 When describing the environmental impacts of a proposal, the agency should consider direct,
6 indirect, and cumulative impacts.

7 196. Environmental review may occur in phases. WAC 197-11-060. Phased review
8 assists agencies and the public to focus on issues that are ready for decision and exclude from
9 consideration issues not yet ready for decision. The Plan and the EIS were part of a phased
10 environmental review.

11 197. SEPA requires an SEIS if there are substantial changes to a proposal which are
12 likely to have significant adverse environmental impacts or when new information indicates a
13 proposal's probable significant adverse environmental impacts were not previously covered by
14 the range of alternatives in existing environmental documents. WAC 197-11-600.

15 198. The EIS for the Plan provides, "Specific actions that may be proposed in the
16 future relating to gray wolf management in Washington would be evaluated under a
17 supplemental environmental impact statement process." The EIS for the Plan does not weigh
18 the individual or cumulative environmental impact of any specific criteria for the lethal removal
19 of wolves while they are a state endangered species; the impact of the standards used by WDFW
20 under the 2017 Protocol to execute the Togo Pack Kill Order; or the impact of WDFW's wolf
21 killing program as outlined by the 2017 Protocol. The EIS did not evaluate any wolf killing
22 program, or weigh the impacts of alternatives to any such program.

23 199. The Togo Pack Kill Order is a specific action related to gray wolf management
24 that was not considered by the EIS. The 2017 Protocol, on which the Togo Pack Kill Order
25 relies, outlines a wolf killing program that was not considered by the EIS. The Togo Pack Kill
26 Order and the 2017 Protocol represent a substantial change to the EIS likely to have significant
27 adverse direct and cumulative environmental impacts.

1 205. Petitioners incorporate by reference all preceding paragraphs.

2 206. Action by an agency that is arbitrary and capricious is void under the APA. RCW
3 34.05.570. Agency action is arbitrary and capricious if it is “willful and unreasoning and taken
4 without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.” *Washington Indep. Tel. Ass’n v.*
5 *Washington Utils. and Transp. Com’n*, 148 Wn.2d 887, 905, 64 P.3d 606 (2003).

6 207. Through the Togo Pack Kill Order, WDFW has violated the requirements of its
7 2017 Protocol, by failing to ensure that meaningful non-lethal deterrent measures were in place
8 at the time of the alleged wolf predations, and by retroactively attributing predations to a pack
9 that occurred before it was recognized by WDFW, and before any of its members could be
10 tracked.

11 208. In addition, the Togo Pack Kill Order, and the 2017 Protocol on which it relies,
12 is arbitrary and capricious because it is inconsistent with the limitations of the Wolf
13 Conservation and Management Plan formally adopted by the Commission, which, among other
14 relevant provisions, requires the agency to minimize wolf mortality as a result of lethal control;
15 requires an emphasis on non-lethal management techniques; provides that lethal control may
16 only be used when non-lethal deterrence measures have been tried but failed to resolve the
17 conflict; provides that lethal control may only be used on a case-by-case basis after full
18 evaluation of all the relevant circumstances; and allows for the use of lethal control only
19 inasmuch as it serves the greater purpose of wolf recovery by reducing the illegal poaching of
20 wolves.

21 209. The Togo Pack Kill Order is arbitrary and capricious because it purports to rely
22 upon, but takes action that is inconsistent with, the guidance of the 2017 Protocol. The Togo
23 Pack Kill Order does not meet the criteria established by the 2017 Protocol, and the criteria in
24 the 2017 Protocol are themselves arbitrary and capricious and in contravention of the Plan. The
25 2017 Protocol was developed through a flawed advisory group process, in which WDFW
26 impeded the flow of accurate information and suppressed science that contradicted its
27 assumptions.

1 210. The Togo Pack Kill Order is arbitrary and capricious and in contravention of the
2 Plan, because it would authorize the killing of one or more wolves in a reproductive pack, even
3 though the pack has only two confirmed adults and pups who are less than six months old and
4 unable to survive on their own. Killing one or more wolves from the Togo Pack would likely
5 have the effect of causing the pups from the pack to starve.

6 211. WDFW took action through the Togo Pack Kill Order without adequate and
7 reasonable independent investigation, based on flawed and incomplete information. The Togo
8 Pack Kill Order was issued in contravention to the provisions of the Plan, because it authorizes
9 the killing of one or more adult wolves when there are perhaps only two wolves in the pack,
10 and WDFW failed to emphasize non-lethal deterrents,

11 212. Both the Togo Pack Kill Order and the 2017 Protocol on which it relies for
12 guidance fail to consider the attending facts and circumstances, including the scientific evidence
13 that state-sponsored lethal control not only fails to reduce wolf-livestock conflicts and the
14 illegal poaching of wolves—but that, to the contrary, it might actually increase livestock
15 predation and wolf poaching. In particular, WDFW ignored and/or actively suppressed
16 prevailing scientific research indicating that non-lethal control measures are the most effective
17 means of reducing predations; that the single most important factor in predicting wolf
18 predations is distance between livestock and wolf den sites and rendezvous points; that lethal
19 control measures are not effective at reducing wolf predations, but may actually increase them;
20 and that lethal control measures by the state have a negative impact on public perception of
21 wolves, and actually increase illegal poaching of wolves by the public.

22 213. The Togo Pack Kill Order should be declared invalid and its implementation
23 enjoined as arbitrary and capricious agency action under RCW 34.05.570(4).

24 214. WDFW should be enjoined from issuing further orders that, like the Togo Pack
25 Kill Order, are based on the guidance of the 2017 Protocol.

26 215. Petitioners are entitled to an award of costs, attorneys' fees, and other expenses
27 associated with this litigation pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act, RCW 4.84.350.

1 **PETITIONERS' PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

2 *Petitioners respectfully request that this Court:*

3 1. Declare that WDFW violated SEPA and the APA in purporting to authorize the
4 lethal removal of one or more members of the Togo Pack;

5 2. Declare that any future kill orders are invalid until WDFW has completed a
6 threshold SEPA determination of significance regarding agency lethal wolf removal actions;

7 3. Declare that any future kill orders are invalid until WDFW has completed an
8 SEIS on a protocol that sets forth the criteria for such orders;

9 4. Order WDFW to withdraw the Togo Pack Kill Order;

10 5. Enjoin WDFW and its agents from killing the remaining members of the Togo
11 Pack;

12 6. Enjoin WDFW and its agents from issuing any further kill orders, or taking
13 actions to kill any additional wolves, until such time as WDFW demonstrates to this Court that
14 it has adequately complied with the law;

15 7. Award Petitioners their costs of suit and attorneys' fees; and

16 8. Grant Petitioners such other relief as the Court deems just and equitable.

1 DATED: August 20, 2018

2 LANE POWELL PC

3
4 

5 By _____

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PETITION - 66
No. _____

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1
2 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

3 Pursuant to RCW 9A.72.085, the undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under
4 the laws of the State of Washington, that on the 13th day of August 2018, the document attached
5 hereto was presented to the Clerk of the Court for filing and uploading to the CM/ECF system
6 and served upon the attorney and parties listed below in the following manner:

7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	Bob Ferguson, Attorney General Attn: Division of Fish, Wildlife and Parks 1125 Washington Street SE Olympia, WA 98501	<input type="checkbox"/> by Thurston County ECF <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission <input type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery
	Kelly Susewind, Department of Fish and Wildlife Natural Resources Building 1111 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98501	<input type="checkbox"/> by Thurston County ECF <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail <input type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery
	Lisa Wood, SEPA Coordinator Dept. of Fish and Wildlife Natural Resources Building 1111 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98501	<input type="checkbox"/> by Thurston County ECF <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail <input type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery
	Department of Fish and Wildlife Natural Resources Building 1111 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98501	<input type="checkbox"/> by Thurston County ECF <input type="checkbox"/> by Electronic Mail <input type="checkbox"/> by Facsimile Transmission <input type="checkbox"/> by First Class Mail <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> by Hand Delivery <input type="checkbox"/> by Overnight Delivery

23 Executed on the 20th day of August 2018, at Seattle, Washington.

24
25 s/ Patti Lane

26 Patti Lane, Legal Assistant

EXHIBIT A

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**Kelly
Susewind
Director**

Gray Wolf Conservation and Management

The Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife publishes reports detailing the wolf conservation and management activities undertaken by the department. Click on the title of an update below to see the complete article.

Available updates: [2018](#) | [2017](#) | [2016](#)

2018 Updates

[Expand All](#) | [Collapse All](#)

WDFW plans to take lethal action in response to depredation on cattle by Togo wolf pack

August 20, 2018

On August 18, 2018, the Washington Department of Fish and Wildlife (WDFW) documented the third wolf depredation by the Togo pack within the last 30 days, which is also the sixth wolf depredation by the pack within the last 10 months. For the most recent depredation, WDFW officials confirmed that one or more wolves were responsible for injuring a calf on a U.S. Forest Service grazing allotment in Ferry County. The recent depredation has prompted Director Kelly Susewind to initiate the lethal removal provisions of the Wolf Conservation and Management plan (Wolf Plan) and wolf-livestock interactions protocol (Protocol).

The six depredations by the Togo pack include:

Depredation #1 - November 2, 2017

On November 2, 2017 WDFW was contacted by a livestock producer (herein Producer 1; note Producer 1 is a family operation with multiple owners) in Ferry County about an injured calf that was discovered less than three miles from where the unmarked female wolf was killed under caught-in-the-act authority on October 27, 2017 (see November 9, 2017 public update at https://wdfw.wa.gov/conservation/gray_wolf/updates.php?year=2017). A WDFW contracted range rider heard that there was a possible injured calf a day prior, but the calf could not be located at that time. Once the calf was found, it was taken to a holding pen for the investigation. The Ferry County Sheriff and WDFW management staff were notified and on November 3, department staff investigated a reported livestock depredation. A Ferry County Officer was also in attendance for the depredation investigation.

The calf had injuries to both rear flanks and on both rear legs between the pin and hocks. Injuries on the rear flanks included bite lacerations and puncture wounds. Hemorrhaging was noted near bite lacerations in all four locations. After the wound was cleaned and dead tissue was removed, significant hemorrhaging was noted inside the wound, specifically around the wound margins. After a field examination of the injuries to the calf, it was determined to be a Confirmed Wolf Depredation. The determination was based on evidence and recent wolf activity in the area. Repeated reports from Producer 1 and WDFW contracted range rider included recent wolf howls, tracks, scat, and cattle grouping behavior in the pasture where the injured calf was located.

Proactive non-lethal deterrence measures - In this incident, Producer 1 met the expectation of deploying at least two proactive deterrence measures suitable for the operation, which were best suited for the operation and for a sufficient amount of time for the measures to be effective. Those included:

- Producer 1's cattle were on private fenced lands,
- Producer 1 checks on the cattle multiple times every day during feedings,
- Producer 1 removes sick or injured cattle from the area,
- Producer 1 also used range riders periodically in 2017 (as well as 2016), and
- Producer 1 also received locations of nearby collared wolves via WDFW's Sensitive Wildlife Data Sharing Agreement.

Responsive non-lethal deterrence measures - After the investigation on November 3, WDFW staff and Producer 1 considered potential responsive deterrent measures consisting of fladry, fox lights and increased range riding activity. The producer decided to move cattle to a different private large fenced grazing pasture, utilize fox lights and agreed to increase range rider activity.

Depredation #2 - November 8, 2017

On November 8, WDFW was contacted by Producer 1 and he reported a calf carcass that was discovered while moving cattle in a different private large fenced grazing pasture. The calf was tarped by Producer 1, a hired hand, and range rider for the pending investigation. Wolf tracks were reported at the scene. The Ferry County Sheriff and WDFW management staff were notified that field staff were responding to conduct a depredation investigation per the 2017 Wolf-Livestock Interaction Protocol. On November 9, WDFW conducted an investigation, accompanied by a Ferry County Deputy and WDFW Contracted Range Rider. After a field investigation and necropsy of the calf carcass, it was determined to be a Confirmed Wolf Depredation. The determination was based on bite lacerations with associated hemorrhaging, signs of a struggle near the calf carcass, large canid tracks near the calf carcass, recent wolf activity in the area, and the confirmed wolf depredation on November 2 in the area.

Proactive non-lethal deterrence measures - In this incident, Producer 1 met the expectation of deploying at least two proactive deterrence measures suitable for the operation, that were best suited for the operation and for a sufficient amount of time for the measures to be effective. Producer 1 continued using the following non-lethal deterrence measures:

- Cattle on private fenced lands,
- Checked on the cattle multiple times every day during feedings,
- Removed sick or injured cattle from the area,
- Utilize fox lights ,
- Used range riders periodically in 2018, and

- Receiving locations of nearby collared wolves via WDFW's Sensitive Wildlife Data Sharing Agreement.

Depredation #3 - May 20, 2018

A woodcutter reported the incident to the producer (herein Producer 2), who had seen the calf alive earlier in the day and who then found the carcass and reported the incident to WDFW. The incident was on a federal grazing allotment in northern Ferry County, in the same vicinity as the November 2 and 8, 2017 wolf depredations. A woodcutter working in the area said he approached a gate that separates U.S. Forest Service land from private property, where he heard a cow bawling and saw a black wolf running from the area where the calf was found. A WDFW official arrived later on May 20 and conducted an investigation with help from a wildlife specialist employed by Stevens and Ferry counties.

The investigators found that the calf had bite lacerations and puncture wounds to both rear quarters, upper rear legs, neck and sternum, consistent with predation by a wolf. Hemorrhaging, indicating the calf was initially alive during the encounter, was visible near the bite wounds and was also found in the left front armpit, where no lacerations or punctures were visible. Based on all available evidence, WDFW classified the event as a confirmed wolf depredation by one or more members of the Togo pack (note, the area was confirmed as the Togo wolf pack territory from surveys conducted in February 2018).

Proactive non-lethal deterrence measures - In this incident, Producer 2 did not meet the expectation of deploying at least two proactive deterrence measures that were best suited for the operation. Producer 2 deployed one proactive deterrence measure, which was checking on his cattle daily.

Responsive non-lethal deterrence measures - Department staff and Producer 2 discussed additional responsive deterrent strategies (including the use of fladry and Foxlights) but agreed the use of range riders would be the most effective additional deterrent, given that the cow-calf operation takes place in an unfenced allotment in rugged terrain. Later on May 20, Producer 2 deployed a range rider and made plans to rotate several riders from the Northeast Washington Wolf-Cattle Collaborative and WDFW to provide ongoing daily or near-daily coverage.

Depredation #4 - August 8, 2018

On August 8, 2018, WDFW was contacted by a wildlife specialist employed by the Stevens and Ferry County Sheriff's Offices about a potential wolf depredation on a U.S. Forest Service grazing allotment in the Togo pack wolf territory in Northern Ferry County, near Danville. Later that day, WDFW staff documented a deceased adult cow. The owner of the livestock is Producer 1. During the investigation, staff documented bite lacerations with associated hemorrhaging, signs of a struggle down a steep hill and around the cow carcass, and recent wolf activity in the area. Based on that evidence, they confirmed that the death was a depredation by one or more wolves from the Togo pack.

Due to the remote location and rugged terrain, the cow carcass was left on site. However, Producer 1 and his range rider - moved the cattle to a different area of the allotment. The cow was turned out as part of a cow-calf pair, but Producer 1 and range rider were not able to locate her calf.

Proactive non-lethal deterrence measures - In this incident, Producer 1 met the expectation of deploying at least two proactive deterrence measures that were best suited for the operation and for a sufficient amount of time for the measures to be effective. Throughout the 2018 grazing season Producer 1 used a variety of deterrent measures to protect the livestock. Producer 1:

- Delayed turnout until late June so the calves would be larger,
- Used Fox lights on his private pasture to deter wolves,
- Following turnout, he removed sick or injured cattle from the allotment,
- Deployed one or more range riders each day to help the producer check the cattle, and
- Moved the cattle when necessary out of areas with higher wolf activity to minimize interactions between wolves and livestock.

Responsive non-lethal deterrence measures - After the investigation on August 8, WDFW staff and Producer 1 considered potential responsive deterrent measures and decided additional range riders would be the best option for their operation.

Depredation #5 - August 9, 2018

On August 9, at about 9:30 p.m., the department was contacted by a WDFW-contracted range rider about another potential wolf depredation in the Togo pack area that injured a 350-pound calf owned by Producer 1. Producer 1 and range rider moved the injured calf, and the cow that accompanied it, from the allotment to a holding pen at their residence.

On August 10, WDFW staff and the two counties' wildlife specialist examined the cow and calf. The cow did not appear to have any injuries, but they documented bite lacerations to both of the calf's hamstrings and left flank, and puncture wounds and associated hemorrhaging to the left hindquarter and stomach. Based on the evidence and related factors, the investigators confirmed that the calf's injuries were the result of a wolf depredation and classified the event as a confirmed wolf depredation. The cow and injured calf were kept at the holding pen for monitoring.

Proactive non-lethal deterrence measures - In this incident, Producer 1 met the expectation of deploying at least two proactive deterrence measures that were best suited for the operation and for a sufficient amount of time for the measures to be effective. Producer 1 continued using the following non-lethal deterrence measures:

- Used Fox lights on his private pasture to deter wolves,
- Removed sick or injured cattle from the allotment, and
- Deployed one or more range riders each day to help the producer check the cattle, and
- Moved the cattle when necessary out of areas with higher wolf activity to minimize interactions between wolves and livestock.

Depredation #6 - August 18, 2018

On August 18, WDFW staff received a call from a wildlife specialist employed by the Stevens and Ferry County Sheriff's Offices about another potential wolf depredation in the Togo pack area that injured a 450-pound calf owned by Producer 1. Producer 1 and range rider moved the injured calf from the allotment, and the cow that accompanied it, from the allotment to a holding pen at their residence. USFS District Ranger was notified of the depredation event. WDFW staff conducted a field examination of the injured calf with the help of a squeeze chute. Present during the examination were the producers and counties' wildlife specialist.

On August 18, WDFW staff and the two counties' wildlife specialist examined the cow and calf. The injured calf had bite lacerations and bite puncture wounds to the outside lower left hindquarter, the left hamstring, the inside of the left hock and

the groin area. Adjacent to the bite puncture wounds on the hamstring and groin was hemorrhaging to the underlying tissue as indicated by severe swelling. Infection had also set in on two of the bite puncture wounds. The bite lacerations, bite puncture wounds and tissue hemorrhaging adjacent to the puncture wounds are consistent with a signature style wolf attack on cattle. Investigators confirmed that the calf's injuries were the result of a wolf depredation and classified the event as a confirmed wolf depredation.

Proactive non-lethal deterrence measures - In this incident, Producer 1 met the expectation of deploying at least two proactive deterrence measures that were best suited for the operation and for a sufficient amount of time for the measures to be effective. Producer 1 continued using the following non-lethal deterrence measures:

- Used Fox lights on his private pasture to deter wolves,
- Removed sick or injured cattle from the allotment,
- Deployed one or more range riders each day to help the producer check the cattle, and
- Moved the cattle when necessary out of areas with higher wolf activity to minimize interactions between wolves and livestock.

As a result of these events, the guidance provided in the Wolf Plan and Protocol the minimum threshold has been reached for consideration and possible implementation of lethal removal the Togo Pack. WDFW Director Kelly Susewind has authorized lethal removal of wolves from the pack, consistent with the Department's Wolf Plan and Protocol.

The goal of lethal removal from the Wolf Plan is to manage wolf-livestock conflicts in a way that minimizes livestock losses, while at the same time not negatively impacting the recovery or long-term perpetuation of a sustainable wolf population. Building on that, the purpose of lethal removal in the Togo pack is to change wolf pack behavior to reduce the potential for recurrent wolf depredations on livestock while continuing to promote wolf recovery (see Protocol). Consistent with the terms of the Wolf Plan and Protocol, the rationale for lethal removal in this case is as follows:

1. WDFW has documented three wolf depredation by the Togo pack within the last 30 days, which is also the sixth wolf depredation by the pack within the last 10 months. All six of the depredation events were confirmed wolf depredations (resulting in two dead calves, one dead cow, and three injured calves). The three most recent depredations occurred over approximately a 10 day period, AND
2. At least two (2) proactive deterrence measures, and responsive deterrence measures as deemed appropriate, have been implemented and failed to meet the goal of influencing/changing pack behavior to reduce the potential for recurrent wolf depredations on livestock in 5 of the six events, AND
3. WDFW expects depredations to continue based of the history of depredations and the appropriate non-lethal measures having been deployed resulting in no change of wolf behavior , AND
4. The Department has documented the use of appropriate deterrence measures and notified the public of wolf activities in a timely manner as outlined in the Protocol. WDFW provided updates on November 9, November 15, December 6, 2017 and May 24, June 1, 2018, August 11, and August 13, 2018 with information on all wolf depredations on livestock in the area, AND
5. The lethal removal of wolves is not expected to harm the wolf population's ability to reach recovery objectives statewide or within individual wolf recovery regions. Comparing the actual level of wolf mortality to that modeled in the Wolf Conservation and Management Plan (appendix G and H), actual average wolf mortality is about 8.4 animals or 10% of the estimated population. This level is well below the 28% baseline annual mortality assumed in the wolf plan model before any simulated wolf removals, which incorporates a 30% lethal removal mortality in addition to the baseline mortality. The model was conducted assuming the regional wolf population was at the regional recovery objective. The wolf population in the eastern recovery region has more than doubled the regional recovery objective.
6. As mentioned earlier, Director Susewind has authorized an incremental removal of pack members from the Togo Pack. The last estimate of pack size during August was 2 adult wolves and an unknown number of pups. The Department expects to begin the effort after 8 business hours following this public notice. The removal effort will likely continue for a two-week period or less.

The Department will use humane lethal removal methods consistent with state and federal laws. The objective of the methodology is to use the best methods available while considering human safety, humaneness to wolves, swift completion of the removal, weather, efficacy, and cost. Likely options include shooting from a helicopter, trapping, and shooting from the ground.

Per the Wolf plan Protocol, WDFW's approach is incremental removal, which has periods of active removals or attempts to remove wolves, followed by periods of evaluation to see if the goal of changing pack behavior was met. The first incremental removal will follow the provision of the Protocol in section 7.

The Department will keep the public informed about this activity through weekly updates. The Department will provide a final report to the public on any lethal removal action after the operation has concluded.

Packs Referenced: Togo

Togo pack update

August 13, 2018

Additional depredations documented by Togo wolf pack

August 11, 2018

Monthly Wolf Report - July 2018

August 2, 2018

Wolf Advisory Group conference call

July 31, 2018